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No More Adhocracies

Reforming the Management of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

BY STUART W. BOWEN, JR.

Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.
—George Santayana, *The Life of Reason*

There now exists a “golden hour” for repairing the U.S. approach to stabilization and reconstruction operations (SROs). The past 8 years of rebuilding efforts in Iraq, fraught as they were with painful and expensive challenges, yielded numerous hard lessons that provide a clear basis for comprehensive systemic reform.

The Iraq experience exposed the truth that the United States is not well structured to carry out overseas contingency rebuilding operations. Although the program’s failures forced the government to develop and implement remedies, these exigent amendments did not fix what was (and still is) a broken system. As discussed further in this article, the current evolution in SRO planning and management (as found in the Department of State’s Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations) does not necessarily promise the kind of interagency integration essential to SRO success.

Wise reform would concentrate the SRO mission into a single structure, pulling the scattered pieces of the current inchoate system together under a single roof. This integral structure, which could be called the U.S. Office for Contingency Operations (USOCO), should be given a clear interagency mandate to command and carry out contingency relief and reconstruction operations. To succeed, it would need sufficient capabilities and capacities to oversee the kind of programs and projects that arise during SROs. Equally important, it must be held accountable for results.

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., is Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.

The many responsibilities inherent in SROs are now divided chiefly among the Department of State, Department of Defense (DOD), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). None of the three, however, is clearly in charge. Lacking an integral approach and the resources to undergird it, this weak system was largely ineffective in Iraq. Furthermore, the delay in imposing meaningful oversight compounded program shortfalls, which increased waste. By applying Iraq's lessons and streamlining existing resources, a holistic reform of U.S. stabilization strategy could produce an integral system that would avert significant waste in future SROs, increase the likelihood of tactical success, and better protect U.S. national security interests abroad.

no U.S. Government office had the sufficient mandate to plan, execute, and oversee the Iraq reconstruction program

Over the past 7 years, my office, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), developed an extensive catalogue of lessons learned derived from the oversight of the U.S. reconstruction effort in Iraq.¹ Through more than 370 audits and inspections, 5 lessons-learned reports, and hundreds of investigations, SIGIR repeatedly revealed the deleterious effects that stem from improvised interagency coordination, poor unity of command, and fragmented unity of effort in SROs. What caused these shortfalls? Our work revealed the answer: No U.S. Government office had the sufficient mandate to plan, execute, and oversee the Iraq reconstruction program.

The enervating weaknesses within the U.S. approach forced the Iraq rebuilding program

into a concatenation of ad hoc organizations. But this *adhocracy* failed to coalesce into a coherent management whole. Reconstruction planners consequently had neither the reliable capacity nor the necessary resources to complete successful programs and projects.

Given the effort's improvised nature and its constant personnel turnover, U.S. strategy continually shifted speed and course, wasting resources along the way and exposing taxpayer dollars to fraud and abuse. The program's management gap caused hundreds of projects to fall short of promised results, leaving a legacy of bitter dissatisfaction among many Iraqis, which ultimately weakened U.S. national security interests.

The U.S. Government responded to the Iraq program's manifold shortfalls by executing assessments and applying targeted remedies. But these few small repairs, being ad hoc, proved inadequate to resolve what fundamentally was a systemic weakness. They could not produce, *in medias res*, a rescue plan for a program whose core flaw was structural, the consequence of an improvidently designed management architecture. Without clarity of mission, unity of command, unity of effort, and clear accountability, the system's center could not hold and the program came apart.

The Hard Lessons of Iraq

The 8-year, \$62-billion U.S. reconstruction effort in Iraq revealed that the U.S. Government's system for executing SROs is neither coherent nor integrated.² From the program's abbreviated preparatory stage in early 2003 to the earlier-than-expected transfer of sovereignty to the Interim Iraqi Government in mid-2004, temporary organizations, expediently created in response to urgent requirements, planned and managed the coalition's variegated

Iraqi employees construct water treatment facility funded by USAID in Baghdad



U.S. Air Force (Ashley Brokop)

rebuilding initiatives. This ever-shifting ad hoc-acy lacked the expertise and capacity necessary to implement the coalition's ambitious reconstruction agenda. It was like a thousand untrained plate-spinners trying to perform during an earthquake, with expected results: lots of broken china.

In late January 2003, just 2 months before the coalition's invasion, President George W. Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 24, *Post-War Iraq Reconstruction*. In what some would later describe as a "palace coup" (because it co-opted the interagency planning process), the directive put DOD exclusively in charge of managing Iraq's relief and reconstruction. To oversee the effort, NSPD 24 established an ad hoc entity called the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). With virtually no staff and just 2 months to prepare, retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner, ORHA's first and only director, was given full responsibility for Iraq's postwar recovery.³

NSPD 24 further provided that USAID "would handle much of the humanitarian and reconstruction work, while ORHA would be in charge of funding."⁴ This bifurcated the rebuilding program's management responsibilities, with DOD in charge of funding and civilians in charge of policy—an awkward and waste-inducing division that would recur repeatedly over the next 8 years to the program's detriment. But General Garner and his team would not be a part of these subsequent iterations.

In early May 2003, barely having begun its work, ORHA was supplanted by another temporary structure, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), led by retired Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III. The CPA

quickly shouldered all relief and reconstruction responsibilities, including a wide range of duties that traditionally fell within the scope of State and USAID. This caused an operational tension, particularly with USAID, which would burden the rebuilding mission for years to come.

As a startup enterprise, the CPA had neither the time nor the resources to plan effectively for what quickly became the largest rebuilding program in history, one much larger than originally envisioned by the President or his planners. The extraordinary growth in spending levels illustrates the breathtaking scope of change that occurred with the advent of the CPA. In early 2003, the United States anticipated spending about \$2 billion in taxpayer dollars on Iraq's reconstruction, with Iraq shouldering the remaining costs. But by the end of July of that year, planned U.S. expenditures had increased ninefold.⁵

While some of the challenges faced by Ambassador Bremer's team were beyond his control—most notably, the security situation's collapse—a well-developed contingency rebuilding plan implemented by an established interagency management office (such as USOCO) could have brought a more robust capacity to bear on the many problems that erupted in Iraq in 2003–2004. Moreover, such an entity would have been better prepared to engineer timely and effective adjustments.

If USOCO had existed at the outset of the Iraq program, the United States might have avoided the waste of billions of taxpayer dollars. Furthermore, the unity of effort that USOCO presumably could have applied would have ensured better effect from the massive outlays in Iraq. Ultimately, ORHA and then the CPA became necessary because no established structure existed in 2003 to

manage SROs. That void, to a certain extent, still exists.

Recent Reform Initiatives

In July 2005, the U.S. Government implemented ameliorative efforts to mitigate problems in Iraq. Pursuant to Presidential directive, the Secretary of State created State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), designating it to "lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations."⁶ S/CRS was supposed to solve the "who's in charge question" regarding SROs. It did not.

From the outset, S/CRS struggled to find its footing. First, it failed to receive the funding necessary to succeed; then it found itself marginalized within State's turf-conscious bureaucracy. Though eventually authorized by congressional act in 2008, S/CRS cannot today be characterized as a successful repair. This truth became transparently evident in State's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), entitled *Leading Through Civilian Power* and issued in December 2010, which recommended that S/CRS be absorbed into the new Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO).⁷ Notwithstanding its difficult history, S/CRS still constitutes a valuable resource, comprising many well-trained personnel awaiting clear-cut guidance. But the current strategy for its future use remains unclear.

The Pentagon's pursuit of expanded stabilization operations' capacities has been much more robust than either State's or USAID's. In November 2005, the Secretary of Defense issued Defense Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations*, committing the military to developing and expanding its SRO capabilities.⁸

This revolutionary directive defined *stability operations* as military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to war activities in order to establish or maintain order, further stating that stability operations are a "core U.S. military mission" that should be given priority comparable to combat operations.⁹ In 2009, DOD reissued Directive 3000.05 as an Instruction, emphasizing again that the military must be ready to support civilian agencies in stability operations.

the Pentagon's pursuit of expanded stabilization operations' capacities has been much more robust than either State's or USAID's

Despite repeatedly recognizing the centrality of a "civilian lead" for SROs, DOD has made limited progress in integrating civilian agencies into its approach. It generally conceives of contingency operations, known as "STAB-OPS" at the Pentagon, as an aspect of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The civilian agencies see "postconflict" contingencies as relief and reconstruction endeavors called SROs, deeming them to be an operational point on the diplomacy/development continuum. Bringing reconciliation and exactitude to both the semiotics and semantics of COIN and SRO is crucial to contingency reform. Creating USOCO could provide a platform for the development of an interagency lingua franca applicable to all stabilization operations.

In December 2005, President Bush issued NSPD 44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, stating that "reconstruction and stabilization are more closely tied to foreign policy leadership

and diplomacy than to military operations.”¹⁰ Through this Executive order, the President sought to set in motion a process to improve the coordination, planning, and implementation of U.S. Government stabilization and reconstruction missions.¹¹

Though rightly responding to observed weaknesses in Iraq, the President’s directive ultimately foundered on the shoals of competing interagency interests. For example, NSPD 44 charged the coordinator for S/CRS to lead the development of a strong stability and reconstruction response mechanism and ordered State and DOD to “integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate.”¹² But S/CRS deployed no one to Iraq (and it has only intermittently deployed small numbers of personnel to Afghanistan, chiefly to fill empty slots in Provincial Reconstruction Teams [PRTs]).¹³ Despite the White House’s reform impetus, State and DOD did not sufficiently integrate civilian SRO systems with military contingency capabilities.

Toward the end of his administration, President Bush signed the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Title XVI of which contained the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008 (RSCMA).¹⁴ Codifying S/CRS into law, RSCMA assigned chief responsibility for planning and managing the civilian response to overseas contingencies to State. Since its passage, many important RSCMA provisions have not been implemented (including the appointment of an assistant secretary to head the office), and the funding for its various authorizations has fallen far short of the act’s legislative vision.

In December 2009, in a *sua sponte* effort to impose “jointness” on SROs, Secretary of

Defense Robert Gates sent a memorandum to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton suggesting “a new model of shared responsibility and pooled resources for cross-cutting security challenges.” This move reflected an approach now employed by the United Kingdom. Secretary Gates’s proposal envisioned a pooled-funding mechanism, requiring joint approval by DOD and State for support of SRO efforts in security, capacity development, stabilization, and conflict prevention.¹⁵ Although forward-leaning in concept, the joint-funding process had limited effect on SRO activity in either Iraq or Afghanistan. The recently adopted “Global Security Contingency Fund” apparently seeks to carry forward the integral ideal embodied by this fiscal initiative.

State’s Latest Reform Initiative

In its inaugural QDDR, State proposed several new structural reforms that, if adopted, could improve SRO management. The review’s recommendations include:

- ❖ expanding joint (civil-military) training programs for senior State personnel, such as Chiefs of Mission and Deputy Chiefs of Mission
- ❖ making interagency experience a prime criterion for promotion to State’s senior ranks
- ❖ creating the new Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations, which would subsume the mission and staff of S/CRS.¹⁶

Among other things, the QDDR calls for CSO to “enhance” the Civilian Reserve Corps, coordinate the building of civilian SRO capacities among key allies, and provide SRO specialists to State’s regional bureaus—ambitious agenda items all, and quite similar to those

set forth for S/CRS at its inception.¹⁷ Once fully operational, CSO will coordinate State's efforts at conflict prevention and manage the rapid deployment of civilian responders as crises develop, while serving as the department's institutional locus for developing SRO policy and operational capacity.¹⁸

State hopes to ensure that CSO does not suffer from the same shortcomings encountered during previous attempts to improve SRO management by staffing it with experts, including civilian specialists from other Federal agencies. Left unsaid, however, is precisely *how* it will do that. This is crucial to determine, given how previous efforts were stymied. Obtaining interagency buy-in, absent a congressional demand for this new initiative, could be difficult. The QDDR itself leaves CSO's relations with other agencies, including USAID, purposefully opaque, merely noting that the bureau would "work closely with [USAID] senior leadership."¹⁹

The CSO will be headed by an assistant secretary who will have the broad but somewhat ill-defined mandate of acting as the Secretary of State's senior adviser on "conflict and instability."²⁰ This role will be in addition to the challenging portfolio of creating, staffing, and managing a new bureau in a turf-conscious department at a time of significant budget-cutting from Congress. Former U.S. Representative to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations Ambassador Fredrick Barton will lead the CSO,²¹ and he is an excellent choice given his broad expertise in the SRO arena. But whether he will have the resources and independent authority to do more than simply develop plans remains an open question.

In recent informal conversations with SIGIR officials, current and former S/CRS personnel acknowledged the difficulties being

confronted by department planners charged with establishing CSO. Current operations have been impeded, and some S/CRS personnel feel as if they are in limbo. Until CSO becomes operational, the nature of S/CRS's future operational use will remain murky.²²

Notwithstanding its potential merit, the CSO solution, as currently drawn, is incomplete. Arguably, establishing the CSO is a step toward better coordination of the diverse SRO missions now distributed among several offices within State. But the CSO only absorbs some of these offices, leaving others independently operating under other mandates (for example, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives). Furthermore, the CSO does not touch those offices within the Departments of Defense, Treasury, and Justice, which play important roles in SROs. Consequently, while the CSO proposal may advance State's thinking about SRO management, it does not ultimately resolve many of the existing interagency SRO disconnects. "Stovepiping" would continue.

establishing the CSO is a step toward better coordination of the diverse SRO missions now distributed among several offices within State

SRO management issues cannot be solved simply by redrawing an organization chart or increasing appropriations. While it is true that State's budget is a fraction of the Pentagon's, the department's poor performance in managing the largest contracts in its history—for example, the DynCorp International contract for police training in Iraq—does not portend well regarding its capacity to oversee future SROs. Creating USOCO would allow State to focus on its core

competencies—diplomacy and development—while working closely with USOCO on the contingency rebuilding mission.

Advantages of an Integrated SRO Management Office

USOCO's creation would yield several immediate benefits. First, consolidating SRO offices and missions within one agency would eliminate structural redundancies and save taxpayer dollars. Second, having a civilian-led agency in charge of SROs would mitigate the perception that U.S. assistance programs have become militarized. Third, managing SROs would move from being an additional duty at State and Defense to the primary duty of USOCO. Finally, USOCO would provide an institutional home for the management of a series of urgently needed SRO reform initiatives and thereby ensure that lessons learned become lessons applied.

One (Invisible) Hand Clapping. Current fiscal realities—most notably, a \$14 trillion national debt—drive the need to improve the efficiency of SROs. Furthermore, the aftermath of the global financial crisis limits the capacity of donor nations to contribute to these costly operations. At the same time, the economic downturn has exacerbated tensions in fragile states, heightening the risk of increased instability. That risk has rapidly become a reality across today's Middle East.

As a matter of fiscal responsibility, USOCO makes eminent sense. The cost of running a single SRO office would be covered many times over by averting waste that would result from poor planning and weak management (see Iraq's reconstruction 2003–2008).²³ As the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan recently reported, unacceptable waste continues today

in Afghanistan because operational responsibilities for executing stabilization operations remain diffused across too many agencies.²⁴ Consolidating the existing system under one roof would induce unity of effort and produce significant savings, while simultaneously reducing redundancies, rationalizing lines of authority, and improving the protection of our national security interests.

To ensure operational agility and low overhead costs, USOCO would scale its size according to the needs of the mission at hand. During periods when overseas deployments are few, USOCO's small permanent staff would engage in formulating plans and conducting exercises to prepare for future SROs. The truth is, though, that the United States has been engaged in some form of SRO every year but 2 since 1980. Given that history, USOCO should expect to have virtually no fallow time.

Institutional Changes That USOCO Would Quickly Implement. USOCO would provide the needed nexus for developing government-wide SRO solutions. Subsequent to its creation, USOCO would do the following:

- ❖ Draft doctrine. Clear-cut SRO doctrine would be developed by USOCO, with the National Security Council (NSC) defining requirements and identifying implementing mechanisms.
- ❖ Integrate planning. USOCO would bring together all relevant agencies to develop integral contingency plans for SROs. Currently, there is “no systemic effort at strategic planning [for SROs] that is inclusive, deliberate, or integrative.”²⁵
- ❖ Rationalize budgeting. The NSC and the Office of Management and Budget would work with USOCO to develop

realistic budget requirements for potential contingencies.

- ❖ Incentivize personnel. Existing Federal personnel regulations would be adjusted to provide stronger incentives that would reward civilian employees for accepting temporary deployments in support of SROs.
- ❖ Consolidate training. Existing SRO training initiatives would be consolidated into an interagency training center with a joint curriculum modeled on the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's Interagency Fellowship Program.
- ❖ Reform contracting. USOCO would implement new contingency contracting procedures for universal use in SROs, which would improve contract management in theater and ensure a more accountable program.
- ❖ Coordinate with contractors. USOCO would provide contractors with a single point of contact, simplifying reporting responsibilities and improving coordination.
- ❖ Anticipate international involvement. USOCO would develop curricula, programs, and systems that anticipate international participation in future contingency operations.
- ❖ Integrate information technology (IT). USOCO would develop a single interoperable IT system capable of tracking all relief and reconstruction projects in theater.
- ❖ Ensure oversight. USOCO's structure would include an independent

Special Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations who would provide effective oversight through audits and investigations of all funds used during the SRO.

The Elements of an Effective SRO Reform Bill

SROs do not fit easily into any of the 3Ds: defense, diplomacy, and development; stabilization and reconstruction operations are executed during the unsettled periods occurring between the termination of full-blown conflict and the resumption of long-term development.

It is crucial that the legislation creating USOCO precisely define *stabilization and reconstruction operations*. Derived from the Army War College's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute's definition,²⁶ stabilization and reconstruction operations could usefully be described as circumstances where a combination of security, reconstruction, relief, and/or development services should, in the national interest of the United States, be provided to an unstable nation, including assistance for the development of military and security forces, infrastructure, and other essential services.

USOCO could someday play a role in the stabilization and reconstruction programs that occur after cataclysms

Notably, this definition does not specifically envision USOCO operating in the aftermath of natural disasters. Responding to those catastrophes would remain the responsibility of USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. But USOCO plausibly could someday play a

role in the stabilization and reconstruction programs that occur after cataclysms.

Clarifying USOCO Operational Space.

The best institutional analogue to USOCO is the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). USOCO's operational engagement could feasibly mirror many of the methods defined under the Stafford Act, which governs FEMA. USOCO's enabling statute could draw from the Stafford Act's paradigm by tying its operational authority to a Presidential declaration.²⁷ In many respects, USOCO would be a type of international FEMA, but would operate solely in the national security context with the potential to respond to other contingencies as its capacities mature.

In the event of an SRO, the President would issue a declaration specifying the date of its commencement, activating USOCO's access to SRO funds and outlining the SRO's geographical and operational parameters. During the life of the SRO, the USOCO director would report to the Chief of Mission, ensuring that USOCO programs and projects harmonize with the State Department's foreign policy and development goals.

the long-term benefits of developing an integrated SRO management office decidedly outweigh the near-term restructuring costs

USOCO staff would embed within the combatant command overseeing the affected theater to ensure close coordination with military units on SRO activities. When the need for a complex contingency stabilization operation no longer exists, the President would issue a declaration terminating the SRO. USOCO would then shift remaining programs and

projects to the appropriate entity, presumably the host nation or State/USAID.

Defining USOCO Leadership and Reporting Requirements. The USOCO director would be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, reporting to and under the general supervision of the Secretary of State *and* the Secretary of Defense. This dual-reporting, though rare in government, mirrors SIGIR's reporting requirements, which has worked effectively in the oversight of Iraq's reconstruction. Both Departments have a major role in SROs and thus both should have a major say in their planning and execution. Furthermore, the dual-reporting reflects the public recognition by the Secretaries of State and Defense regarding the civilian/military nature of SROs. USOCO would also have a deputy director and three associate directors. The three associate directors would include one each from Defense, State, and USAID.

USOCO would have robust reporting responsibilities to Congress. Within 30 days after the end of each fiscal-year quarter, the director would submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a comprehensive report summarizing USOCO's activities and expenditures for that quarter. Each quarterly report would include a detailed statement of all obligations, expenditures, and revenues associated with any ongoing stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Consolidating SRO Structures under USOCO. Current SRO lines of responsibility, accountability, and oversight are poorly defined. To remedy this predicament, USOCO's enabling legislation should consolidate certain existing offices responsible for discrete aspects of SROs, potentially including all or part of the following:



U.S. Air Force (Shawn Weismiller)

- ❖ S/CRS
- ❖ DOD capacities established under Defense Directive 3000.05
- ❖ USAID Office of Transition Initiatives
- ❖ Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance and Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training Programs, and Department of the Treasury's Office of Technical Assistance
- ❖ General Services Administration's Contingency Acquisition Corps.

The long-term benefits of developing an integrated SRO management office decidedly outweigh the near-term restructuring costs.

Institutionalizing Oversight: Special Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations. An independent Office of the Inspector General would be an integral part of this reform. The new Special Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations (SIGOCO), an element within USOCO, would have authority to oversee all accounts, spending, and activities related to an overseas contingency operation regardless of the implementing agency. That would ensure the uninterrupted supervision of U.S. expenditures made during a contingency operation, not merely those made by USOCO. The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan recently endorsed the need to create a permanent inspector general for contingency operations.²⁸ The idea was recently picked up by Congress, with legislation already introduced to create SIGOCO.

Other Statutory Powers. USOCO's enabling act should empower the director with the legal authority to:

- ❖ issue contingency acquisition regulations that have the force of the Federal Acquisition Regulation with respect to acquisition activities intended for use in stabilization and reconstruction emergencies
- ❖ prepare information and financial management systems for use in planning for and executing SROs
- ❖ establish an interagency training, preparation, and evaluation framework for all personnel deployed in support of SROs
- ❖ establish a Stabilization and Reconstruction Reserve Fund that USOCO would administer during SROs.

the Canadian and Dutch SRO offices are inherently creatures of their respective foreign ministries and lack the necessary degree of civilian-military integration needed to reform the U.S. approach to SROs

Existing International Models

Several Western nations already have created dedicated SRO management offices. The offices in the United Kingdom and Canada—and to a lesser extent the Netherlands—are fully charged with managing SROs and accordingly provide a glimpse of what an operational USOCO could do.²⁹

The most applicable existing model for USOCO is the United Kingdom's Stabilisation

Unit (SU). The SU is an independent agency that reports to a tripartite board consisting of senior officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence (MOD), and Department for International Development (DFID). It is staffed by personnel from all three departments and operates in conflict and postconflict environments but does not deploy in response to natural disasters. The SU has about 50 permanent staff, supplemented by detailees from other governmental departments, but it can draw on a civilian reserve component numbering more than 1,000. It also has an \$85 million interdepartmental conflict funding pool to support its operations. To date, the SU has been active in Sudan, Haiti, Afghanistan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.³⁰

Similar in many ways to the SU, Canada's Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) is responsible for coordinating that nation's response to major complex international crises. It implements stabilization and reconstruction programs in fragile states; administers the Canadian Police Arrangement, which allows for the deployment of Canadian police officers to stabilization operations; and provides civilian experts for international peace operations. START, a subordinate office within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, has an operating budget of just under \$20 million per year and administers a \$146 million Global Peace and Security Fund.³¹ It has a staff of about 60 and, if necessary, can draw on a substantial civilian reserve component. START deploys to both postconflict fragile states and to regions devastated by natural disasters, and it assisted with relief efforts after the Haitian earthquake and the Pakistani floods.³² It is now contributing personnel to PRTs in Afghanistan.

Much like START, albeit on a smaller scale, the Fragile States Unit (FSU)³³ is an office within the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) responsible for coordinating Dutch strategies toward fragile states. The FSU has about 2 dozen full-time personnel—all from the MFA—and maintains a roster of private-sector experts upon which it can draw in the event of a contingency operation. The FSU can access a Stability Fund to finance reconstruction projects, subject to the approval of an interagency steering committee. To date, its teams have been active in Afghanistan, Sudan, Burundi, and Kosovo.³⁴

Bringing together elements of the Foreign Office, MOD, and DFID, the United Kingdom's SU is the most apt analogue to USOCO. With a small permanent staff capable of rapid growth during a crisis, it represents a cost-effective way of consolidating SRO expertise in a single office. The Canadian and Dutch SRO offices, while appropriate for those countries, are inherently creatures of their respective foreign ministries and lack the necessary degree of civilian-military integration needed to reform the U.S. approach to SROs.

Closing the Hole in Government: A Plausible Solution

In recent years, the U.S. Government has pursued an abstract SRO management strategy called *whole of government*. This simultaneously opaque and glib term has yet to generate an operational structure that is either comprehensive or coherent. Whole-of-government's core flaw is that it ensures that everyone is partly in charge of SROs—thus, no one is in charge.

Since 2007, the chief mechanism for addressing SRO issues has been the Interagency Management System (IMS). It essentially

provided guidance on issues that bubbled up from the Iraq and Afghanistan SROs (rather than top-down management) through a National Security Council committee chaired by the director of S/CRS. The IMS had limited effect on the execution of SROs in theater and is now largely dormant.

implementing USOCO could be the means by which the hard lessons from Iraq are turned into best practices for Afghanistan and beyond

Key stakeholders in the U.S. interagency community generally agree on the need for robust SRO reform, but dispute continues as to the shape such reform should take. State is pressing ahead with the CSO, but its mandate does not indicate that it will be operating aggressively on an interagency level. Others have argued for creating an independent USAID and giving it the full SRO mission. Some support a quasi-independent SRO management entity (as in the United Kingdom).

In discussions with SIGIR, Ambassador Ryan Crocker (after his appointment to Iraq and before his appointment to Afghanistan) and former National Security Advisor Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft endorsed the idea of an independent SRO office like USOCO. Ambassador James Dobbins expressed support for creating a USOCO-like entity, but only if it is placed within USAID. Former U.S. Central Command commander General Anthony Zinni likes the concept but advocates embedding it within DOD as a combatant command analogue. But housing a new SRO office within State, USAID, or Defense leaves the stovepiping problems that plague the current system unresolved.

With the Iraq experience still fresh in mind and the Afghanistan SRO likely to continue for several years, circumstances are ripe for bold reform. Implementing USOCO could be the means by which the hard lessons from Iraq are turned into best practices for Afghanistan and beyond. Consolidating existing resources and structures under USOCO would achieve money-saving management efficiencies that would avert waste in future SROs and thus produce real financial savings for the U.S. Government. Moreover, integrating the planning, management, and execution of SROs would ensure that the next time the United States undertakes such an operation, those deployed to execute the mission will have the mandate, expertise, and resources to achieve victory.

The bottom line is that creating USOCO would dramatically improve the bottom line of our SRO balance sheet, significantly increase the likelihood of success in future SROs, better protect U.S. national security interests abroad, and strengthen the stewardship of scarce taxpayer dollars in the next stabilization and reconstruction operation. Moreover, that next operation may soon be upon us. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ The U.S. Congress created the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), an independent Federal agency, in 2004. SIGIR has oversight of the more than \$58 billion in U.S. funds committed thus far to the reconstruction of Iraq. This article is based on SIGIR's most recent lessons learned report: *Applying Iraq's Hard Lessons to the Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, which recommends an innovative solution to the persistent problem of integrating civilian agencies' efforts with those of the military during overseas stability and reconstruction operations. The complete report is available at <www.sigir.mil/applyinghardlessons/index.html>.

² SIGIR, *Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress*, January 30, 2011, 3, available at <www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/January2011/Report_-_January_2011.pdf#view=fit>.

³ *In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities*, Report of an Independent Task Force, Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2005), 11, available at <www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Post-Conflict_Capabilities_final.pdf>.

⁴ L. Elaine Halchin, *The Coalition Provisional Authority: Origin, Characteristics, and Institutional Authorities*, RL32370 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 29, 2004), CRS-2, available at <www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32370.pdf>.

⁵ See SIGIR, *Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2009), chapters 5–10, available at <www.sigir.mil/files/HardLessons/Hard_Lessons_Report.pdf>.

⁶ Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, P.L. 108–447, § 408 (2004).

⁷ *Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* (Washington, DC: Department of State, December 2010), available at <www.state.gov/documents/organization/153108.pdf>.

⁸ Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations* (Washington, DC: DOD, November 28, 2005).

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Dane F. Smith, Jr., *An Expanded Mandate for Peace Building: The State Department Role in Peace Diplomacy, Reconstruction, and Stabilization* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], April 30, 2009), 39.

¹¹ In March 2004, CSIS President John Hamre endorsed legislation that would have institutionalized stabilization policy within the National Security Council. Instead, President George W. Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*.

¹² Field Manual 3–07, *Stability Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, October 2008), 13.

¹³ SIGAR, *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, October 30, 2003, 3, available at <www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/Oct2010/Lores/SIGAR4Q_2010Book.pdf>.

¹⁴ The Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008 was included as Title XVI of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2009, which was signed into law on October 14, 2008, as P.L. 110–417. It is similar to an earlier bill proposed by Senator Richard Lugar and then-Senator Joseph Biden, which passed the Senate Foreign Relations committee but did not go further.

¹⁵ Robert M. Gates, Options for Remodeling Security Sector Assistance Authorities, introduction to proposal in Memorandum for Secretary of State, December 15, 2009.

¹⁶ *Leading Through Civilian Power*, chapter 4.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., 136.

²⁰ Ibid., 134–135.

²¹ Ibid.

²² SIGIR discussions with State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization officials, mid-2011.

²³ SIGIR estimates that an office with a standing capacity of 200 staff would run approximately \$30 million annually. Waste resulting from management failures in Iraq alone is approximately \$4 to 5 billion (SIGIR estimate).

²⁴ Todd Moss, “Too Big to Succeed? Why (W)Hole-of-Government Cannot Work for U.S. Development Policy,” *Global Development: Views from the Center*, October 5, 2010, available at <<http://blogs.cgdev.org/globaldevelopment/2010/10/too-big-to-succeed-why-whole-of-government-cannot-work-for-u-s-development-policy.php>>.

²⁵ Michèle A. Flournoy and Shawn W. Brimley, “Strategic Planning for National Security,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 41 (2^d Quarter, 2006), 80–81.

²⁶ See *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2009), available at <<http://pksoi.army.mil/PKM/publications/collaborative/collaborativereview.cfm?collaborativeID=2>>.

²⁷ Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, P.L. 93–288, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 5121–5207, and Related Authorities, June 2007, available at <www.fema.gov/pdf/about/stafford_act.pdf>.

²⁸ Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, “At what risk? Correcting over-reliance on contractors in contingency operations,” February 24, 2011, appendix A, available at <www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_InterimReport2-lowres.pdf>.

²⁹ Presentations made by various parties at the Civil Military Interaction Seminar, Sydney, Australia, December 6–9, 2010; SIGIR analysis of publicly available government documents. Germany, Australia, and

Sweden have stabilization and reconstruction operations agencies that focus on research and training, but do not deploy as units to support overseas contingency operations.

³⁰ Stabilisation Unit's presentation made at the Civil Military Interaction Seminar, Sydney, Australia, December 6–9, 2010.

³¹ Canada's Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force presentation made at the Civil Military Interaction Seminar, Sydney, Australia, December 6–9, 2010.

³² Ibid.

³³ This unit is also known as the Peace-Building and Stabilization Unit.

³⁴ Finn Stepputat, "Integrated National Approaches to International Operations: The Cases of Denmark, UK, and the Netherlands," *DIIS Report: The Civil-Military Agenda* 14 (2009), 47–48, available at <www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2009/DIIS_Report_2009_14_Integrated_National_Approaches_International_Operations_web.pdf>.



British army soldier teaches mine-clearance techniques to Afghan National Army officer cadets at Officer Candidate School in Kabul, Afghanistan

Lost in Translation

The Challenge of Exporting Models of Civil-Military Relations

BY LAURA R. CLEARY

Once viewed as an interesting but minor subset of the broader disciplines of international relations and security studies, the promotion of civil-military relations (CMR), under the new and broader banners of security sector reform (SSR) and stabilization, has become a critical component of foreign, defense, and development policies of former colonial powers in the 21st century.¹ Indeed, it would be fair to say that the promotion of CMR/SSR has become a booming industry. The United States, United Kingdom (UK), Germany, and France have sanctioned the development of this industry through the award of contracts to preferred service providers. There appears, however, to be little consistency, coordination, monitoring, or regulation in the selection of service providers or in the way in which the service is provided.²

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The “Great Powers” have outsourced the delivery of their foreign policies. The result is that, while those states may be in agreement on the requirement to improve CMR or reform the security sector in developing countries, there is little or no agreement on how this should be done, either between the countries or between their respective ministries. This lack of unity and coordination is apparent to recipient nations. As a result, the message that the West seeks to transmit is diluted, and it takes longer to identify the focal point for change and develop the critical mass required for reform. This is the first general point that needs to be understood. The second is that the Western definition and interpretation of CMR is not universally shared.³

Three names dominate the field of CMR: Samuel Huntington, Samuel Finer, and Morris Janowitz. Although these three men were apt to criticize each other on aspects of their respective theories,⁴ they were essentially in agreement that stable, democratic civil-military relations were more likely if the military was professional, reflective of the society it served, and believed in an explicit principle of civil supremacy. In essence, their theories were predicated on what has come to be perceived as the Clausewitzian trinity: people, army, and government. Although there have been many studies conducted of civil-military relations in Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, and South America, the essential theory has remained the same.

Western academics tend to adopt a holistic approach to the study of CMR, looking at the way the military relates to both government and society. As in any academic discipline, there have been some splinter movements with individuals arguing that more emphasis should be placed on military-society relations and less on

government-military relations; but, on balance, recent theorists have sought to determine the ways in which the trinity of people, army, and government can be renewed.

The most recent and high profile example of this is Rebecca Schiff’s Concordance Theory, which stresses the need to develop a partnership between the military, government, and civil society if peace and stability are to be achieved.⁵ While this theory has a certain degree of merit, if it is to be advocated outside of a North American or European context, then those promoting it need to be aware that the playing field in other parts of the world is not the same. In Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the focus is on military-political/administration relations; society does not really factor into the equation. The military views politicians with opprobrium because they are perceived as ignorant, uneducated, and corrupt. Civil servants are viewed with disdain because they are perceived as overly bureaucratic, inefficient, and incompetent. In turn, the military is viewed as distant, superior, and potentially dangerous to political stability. As for the citizenry, they are viewed as largely uninterested in, and generally ignorant of, security. Thus, the fundamental ingredients for the development of effective partnerships are missing. There is no mutual understanding, respect, or trust.

Douglas Bland has argued that extant and new theories on CMR fail in two ways: “They are narrowly conceived and miss critical aspects of the problem and they are too bound by the culture and national politics of their proponents.”⁶ This is a valid assessment and I would suggest that the absence of a rigorous theoretical framework means that the practices being promoted through stabilization activities in Iraq and Afghanistan or SSR initiatives in Africa, Central and Eastern Europe, and Latin America

are as likely to cause harm as good. Based on 10 years of support to, and observation of, the UK Defence Diplomacy mission,⁷ I have identified four factors that make the task of exporting models of CMR particularly challenging:

- ❖ nature of the colonial legacy
- ❖ alternative realities of the strategic context
- ❖ varying issues of concern within the civil-military relationship
- ❖ different cultural reference points.

Each of these points will be illustrated in turn.

Nature of the Colonial Legacy

Although colonialism is generally assessed in terms of its economic impact, specifically with reference to the distortion of colonial economies, it also had a significant influence on political and administrative structures within those colonies. Great Britain's footprint in both Asia and Africa is marked by the establishment of systems of administrative and military control. In Asia, Britain was able to build upon a preexisting system of civil service administration that dated from the 13th century, if not earlier. The Hindu kingdoms of the subcontinent consisted of "an organised governmental bureaucracy, categorized into departments with several classes of officials."⁸ The individuals were selected on the basis of "their wisdom and high character," and they served the ruler and not the state.⁹ During the period of the Mughal Empire (1526–1858), this system of administration would be further developed with quasi-autonomous layers (central, subcentral, and local) performing specific functions to manage the affairs of the empire.¹⁰ There was continued emphasis on the merits of candidates who needed to demonstrate "perfect

capacity, complete experience, great integrity, ample understanding and extreme diligence."¹¹ The most important quality, however, remained their loyalty to the emperor.

Great Britain adapted this basic framework to suit its own ends, refining the recruitment criteria, and formalizing the basis for compensation, promotion, and training. By the time of Indian independence in 1947, the transition from a personalized service to a state and public service was well advanced, as was the development of a culture based on meritocracy and competition. There were, however, other cultural trends in evidence, namely those of red tape, institutionalized racism, cultural superiority,¹² and "wanton factionalism, polarization, and regionalism."¹³ These are traits that continue to bedevil attempts to govern the states in South Asia.

Great Britain's footprint in both Asia and Africa is marked by the establishment of systems of administrative and military control

In Africa, the experience was rather different. European colonial powers in many cases created administrative systems from scratch and staffed those bureaucracies not with members of the indigenous population but with Europeans. As Martin Meredith has outlined in his seminal work *The State of Africa*,¹⁴ in many cases when the colonial powers withdrew, there were few qualified people to staff the civil service. While that situation has gradually changed through the expansion of education and reforms that have targeted administrative structures and pay, for many African states there is a continued sense that the civil service lacks capacity. For example, the Nigerian civil service has been

described as “oversized and under-skilled” with employees lacking the “appropriate technical skills needed for their assignment,”¹⁵ a statement that is equally relevant in many parts of Africa. Although reforms of the civil service may have been imposed by military regimes or proposed by democratic governments and the World Bank, it has all been to little or no avail. Reforms have tended to be superficial rather than fundamental, focusing on pay and structures rather than on enhancing core competencies. Thus, in both South Asia and Africa, the perception remains that the civil service is overly bureaucratic, with multiple mini-bureaucracies existing within the whole, and is deeply politicized and manifestly corrupt.

Great Britain provides technical training required to proclaim that an individual is an expert in the use of force, and thus a professional

As a result of the colonial legacy and subsequent failure to do anything other than tinker with that inheritance, it has proven difficult for the civil service to act as a stabilizing or unifying force in either Asia or Africa. This situation has been further exacerbated in those countries in which the military has frequently intervened in politics. As part of the process, the military has co-opted the civil service to provide it with the cover of legitimacy. As a result, neither organization is trusted by the people.

The reasons for a lack of trust in the military are slightly different from those pertaining to the civil service administration. With respect to military organizations, although the colonial powers may have withdrawn, they maintained an “interest” in the armed forces by continuing to invest in the shaping of force

structures, development of doctrine, provision of education and training, and sale or gifting of weapons and platforms. We can see in both Africa and Asia that the regimental system inherited from the British continues to frame the way in which the armed forces of those states relate to their own societies, their history, and their cultural values.¹⁶ More often than not, an officer in West Africa or South Asia believes that he has more in common with a British officer than he does with citizens in his own country. This belief is in part engendered through exposure to the British military education system.

It has been argued that the throughput of officers at educational establishments such as the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst (RMAS), Royal College of Defence Studies, Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC), and Defence Academy’s College of Management and Technology helps to maintain historical and cultural reference points, but what it also succeeds in doing is exposing officers to alternative ideas and practices, an opportunity denied to the majority of civil servants and politicians. The result is that the officer corps appears more professional and certainly more cosmopolitan than its civilian counterparts.

The United Kingdom has tended to justify this activity with the argument that by professionalizing the armed forces of newly independent states, a greater stability would be created, an argument that is now used in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The reality, however, is that much of the education and training provided by the UK is technically specific (for example, specialist-to-arms training at RMAS, staff officer training at JSCSC, and human rights training conducted in-country). Thus, Great Britain provides technical training required

to proclaim that an individual is an expert in the use of force, and thus a professional.¹⁷

What Great Britain, the United States, France, and China also succeed in doing through their long courses at officer training schools and command and staff colleges is exposing individuals to their own organizational cultures, which may then mean that the officer or group of officers become disconnected from their own civilian authority and wider society. At no point is the same level of organized or targeted investment being made in the civilian authority structures, and thus those structures are unable to assert the “control” of the military advocated in theories of CMR. Ideally, states should be as focused on the professionalization of their civil services and political structures as they are on the professionalization of the armed forces.

So what is Great Britain’s legacy in Asia and Africa? It is widely recognized that the United Kingdom has influenced the civil service and armed forces structures, as well as legal, educational, and transport systems. These influences are generally viewed as positive benefits of colonialism, but there is a sense that postcolonial governments squandered the opportunities for further development.¹⁸ The inherited systems have changed little since independence, apart from growing in size and scope. Attempts at reform—whether that is the application of new public management in the civil service or the promotion of jointery in the Indian armed forces,¹⁹ for example—have had little lasting effect. Meanwhile, the UK has initiated a series of civil service reforms since the 1950s and is in the process of streamlining both the civil service and armed forces, all of which has had an impact on missions, ethos, and structure. As a result, when the UK looks

at the systems in South Asia or Africa, the tendency is to think, “Look how far we have come,” although this response is sometimes tinged with nostalgia, particularly among the military as it reflects on lost privileges. When South Asians or Africans look at the UK, they often wonder how those reforms were achieved because they appear impossible within their own contexts. Indeed, they want to know *what* to do, but more importantly, they want to know *how* to do it.

What is the process for successful reform? As the United Kingdom places a renewed emphasis on soft power and unveils its new strategy for building security overseas, it needs not only to spend more money, but also identify better ways in which to address fundamental questions within defense reform.²⁰ The UK has managed to maintain a degree of traction in former colonial states as a result of shared history and institutional structures. The colonial power and colonies could be described as having been on parallel tracks, but as the strategic context continues to evolve, those paths and reference points will diverge even more.

Alternative Realities of the Strategic Context

The decision by any of the Western powers to engage in security sector reform elsewhere is determined by an analysis of its own strategic context. The United Kingdom undertakes this assessment on a regular basis, and the conclusions are published in a range of documents including the National Security Strategy (2010), *Strategic Defence & Security Review* (2010), and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s strategy document, *Better World, Better Britain* (2008).

Since 2002, the United Kingdom has placed an increasing emphasis on countering

terrorism both nationally and internationally. It has adopted a combined approach, supporting the United States in its application of the strategy of preemption, most notably in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also siding with its European partners by promoting a strategy

for most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event

of prevention and tackling the root causes of terrorism such as poverty and illiteracy. In some areas, such as the Middle East, this dual approach has met with little favor because too much emphasis has been placed on the exercise of hard power. In other regions, such as South Asia, the UK has succeeded in maintaining a convincing balance, using its historical ties to the region to encourage alternative patterns of behavior. The UK has, through its defense relations activities,²¹ sought to exercise hard and soft power simultaneously, and it chose to do so long before the United States ever advocated “smart power.”

Although the United Kingdom and many states share a concern over terrorism, the scale of the problem is different. In the 40-year period since the beginning of the Irish Republican Army terrorist campaign, the number of British citizens killed in terrorist attacks was just under 4,000, including those killed on 9/11 and 7/7. As tragic as these deaths are, the number is low compared to the loss of life in Pakistan between 2003 and 2008, for example.

We can see a similar trend in many other parts of the world. While the organizations responsible for the attacks may vary from country to country, the truth is that

both their origins and their effects tend to be local. This has been clearly illustrated in Nigeria by the activities of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta during October 2010, the attacks by Boko Haram (which means “Western education is a sin” in the Hausa language) on police headquarters in Abuja in June 2011, and again in August on the United Nations headquarters, or through the frequent rounds of ethnic and religious conflict in Jos, Nigeria, and the surrounding area. A purely military response, as previously advocated by the United States, is insufficient and can prove counterproductive in terms of managing internal security issues. This is the strategic reality on the ground for many countries that have loosely subscribed to the war on terror.

The strategic context for many states around the world tends to be focused on internal issues: political, economic, social, and environmental—so-called human security. This trend is not new; indeed, in 1994 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) attempted to capture the emerging trend in its *Human Development Report*. The authors declared that for too long the concept of security has been shaped by the potential for conflict between states; security has been equated with threats to a country’s borders; and nations have sought arms to protect their security. For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime—these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world.²²

Since 1994, numerous constitutions, security doctrines, and protocols have adopted as their starting point this new

conceptual framework for security, although words do not always match deeds. In the case of the African Union, recent attempts to devise strategies for peace and security on the continent have been frustrated by the diverse ways in which security is interpreted and pursued. Although the “Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union”²³ reflects the position adopted by UNDP in 1994, national approaches to attaining national and regional security remain at odds with the declaration. Many African countries continue to respond to a range of threats within their own countries through the deployment of military and paramilitary forces rather than through a concentrated effort to improve governance.²⁴ Those countries that view themselves as being more militarily capable than their neighbors tend to focus on hard rather than soft security responses to conflict both at home and abroad. Their disregard for the “niceties” of a legal framework has negative consequences within the operational environment, as evidenced by the numerous cases over the last few years of the abuse of combatants and civilians.²⁵ Thus, we see two dominant trends within the African context, but these are not exclusive to the region. The first is a failure to systematically analyze the national strategic context and to use that analysis to inform the development of relevant policies that will result in improved capabilities. The second is the tendency to over-militarize or over-secure responses to risks and challenges.

As John Allen Williams has noted, a central assumption of all CMR theories is that the threat a military is tasked to confront has a significant impact on relations with civil society.²⁶ When the nature of the existential threat changes, so too should the

relationship between the military and society. In countries such as the United States, UK, France, and Germany, the post–Cold War threat environment has led to the proclamation of a postmodern military. The hallmark of such an organization is a “volunteer force, more multipurpose in mission, increasingly androgynous in make up and ethos, and with a greater permeability with civilian society.”²⁷

As Williams has noted, traditional military culture is confronted by a number of challenges such as cultural relativism and the imposition of nonmilitary, social, ethical, and political criteria of evaluation on the military.²⁸ It is these postmodern militaries, and the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and consultancies abounding in security sector reform, that are seeking to provide advice on ideal forms of civil-military relations to militaries and governments that are still effectively classed as being within the “modern or late modern era,” meaning that the military is comprised of “a combination of conscripted lower ranks or militia and a professional officer corps, are war-oriented in mission, [are] masculine in makeup and ethos, and sharply differentiated in structure and culture from civilian society.”²⁹ The reference points are at complete variance, and thus the perception of what is an appropriate role for the military is also divergent.

Looking around the world, we see different military agendas: nation-building, national defense, and regime defense. With respect to the first role, there is an assumption within theories of civil-military relations that the military can act as a benign organ of national unity. It is argued that the integration of different nationalities or ethnicities into the armed forces can make a significant contribution to the process of nation-building.³⁰ The reality,

however, has proven different. Military governments in deeply divided societies have usually been unable or unwilling to contain internal conflicts.³¹ Thus, instead of unifying the nation, we have seen the gradual drifting apart of the military and the society it was intended to serve.

There are a number of states that remain preoccupied with the role of national defense. In Latin America, militaries are fixated on issues pertaining to the defense of national sovereignty and protection of territorial integrity, concerns shared by some countries in Central and Eastern Europe, which are attempting to establish themselves as states (Kosovo), or to defend themselves against further aggression (Georgia).

In countries such as Nepal, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, the military may express an interest in establishing the parameters for political neutrality, but their most recent lived experience is of regime defense. They require explicit guidance on how to orientate themselves to operate in an apolitical fashion in accordance with the law and subordinate to the legal and political authority of civilian political masters. Advising exactly how to achieve that is difficult; the last time England's military actively intervened in politics was at the time of the Civil War (1642–1645) and the subsequent restoration of the monarchy in 1660 when General George Monck played the role of kingmaker. In Pakistan, the military last intervened in politics in 1999 when General Pervez Musharraf assumed power in an attempt to root out corruption, although in March 2009 the military was placed on alert when President Asif Ali Zardari was at odds with his opponent Nawaz Sharif. In Bangladesh, the military established a caretaker government in 2007, and

in 2008, in the run-up to elections in Nepal, there were strong concerns that it would seize control of the government.

An emphasis on regime defense is counter to the prescriptions of how a military should behave as made by the classical theorists of CMR. Too much of the literature describes the nature of the problem rather than ways a transition can be successfully achieved. And that is the question most frequently asked by those on the receiving end of defense and security sector reform assistance: How do we adopt civilian control and maintain our security?

Issues of Concern

In assessing CMR or the state of the security sector in developing countries, Western donors tend to focus on levels of professionalism, extent of corruption, representativeness of the security services, existence or absence of civil society organizations (CSOs), and degree of accountability and transparency. The prevailing attitude is that if professionalism of the armed forces could be increased, corruption rooted out and CSOs introduced, then accountability and good governance would increase and a stable and secure society would appear.³² This agenda is primarily that of the donors rather than the recipients. Indeed, there is a desire for improved levels of governance, but the Western prescription is not easy to swallow. The issues of concern in many states are the true nature of civil, civilian, and democratic control; professionalism; politicization; and how exactly the military should disengage from politics.

Civil, Civilian, and Democratic Control of the Armed Forces. One of the challenges of promoting new models of CMR is simply trying to guarantee conceptual clarity. The literature refers to controlling the

civil-military relationship, whether that is through civilian or democratic control. The first problem that is encountered is the use of the word *control*, which in many languages is pejorative, implying a dictatorial approach, when what is actually being prescribed is a more collaborative relationship.³³ It may be of value in some instances to replace the word with *management*, which implies the generation of capability through careful planning and the efficient and effective use of resources.³⁴ The use of the word *management* also allows attention to be directed to the functions that need to be performed in order to generate the capability to provide security: planning, organizing, commanding (or leading or directing), coordinating, and eventually controlling.³⁵ Whether or not management is adopted in lieu of control, the language used should imply partnership in the decisionmaking process.

The second problem is that all too frequently the terms *civil*, *civilian*, and *democratic control* of the armed forces are used synonymously. To my mind, however, they are distinct but related concepts. According to David Chuter, civil control refers to the allegiance that the armed forces or more broadly, the security forces owe to the *civis* or the state.³⁶ That allegiance should be based in law and might be stated in a constitution, armed forces act, doctrine, or code of conduct. The point is that all members of the armed forces should know to whom they owe allegiance and whom they serve.

Civilian management is then layered over civil control. *Civilian management* refers to the appointment of civilians to positions of responsibility in governance and management of the security services. It should refer to more than just the appointment of civilian

ministers and incorporate the role of civilians at various administrative levels within ministries of defense, foreign affairs, finance, or within the legislative branch. The achievement of civilian management often requires

civil servants operating in a patronage-based system are deemed to serve the interests of their political masters, not the interests of the nation

a change in the way information is handled and transmitted, and it also requires a review of decisionmaking and management practices more broadly.

The concept of civilian control or management often proves problematic in a range of countries undergoing defense and security sector reform. For reasons detailed above, civilian politicians and civil servants may not be trusted by the military to make good decisions or implement policy in such a way as to result in military effectiveness. Furthermore, those civil servants operating in a patronage-based system are deemed to serve the interests of their political masters, not the interests of the nation. Military personnel view themselves as the sole guardians of the national interest. In the absence of a modicum of respect and trust, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to accept the subordination of the military to civilian control. It is for this reason that we should move the debate away from the types of people placed into positions of responsibility to an examination of the process through which the management function is exercised. The third layer of democratic management then becomes critically important.

Democratic management of the armed forces refers essentially to the process of

decisionmaking. As Robin Luckham has acknowledged, some of the largest democratic deficits are found in the security sector.³⁷ Therefore, there is a need to develop institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and professional norms.³⁸ Thomas Bruneau and Floriana Matei suggest that institutional control mechanisms can manifest themselves in a clear legal framework, the establishment of a Ministry of Defense or a National Security

members of the armed forces believe that their politicians lack security literacy, are unwilling to engage in matters of state security, and are more likely to be part of the problem than part of the solution

Council, the existence of parliamentary committees with authority over policy and budgets, and transparent and apolitical officer promotion processes.³⁹ With respect to oversight, they are concerned with whether civilians in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, alongside the media, NGOs, and think tanks can in fact keep track of what the defense and security forces do. For Bruneau and Matei, it is the professionalism of the armed forces that is critical to the success of the other two control mechanisms. They are not alone in this perspective.

Professionalism. As noted above, Huntington, Finer, and Janowitz, in their respective works and to varying degrees, stressed the need for a professional armed force. According to Huntington, professionalism comprises three elements: expertness, social responsibility, and corporate loyalty to fellow practitioners.⁴⁰ Many armies would argue that they meet those criteria. Ask them, however, whether the

civil service in their countries is professional, and they will respond that the service falls short on social responsibility. Ask them to define a professional politician, and the most frequent response is that “a professional politician is a professional liar.”⁴¹ In many developing democracies, a politician may at best have a secondary school education, or at worst may be illiterate. There is little or no attempt to provide an induction into the parliament for new members, and those individuals therefore lack the ability to draft legislation or conduct oversight. This is a significant concern but particularly so when we consider the seriousness of the internal security situation in many of these countries. Members of the armed forces believe that their politicians lack security literacy, are unwilling to engage in matters of state security, and are more likely to be part of the problem than part of the solution. Thus, among the military of many transitional democracies, there is a desire to see the focus of CMR shift from the professionalism of the military to the professionalism of the civilians, both within the civil service and political echelons.

To achieve that end requires education and training. While within various SSR initiatives there are programs to educate politicians on practices within parliamentary systems or to finance the appointment of civil servants in support of parliamentary committees, politicians and civil servants are not brought together with their military counterparts often enough to generate a discussion and engender respect and trust. Educating these groups in isolation from one another limits the potential for meaningful dialogue, particularly when different service providers funded by different nations seek to provide those programs. A great deal of emphasis is placed by both the UK and the United States on the comprehensive

approach, but that needs to occur not only on the battlefield, but also in the planning and delivery of the stabilization undertaking. To date, multinational coordinated responses remain in short supply.

Politicization. Related to the point above is the concern expressed over the extent of the politicization of the armed forces, civil service, and security as a whole. Given the immaturity of many of the world's democracies, we still tend to see radical shifts in policy depending on who is in power. There is no consensus between the parties as to what is in the national interest, and it appears that the parties are more interested in political point scoring. Since the pursuit of short-term electoral interests is the order of the day, there is little incentive to commit to longer term strategic planning.⁴² It is not, however, simply issues that are politicized, but structures too. For many developing democracies, the rank structures of both the civil service administration and security forces have been politicized. Despite laws and rhetoric proclaiming the existence of a meritocracy, at the senior levels of organizations, promotion becomes dependent on who one knows rather than what one knows. This in turn creates closed networks in terms of decisionmaking, has an impact on levels of accountability and transparency within an organization, and generates resentment within the ranks. Individuals are loath to criticize their line managers and their services as a whole if it will ruin their chances for promotion and increased financial remuneration. So if governments are truly committed to improving levels of governance, then there is a clear need for the depoliticization of the promotion process and better career planning. Yet this is unlikely to occur without strong political will and a wider cultural change.

How Can the Military Disengage from Politics? Political will and cultural change are also required if militaries are to withdraw from politics and become apolitical. Western theories of CMR are predicated on a belief that apolitical militaries are essential for democratic security. They are—but what those theories do not adequately address is how a military *transitions* from being political to nonpolitical. Various authors have discussed the attributes of political armies, or the way in which military regimes hand over power to civilians, be it through a negotiated settlement as in Chile or the orchestration of democratic elections as in Nigeria or Ghana. But there is little literature on how to secure that change over the longer term. It is recognized that, with regard to the political domain, it is best if armies remain in their barracks, but how do we ensure that politicians keep out of those same barracks? This is a central question with which theories of civil-military relations should be engaged.

Far more work needs to be done on creating and enforcing the right type of legal framework to ensure the political neutrality of the armed forces, but we also need to examine the development of doctrine and training, and, perhaps most importantly, the sensitization of civilians and military to the correct forms of behavior in democracies. This last point relates essentially to a change in organizational culture within both military and civilian organizations. As part of that process, we should examine how those respective organizations can become more representative of the societies they serve. By representative I do not mean solely reflective of ethnic or social composition, which is how representativeness is normally understood within theories of CMR, but reflective of the emerging democratic values. Both social composition and values need to be represented within democratic armed forces. At present, however,

Western theorists have given insufficient thought as to how to achieve that.

Varying Cultural Reference Points

So much of what is prescribed within SSR programs is put forward to advance Western interests and is predicated on Western cultural values. In promoting reform, the benefits of democracy are presumed to be universally self-evident. It is assumed that in a system in which free and fair elections prevail, politicians duly elected have legitimacy bestowed upon them through an electoral mandate and will fulfill their duties in accordance with the rule of law and by exercising appropriate leadership skills. Perhaps we presume too much.

For the fifth year in a row, Freedom House has reported that democracy is in retreat, citing evidence of rigged elections, restriction of civil liberties, limitations on the media, and inability of legislatures and judiciaries to ensure accountability.⁴³ There is also mounting evidence that democracy does not guarantee stability or security in the short term,⁴⁴ and yet we continue to advocate systems and approaches that are at odds with existing structural and cultural paradigms in target nations. Two issues—leadership and accountability—illustrate this argument.

Leadership. Romie Littrell has argued that “leadership myths in a culture give clues to how members see themselves and what constitutes good governance, ethical behaviour and fundamental courage.”⁴⁵ In a study of leadership mythology in England, he identifies certain common themes about appropriate leadership behavior:

- ❖ standing up for what is right
- ❖ heroically defending the nation
- ❖ heroically defending the nation in league with the common people.

These values are not only represented by leaders but also are reflected in the institutional arrangements established for governance, with the emphasis placed on justice, accountability, and public service on behalf of the nation.

These value sets are also reflected in American political institutional arrangements for obvious reasons, but the individual leader is not just heroic, but superheroic. A prototypical American superhero leader profile is one in which he fights for “noble personal and social goals, [is] strong, fast, brave and nimble, leverage[s] cutting edge technology and physical resources, creatively develop[s] and exploit[s] unique advantage, [is] self-reliant yet compassionate, actively manage[s] reputation and image and self-reflect[s] on identity and purpose.”⁴⁶

In both the UK and the United States, the less powerful members of organizations find that the more powerful ones are approachable, decisions can be questioned, and inequality is not endorsed by either leaders or followers.⁴⁷ Those beliefs are then incorporated into management approaches such as delegated authority or mission command, the role of the “critical friend,” and the emphasis placed on “speaking truth to power”—approaches that are often at odds with the cultural values of the nations seeking assistance in defense and security sector reform. For example, in Kenya, where the UK has continuing military-to-military contacts and has supported wider SSR initiatives, the leadership style is largely hierarchical and authoritarian and the leader demands unquestioning personal allegiance from followers in return for which the leader should provide care and affection to subordinates as well as provide balance, challenge guidance, and inspiration.⁴⁸ Criticism of the leader and his policies would be deemed inappropriate, deeply insulting, and, if it were the military criticizing the politicians, a breach of the constitution.

Table. Comparison of Cultural Value Sets

	United Kingdom	United States	Arab World ¹	West Africa ²
Power distance: extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally	35	40	80	77
Uncertainty avoidance: a society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity	35	46	68	54
Individualism/collectivism: the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups	89	91	38	20
Masculine/feminine: the distribution of roles between genders	66	62	53	46
Long- /short-term orientation: values associated with long-term orientation are thrift and perseverance; values associated with short-term orientation are respect for tradition, fulfilling social obligations, and protecting one's "face"	25	29	—	16

¹ The Arab world is deemed to consist of Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

² West Africa consists of Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone.

In societies where there is a high power-to-distance ratio, as in the case of Kenya, Thailand, and the Philippines, General Sir Richard Dannatt's criticisms of the Labour government's policies in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2006 would be viewed as an unforgivable breach of political neutrality of the military and good CMR.⁴⁹ In the UK, some politicians claimed that Dannatt had overstepped the mark, but service personnel generally believed that at least someone was listening and responding to their concerns, thus standing up for what was right.

The table, derived from the work of Geert Hofstede,⁵⁰ illustrates the different cultural value sets of the UK, the United States, and those countries in which these two powers have been most actively engaged in stabilization activities.

We should recognize, therefore, that the institutional models and systems with which we are most familiar, and seek to advocate elsewhere, encourage and are dependent upon certain types of leadership behavior that may be alien to the societies we seek to assist. The inherent problems of that are then further exposed when we examine the issue of accountability.

Accountability. The application of civil control and civilian and democratic management and the pursuit of professionalism in all sectors require the political will or leadership to initiate it in the first place and a belief that accountability is a necessary and desirable goal and process. Neither is guaranteed. In delivering activities in support of UK defense engagement, it has become evident that the way in which a society defines *accountability* has a direct bearing on the institutions and procedures through which it seeks to ensure it. So, for example, in Spanish, *accountability* means to count; thus, in Uruguay, the practice of accountability relates specifically to the annual report to the legislature on activities. It does not imply or necessitate any follow-up action by that parliament.

In the Slavic languages, there is no separate word for accountability, and its meaning is either subsumed within that of responsibility (in Russian, *ostvetstvennost*) or circumscribed by the use of the term public finance accountability (*publichnaya finansovaya podotchenost*). These interpretations result in systems that focus primarily on expenditure.

What is often difficult to convey is the distinction in English between responsibility and accountability. *Responsibility* is understood in most languages as referring to the duties or tasks one undertakes, and to be *responsible* implies that an individual has some control or authority over the performance

of those duties. In English, accountability advances the concept of responsibility and implies that an individual should be able to explain and answer for his actions and may be legally obliged to do so.

The aim of accountability, as practiced in the UK and the United States, is not only to uncover wrongdoing but also to adopt corrective measures to ensure that individuals and institutions operate within the law. Justice and accountability are viewed as integral to society,⁵¹ and thus overlapping and supportive systems and procedures are put into place to ensure it. In other cultures, the same value may not be placed on accountability and thus existing or proposed bureaucratic systems may prove inadequate to the task. Where do the fault lines lie?

- ❖ Powers of oversight and accountability may be guaranteed in the constitution or may exist in legislative procedures; however, they may not be exercised because legislators are unaware of those powers.
- ❖ Investigations into executive actions may be deemed inappropriate challenges to the leader.
- ❖ There is an assumption in the UK and the United States that effective systems of accountability are dependent on an impartial bureaucracy.⁵² That assumption may not apply or can pose an inherent problem to clan- or tribal-based societies (for example, Kosovo, Somalia, Democratic Republic of the Congo).
- ❖ There is an increasing sense that demands for greater accountability and anticorruption campaigns are simply

another form of conditionality imposed by donors on aid. Given that target countries have seen so many conditions imposed in the past, they are willing to pay lip service to combating corruption, but may not be willing to take any meaningful action. There is also concern that those providing advice do not follow it in all instances. The failure to address allegations of sexual abuse by United Nations peacekeepers in the Balkans and Haiti in any meaningful way is cited as an example of this perfidy.

Leadership, personal responsibility, and accountability are integral to Western conceptions of, and prescriptions for, civil control and civilian and democratic management. If those prescriptions are to prove more than just well-funded exercises in futility, the models must take account of fundamental cultural differences.

Conclusion

As CMR morphed into SSR, now SSR is morphing into stabilization. The inherent weaknesses and cultural biases of civil-military relations theory are now being exposed on a much larger canvas, and this could prove to be an issue of significant consequence. It is recognized in both the UK and the United States that government must review and seek to ensure that stabilization activities are conducted in more effective and efficient ways.⁵³ The prescriptions for reform, however, tend to focus on the internal business space of the organizations engaged in stabilization activities, not on the cultural and social realities of the countries requiring stabilization. As I have argued elsewhere, reform agendas are more likely to succeed if those providing assistance fully acknowledge the real structural, cultural, and strategic differences between them and those they seek to assist.⁵⁴ Until that occurs, the principles and practices we seek to impart will continue to be received politely, but there is little chance that they will be applied in the short to mid term, and thus there is little hope that stabilization will be achieved. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ Douglas L. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society* 26, no. 7 (1999), 7; David Chuter, "Civil-Military Relations: Is There Really a Problem?" *Journal of Security Sector Management* 7, no. 2 (2009), 1.

² Francesco Mancini, *In Good Company? The Role of Business in Security Sector Reform* (London: Demos, 2005).

³ Chuter; James Burk, "Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society* 29, no. 1 (2002).

⁴ See Samuel Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962), 23–60.

⁵ Rebecca Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," *Armed Forces and Society* 22, no. 1 (Fall 1995). Schiff has also published *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations* (Abingdon, Oxon: Cass Military Studies, 2009).

⁶ Bland, 8.

⁷ See United Kingdom (UK) Ministry of Defence, *Defence Diplomacy: Strategic Defence Review Supporting Essay No. 4* (London: Crown Copyright, 1998), 12.

⁸ Habib Zafarullah, Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, and Mohammad Habibur Rahman, “The Civil Service System of Bangladesh,” in *Civil Service Systems in Asia*, ed. John P. Burns and Bidhya Bowornwathana (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2001), 26.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., 27.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² John P. Burns and Bidhya Bowornwathana, “Asian Civil Service Systems in Comparative Perspective,” *Civil Service Systems in Asia*, 5.

¹³ Habib Zafarullah, “Shaping Public Management for Governance and Development: The Cases of Pakistan and Bangladesh,” *International Journal of Organization Theory and Behaviour* 9, no. 3 (Fall 2006), 354.

¹⁴ Martin Meredith, *The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence* (London: Free Press, 2005).

¹⁵ Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala and Philip Osafo Kwaako, “Nigeria’s Economic Reforms: Progress and Challenges,” Working Paper No. 6 (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, March 2007).

¹⁶ See, for example, Mohamed Amin et al., *Defenders of Pakistan* (Lahore, Pakistan: Ferozsons Ltd., 1988).

¹⁷ Moriss Janowitz argued that a *profession* was one in which individuals demonstrated a special skill, in the case of the military the use of force, a system of corporate administration, and a sense of identity. See *The Professional Soldier* (London: Free Press, 1964).

¹⁸ Interview with Colonel (Ret.) Shiam Viduopola, Sri Lankan army, conducted on April 4, 2009; Zafarullah.

¹⁹ Rahul Bedi, “Interview with Lt. Gen. Pankaj Joshi, Chief of India’s Integrated Defence Staff,” *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, July 23, 2003, 32; Rahul Bedi, “Divided Interests,” *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, May 21, 2003, 18–24.

²⁰ UK Defence Attaché E, survey submitted on April 5, 2009; UK Defence Attaché S, survey submitted on April 1, 2009. See also Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence, *Building Stability Overseas Strategy* (London: Crown Copyright, 2011).

²¹ UK defense relations activities are defined as the range of nonoperational international engagements conducted by the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces in support of UK long-term foreign, defense, and wider security policy objectives. See UK Ministry of Defence, *Delivering Security in a Modern World, the Defence White Paper* (Norwich, UK: TSO, 2003).

²² United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 3.

²³ African Union, “Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 2003, available at <www.africa-union.org/root/au/organs/psc/Protocol_peace%20and%20security.pdf>.

²⁴ InterAfrica Group/Justice Africa, “African Union and Peace and Security,” Issues Paper for the African Union Symposium, 2002, available at <www.uneca.org/adfiii/docs/issuepn3.pdf>.

²⁵ See Mats Berdal, *Building Peace after War* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009).

²⁶ John Allen Williams, “The Military and Society Beyond the Post-Modern Era,” *Orbis* 52, no. 2 (2008), 199–216.

²⁷ Edwin R. Micewski, “Leadership Responsibility in Post-Modern Armed Forces,” available at <www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/10_cma_03_lrp.pdf>. See also Charles C. Moskos, John A. Williams, and David R. Segal, *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 1.

²⁸ Williams.

²⁹ Moskos, Williams, and Segal, 1–2.

³⁰ Janowitz made this argument in *The Professional Soldier*, but it has also been advanced in the writings of Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt in their edited volume *Political Armies: The Military and National Building in the Age of Democracy* (London: Zed Books, 2002). We can also see this notion advanced within the policy framework of postconflict state- and nation-building.

³¹ Gunnar Simonsen, “Building ‘National’ Armies—Building Nations?” *Armed Forces and Society* 33, no. 4 (2007).

³² See, for example, David Chandler, *International State-Building: The Rise of Post-Liberal Governance* (London: Routledge, 2010); or Paul Collier, *Wars, Guns & Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places* (London: Vintage Books, 2010).

³³ Bland refers to the sharing of responsibility for control between civilian leaders and military officers. See Bland, 9.

³⁴ Teri McConville, “The Principles of Management Applied to the Defence Sector,” in *Managing Defence in a Democracy*, ed. Laura R. Cleary and Teri McConville (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2006), 109.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 110.

³⁶ David Chuter, *Defence Transformation: A Short Guide to the Issues* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2000).

³⁷ Robin Luckham, *Democratization in the South: The Jagged Wave* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1996), 14.

³⁸ Thomas C. Bruneau and Floriana Cristiana Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations,” *Democratization* 15, no. 5 (December 2008).

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1957), 8–10.

⁴¹ Over the last 8 years, I have asked thousands of military personnel in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Central and Eastern Europe to define what it means to be a *professional politician*. Nine times out of 10, their response is that “a professional politician is a professional liar.”

⁴² Collier details the nature of politics for what he terms the *bottom billion*.

⁴³ Arch Puddington, “Freedom in the World 2011: The Authoritarian Challenge to Democracy,” available at <www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=130&year=2011>.

⁴⁴ Chandler, 22–42; R. Parris, *At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Robin Luckham, “Democratic Strategies for Security in Transition and Conflict,” in *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of the Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies* (London: Zed Books, 2003), 3–28.

⁴⁵ Romie Frederick Littrell, “Cultural Mythology and Global Leadership in England,” in *Cultural Mythology and Global Leadership*, ed. Eric H. Kessler and Diana J. Wong-Mingji (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2009), 148.

⁴⁶ Eric H. Kessler and Diana J. Wong-Mingji, “Introduction to Cultural Mythology and Global Leadership,” in *Cultural Mythology and Global Leadership*, 12.

⁴⁷ Geert Hofstede, *Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviours, Institutions and Organizations across Nations*, 2^d ed. (London: Sage, 2001), 500.

⁴⁸ Fred O. Walumbwa and George O. Ndege, “Cultural Mythology and Global Leadership in Kenya,” in *Cultural Mythology and Global Leadership*, 234–235.

⁴⁹ Sarah Sands, “Sir Richard Dannatt: A Very Honest General,” *The Daily Mail*, October 12, 2006.

⁵⁰ Hofstede.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 108, 251.

⁵² Paul du Gay, *In Praise of Bureaucracy* (London: Sage, 2000).

⁵³ Derek S. Reveron, *Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2010); *Building Stability Overseas Strategy*.

⁵⁴ Laura R. Cleary, “Triggering Critical Mass: Identifying the Factors for a Successful Defence Transformation,” *Defence Studies* 11, no. 1 (2011), 43–65; Rory Stewart and Gerald Knauss, *Can Intervention Work?* (New York: Norton, 2011).

Taking Stock

Interagency Integration in Stability Operations

BY CAROLINE R. EARLE

C current Department of Defense (DOD) policy directs the development of capabilities within the Department to foster integration of the stability operations mission internally as well as externally with interagency partners. This policy identifies support to integrated civilian-military efforts as a key element of successful stability operations. DOD efforts parallel those taken by U.S. Government civilian agencies that respond to national level guidance endorsing the importance of stability operations missions and emphasizing the importance of civil-military integration in those missions. The question remains, how is the U.S. Government faring in achieving the objectives of interagency integration for stability operations?

This article will explore progress to date, outline some remaining challenges, and posit areas that can be improved. It will cover key elements of integration including availability of authorities (congressional mandates as well as executive-level and departmental policies), guidance (doctrine), financial resources, civilian capacity, concepts for integrated planning and operations, integrated organizational structures to prepare and execute operations, and training strategies for civil-military teams.

Since 2005, DOD policy has recognized stability operations as an essential military mission of equal importance to major combat operations, first appearing with the issuance of DOD Directive (DODD) 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations* (2005), and superseded by DOD Instruction (DODI) 3000.05, *Stability Operations* (2009). This policy reflects support to national guidance embodied in National Presidential Security Directive (NSPD) 44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations* (2005), and congressional legislation outlined in Title XVI of the fiscal year (FY) 2009 National Defense Authorization Act, *Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management*.

DODD 3000.05 emphasized the need for DOD to support development of civilian capacities for stability and reconstruction operations and to be prepared to develop its own capacities to accomplish the mission alone if called upon. The DOD Directive and Instruction both laid out

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guidance for the development of appropriate concepts, doctrine, tasks, and training to support planning and execution of this mission. In 2008, the U.S. Army developed Field Manual (FM) 3–07, *Stability Operations*, in response to this guidance, and the development of a new Joint Publication (JP) 3–07, *Stability Operations*, was initiated in 2009.

while DOD has a capability to fulfill most short- to mid-term requirements for stability operations, it cannot achieve long-term strategic success alone

A key aspect of 3000.05 that was captured in FM 3–07 and in the August 2011 version of JP 5–0, *Joint Planning*, is the recognition that the stability operations mission cannot be accomplished by the military alone, and that it requires coordination with and support to U.S. Government interagency partners to achieve unity of effort. JP 5–0 emphasizes the need for comprehensive efforts by the United States in stabilization operations. DODI 3000.05 further emphasizes the importance of integrated civilian and military efforts for successful conduct of stability operations, and outlines actions the Department should take to foster this integration.

DOD has provided regular progress reports on implementation of 3000.05. In May 2009, a report to Congress highlighted the biggest challenge to integration as the lack of civilian department and agency capacity; while DOD has a capability to fulfill most short- to mid-term requirements for stability operations, it cannot achieve long-term strategic success alone. The report recognized the need for better U.S. Government architectures and capacity for integrated civil-military

action as well as more resources to increase civilian expeditionary capacity within civilian departments.¹

At present the challenges outlined in the 2009 DOD report to Congress remain persistent gaps. This article will elaborate on this point, drawing from personal research on stability operations and interagency coordination issues to examine current progress and prospects for interagency integration in stability operations. It starts with a background discussion on the development of U.S. Government guidance and structures for stability operations from the 1997 interagency planning and management policies of the Bill Clinton administration through to the 2008 passage of legislation during the George W. Bush administration codifying the creation of a new deployable civilian capacity. Next, it evaluates what has been accomplished to date on key concepts (processes and organizational constructs), doctrine, and training for the planning and execution of stability operations. Finally, the article concludes with an assessment of future prospects for interagency integration in stability operations based on planned reform efforts and the likely political environment of the future.

Guidance and Structures for Stability Operations

The U.S. Government has set forth a variety of guidance documents since 1997 aimed at improving the ability of the government to address what DOD calls stability operations and civilian agencies have called reconstruction and stabilization operations.

During the Clinton administration, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, created new planning and implementation

mechanisms for complex contingency operations. During that time, DOD published the *Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations*, and PDD 56 encouraged all agencies to distribute it in order to support creation of a “cadre of professionals familiar with this integrated planning process.”²

PDD 56 emphasized the need for close integration of civilian and military components of an operation to “maximize the effect of judicious military deployments,” and also emphasized that “integrated planning and effective management of agency operations early on in an operation can avoid delays, reduce pressure on the military to expand its involvement in unplanned ways, and create unity of effort within an operation that is essential for success of the mission.”³

PDD 56 called for a cadre of professionals familiar with the integrated planning process, and also for the National Security Council (NSC), with the support of the Department of State and DOD, to work with the appropriate U.S. Government educational institutions to form and conduct an annual interagency training program for mid-level managers in the development and implementation of political-military plans for complex operations. PDD 56 was never fully implemented because it met with bureaucratic resistance. Eventually the directive was rescinded by incoming President Bush in 2001.

During the early years of the Afghanistan and Iraq engagements, the Bush administration had no overarching directives to cover the interagency coordination issues related to complex contingencies. Several specific directives were issued related to Iraq. On January 20, 2003, NSPD 24, *Post-War Iraq Reconstruction*, placed DOD in charge of managing reconstruction efforts following the invasion (replacing

the interagency planning process that typically would have been civilian-led). Reconstruction in Iraq was carried out initially by the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and later subsumed by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). On May 11, 2004, NSPD 36, *United States Government Operations in Iraq*, then transferred responsibilities for relief and reconstruction operations from CPA/DOD to the State Department, placing the Chief of Mission at the new U.S. Embassy in charge.

S/CRS was charged with promoting a whole-of-government approach to reconstruction and stabilization operations

According to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) analysis of February 2010, “both ORHA and CPA lacked sufficient personnel, contracting, information technology, and financial resources to carry out their respective missions.”⁴ The SIGIR also cited the ambiguity of NSPD 36 as a cause of interagency coordination problems among State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and DOD. Despite State Department designation as lead for reconstruction efforts, confusion was caused by the blurred lines of authority and responsibility with DOD regarding contracting for reconstruction programs because State did not have the capacity or experience to run such a large effort.

In July 2004, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was created within the State Department to address the civilian deficit. S/CRS was charged with promoting a whole-of-government

approach to reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) operations; its mission was to “lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so that they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy.”⁵

The November 2005 issuance of DODD 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations*, identified stability operations as a “core U.S. military mission” that should receive emphasis comparable to major combat operations. It signaled DOD commitment to developing stability operations doctrine, resources, and capacities; it also signaled DOD support for U.S. Government planning, preparations, and conduct of stability operations, and emphasized the importance of integrated civilian and military efforts as key to successful stability operations.

The Bush administration followed the department level reform initiatives with an Executive-level directive in December 2005, NSPD 44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, which addressed the void left by the rescission of PDD 56 and outlined changes to move the planning and implementation of R&S operations under the leadership of the State Department. This directive gave S/CRS the mandate to lead the development of a new R&S civilian capacity and called for the integration of “stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate.” Finally the directive established an NSC-level Policy Coordination Committee for R&S operations cochaired by the coordinator for S/CRS and

a member of the NSC staff who was directed to manage development, implementation, and coordination of R&S policies.⁶ In 2008, Title XVI of the FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act codified S/CRS in law, expanded its functions, and authorized the creation of a deployable civilian cadre, now called the Civilian Response Corps (CRC), with funds appropriated to support recruitment and training of members from across the Federal Government including State, USAID, and initially six domestic agencies (currently seven).⁷

Planning Processes and Organizational Constructs

S/CRS worked together with interagency partners over the years since its creation in 2004 with much concept development and experimentation support provided by DOD (primarily carried out by U.S. Joint Forces Command/J9) to develop processes and organizational structures for whole-of-government R&S operations. These concepts were designed to provide standardized frameworks in order to build and prepare civilian capacity, as well as plan, manage, and execute operations using a whole-of-government approach. Application of these standardized interagency structures could then foster greater U.S. Government unity of effort in stability operations. Key concepts developed include the Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation (2005), an Interagency Management System (IMS) for R&S to coordinate the management and execution of operations (2007), and an Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) (2008).

The interagency planning and conflict assessment concepts outlined above have

PRT Farah, State Department, and USAID representatives meet with local Afghan women to discuss health care

ISAF (Alexandra Hoachlander)



been applied (to various degrees) for scenario-based (contingency), real-world steady state and crisis-related cases. The Planning Framework has been renamed the “Integrated Planning Process for Conflict Prevention, Response and Transformation,” and its principles have been utilized by S/CRS to support development of the Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan in Afghanistan, scenario-based contingency planning efforts for the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan, development of a strategic plan for U.S. engagement in Haiti (2005–2006), developing U.S. Government plans to support United Nations–led international efforts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and planning/facilitation support to U.S. Embassy Bangladesh in development of its Mission Strategic Resource Plans in a manner that fosters conflict prevention and stability.⁸

The ICAF is designed to facilitate environment and problem framing and is a valuable part of the planning process that can inform plan development, refinement, execution, and programs that prevent or avert potential conflict by addressing the appropriate aspects within the environment and changing the conflict dynamic. To date, the ICAF has been utilized 35 times (including 4 updates to existing ICAF applications) for 19 countries since 2008.⁹ It continues to be a prominent element of S/CRS operations and support to U.S. Embassies.

ICAF training offered by S/CRS as part of the CRC curriculum is open to military participation, though only after completing the S/CRS Foundations Course and the 3-week Level 1 Planners Course. One concern is that the prerequisites (and the associated time commitment) might hinder

military participation. To date, DOD has not sought development of an ICAF course for delivery to a military audience, although introductory presentations have been given at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and Marine Corps University. Reference to the ICAF is included in current doctrine including JP 3–08, *Interorganizational Coordination for Joint Operations*, FM 3–07, and draft JP 3–07 (still under review). ICAF is not referred to in JP 5–0, *Joint Operations Planning*.

in a departure from typical practice, DOD officially authorized State Department and USAID representatives to participate in the development of strategic guidance

DOD's evolution of its doctrine and policy for planning since 2005 has served to enable greater interagency interaction in military contingency planning for stability operations. While war plans development remains a relatively closed process due to its sensitive and highly classified nature, there are some approved mechanisms developed over recent years that allow appropriate interagency interaction during the contingency plan development process.

A 2009 study analyzed the results of an “experimental” approach to incorporating interagency perspectives into military planning at U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) that took place during 2004–2008.¹⁰ In a departure from typical practice, DOD officially authorized State Department and USAID representatives to participate in the development of strategic guidance framing the plan. Traditionally, there had been limited opportunities for interagency contributions. The typical point of interagency review had been at the coordination stage after

the plan was already developed, and perhaps only to vet its Interagency Annex.

The USEUCOM experimental planning process reflected a greater degree of interagency participation in the development of strategic guidance and the concept of operations for the plan, and participants in the process (civilian and military) acknowledged the added value of interagency contributions. A prominent deficiency identified was the lack of formal interagency collaboration and coordination mechanisms, as well as the need to codify such processes in DOD doctrine, training, and policy guidance. Another finding from the research was that the compressed planning timelines in DOD's adaptive planning construct complicated the accommodation of inputs from the interagency partners, given the lack of civilian capacity to participate in and contribute to such planning.

The Joint Staff–hosted Promote Cooperation forum is a coordination mechanism for interagency input to DOD plans development (including theater campaign plans), although civilian agency “bandwidth” remains a challenge to participation in the many sessions offered. Generally, these events occur at both the working and Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) levels to ensure DOD's plans are complementary to ongoing operations and initiatives at other agencies, especially the State Department. Additionally, a new approach developed by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) Plans to enable interagency input to contingency plans is the “core team” concept. Small interagency groups are formed at the working level to review and provide critical feedback during contingency plan development. The teams usually include participants from the State Department Regional Bureau

and other relevant agencies, all of whom are cleared to participate in sensitive planning. DASD Plans has piloted the concept for country focused plans in different geographic theaters. The goal of the core team model is to help regional desks and DAS-level personnel gain better awareness of DOD planning efforts and areas where interagency coordination and assistance are needed.¹¹

Another avenue for interagency inputs to plans development is the Plans Review cycle, which is part of the adaptive planning approach.¹² Plan reviews are an iterative, internal DOD process scheduled throughout the planning lifecycle that helps prompt clarification of policy issues and identify issues for interagency discussion. In recent years, Office of the Secretary of Defense Policy has engaged senior-level interagency counterparts empowered to provide authoritative feedback on policy issues uncovered during planning at the geographic theater level.¹³ This addresses a gap also identified in the aforementioned USEUCOM study.¹⁴

In addition to the processes outlined above, organizational constructs have been created to foster interagency coordination and civil-military integration for stability operations. Some remain as concepts while others have been applied to real world operations. The IMS remained as a concept, only tested in experiments and U.S. combatant command (COCOM) exercises. This concept included interagency organizational constructs to be stood up during R&S operations at the strategic (Washington/NSC), operational (geographic combatant command), and tactical levels (Embassy and field/province) for interagency management of the planning and execution of operations. This concept was recently integrated into

U.S. military doctrine with inclusion as an annex in the 2011 revision of JP 3-08 and FM 3-07.

While it is heartening that this interagency concept is referenced in military doctrine, the information is outdated. Since the IMS has never been activated, the State Department has decided to drop this concept and remove it from current COCOM exercises conducted with S/CRS and the CRC. It will be replaced by a yet-to-be-developed International Operational Response Framework (IORF) recommended by the State Department's 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). In the interim, beyond the ad hoc structures in Afghanistan, there are no standardized operational structures for civilian interagency participation or civil-military integration in stability operations other than the existing country team platform. This challenges the ability of the government and military to train on civil-military integration during stability operations.

there is no standardized construct for a PRT, but the teams have evolved some common principles in each country application

At the field level, the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept was developed and deployed by the U.S. military first in Afghanistan and later by the State Department in Iraq. There is no standardized construct for a PRT, but the teams have evolved some common principles in each country application. PRTs in Iraq are civilian-led by State Department personnel, while those in Afghanistan were originally

military-led and predominately staffed by military personnel, with a small number of civilian advisors from State, USAID, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).

The U.S. PRT structure in Afghanistan has since evolved to an integrated structure, with a military commander leading the military component of the PRT complemented by a Department of State lead on policy, governance, and political issues, and USAID and USDA representatives providing development advice on local governance and agriculture.¹⁵ More recently, in 2009, additional structures beyond the PRT were developed to foster greater civil-military coordination, integration, and unity of effort in Afghanistan. These include the creation of the Civil-Military Planning and Assessment Sub-section mission within the U.S. Embassy, responsible for developing and maintaining the Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan for Afghanistan, and the establishment of the Office of Interagency Provincial Affairs (IPA) at the Embassy to provide strategy and policy guidance on subnational governance, stabilization issues, Afghan capacity-building programs, and civil-military integration. The IPA's organizational structure parallels the military command and control structure with civilian regional platforms that mirror the regional commands (RCs), each with a senior civilian representative (SCR), who is the counterpart to the military commander in the RC. The SCR's main task is to foster civil-military integration through the civilians working under them at the task force, PRT, and District Support Team (DST) levels.

When exploring how well the U.S. civil-military structures in Afghanistan have fostered integration and unity of effort, several challenges are revealed.¹⁶ Chief among these

are the distinct civilian and military coordination channels, which run parallel to one another with little cross-coordination. That is to say, civilian regional platforms and military RCs typically interact via separate video teleconferencing (VTC) sessions to communicate with the IPA (run by U.S. Embassy civilians) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Command (IJC) (run by the U.S. military). Weekly governance VTCs that connect relevant parties (for example, ISAF, IJC, Embassy, regional platforms, regional commands, and the Afghan government) are an effective and efficient exception. Another structural challenge is the use of separate information technology (IT) networks (four classified and three unclassified) and the lack of cross-platform information-sharing mechanisms between the civilian and military elements. Embassy civilians cannot connect to military liaison officers housed in the Embassy over classified channels, as officers are on separate military classified networks. At regional platforms, only two out of four classified systems are compatible and a limited number of terminals allow interaction with military classified systems. PRTs have access to some, but not every U.S. system, and U.S.-led DSTs had access to Secure Internet Protocol Router and Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange methods of communication. Most unclassified communications are on commercial email channels to bridge the IT barriers. Additional challenges to civil-military integration in Afghanistan include personnel tour length (civilian tours run 6–9 months) and frequent turnover. Furthermore, many U.S. civilian staffers lacked formal professional development in small unit leadership; they typically do not get such opportunities until much later in their careers, in contrast

to the military. Thus, civilians sent to the field often lacked the tools to lead. Finally, mutual unfamiliarity of civilian and military planning and operational constructs challenges civil-military communication.

Training is the key to fostering the civil-military integration necessary for unity of effort in the field. National-level guidance reinforces the importance of training for integrated operations, but current R&S Interagency Training Strategy is not integrated and does not cover the military. In the main, training is carried out by separate civilian and military regimens with separate strategies, to include predeployment training for the integrated Afghanistan PRTs.¹⁷

Future Prospects

The current state of affairs for interagency integration in stability operations reveals several gaps in planning and operations and, based on the current trajectory, an uncertain future.

While civilian and military concepts, doctrine, and training reference the need for increased interagency integration and unity of effort, the civilian and military concepts and processes remain distinct from one another. There are no institutionalized overarching planning and operations concepts in place for stability operations applicable to both civilians and the military, nor is there integrated U.S. Government training for stability operations. These factors challenge progress on achieving unity of effort during operations. While several whole-of-government concepts for planning and operations have been developed since 2005, none has been operationalized or institutionalized in a way that has broken down the separate civilian and military stovepipes.

Concepts for civil-military teams have been developed and applied in an ad hoc fashion, with a lack of consistency or a predictability that challenges training and operations. Training and education levels between civilian and military counterparts are separate and uneven, and integrated training of civil-military teams has not materialized. The number of properly trained, readily deployable civilian experts is dwarfed by the number of military personnel available for such missions. There is no official common U.S.

concepts for civil-military teams have been developed and applied with a lack of consistency or a predictability that challenges training and operations

Government doctrine for stability operations or systematic approach to planning for such operations, and the approved operational construct originally developed for interagency management of stability operations (the IMS) was never implemented and was recently abandoned.

Given these remaining challenges to interagency integration in stability operations, what are the prospects for the future? Two major factors will influence these prospects:

- ❖ The State Department's reform initiatives outlined in the QDDR
- ❖ Budget austerity measures related to the poor state of the economy compounded by political pressure to reduce government spending on engagement abroad.

The relevant QDDR reforms include the creation of the new Bureau of Conflict

Iraqi men unload truck as part of PRT effort to distribute chickens to farmers in Badoush, Iraq

U.S. Navy (Manhea Kim)



Stabilization Operations (CSO) within the State Department, which will absorb the functions of S/CRS. As S/CRS transitions to the new CSO, the scope of its mandate will change and reconstruction will be removed. The CSO focus will be conflict prevention and response with the three elements of prevention, stabilization, and transition.¹⁸ State Department working groups are actively discussing implementation of the S/CRS to CSO transition, looking at different functional areas, and developing work plans with milestones.

One aspect of the changes related to planning is the move away from whole-of-government language to more references to “integrated” planning, which could employ any combination of government agencies. For example, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where Washington supports a broader international effort, integrated planning involves USAID, the Department of Justice, and State along with some DOD military components. In this format, S/CRS is not coordinating U.S. Government integrated planning as envisioned by some of the earlier concepts; rather, it is contributing as a supporting element to a country team or a regional bureau.

The new focus of CSO will be along these lines, to support Embassies with expertise for prevention and crisis response-related requirements. CSO involvement and the use of experts from various government departments will be mission-dependent and plugged into the State Department regional bureau process.

The emerging approach envisions a list of 25 to 30 countries of interest with national security impact that CSO will focus on to be prioritized and framed by the regional bureaus. The intent is to have a more systemized approach within State as to how and when CSO is

called in to help the regional bureaus and/or country teams.

The regional bureaus and Embassies will be the locus of coordination and engagement efforts abroad, and CSO will provide expertise regarding conflict to the larger effort. The CSO will be able to offer civil-military planning and assessment expertise as well as functional subject matter expertise drawn from the CRC. The plan is for the Embassy to identify recommended requirements for expertise for missions it has defined and request CSO support to fulfill these requirements. The definition of CSO's role is under review, but the intent is that CSO will participate in mechanisms for validating and refining requirements up front. Based on personal past research and interaction with CRC member agencies outside State and USAID, there will be great interest on their part to inform the decisions for mission and expertise requirements. If not already addressed, this issue should be considered by the CSO working groups to ensure continued support and engagement by the CRC agencies.

One working group is looking at future CSO coordination with the military, which according to discussions with a current S/CRS staff member will likely include conflict prevention as a priority area, making early engagement the focus for civil-military interaction in phase zero. That said, crisis response and transition efforts will still be part of the CSO mandate. Given that State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (State/PM) is the focal point for coordination of State inputs to DOD contingency plans or theater campaign plan development, as well as DOD participation in steady state country planning, it will be interesting to see how CSO implements phase zero-focused interaction with DOD and how State/PM will be involved.

The other QDDR reform relevant to stability operations is the development of a new IORF to replace aspects envisioned in the IMS construct mentioned earlier. The lead for the IORF development is not S/CRS or CSO, but rather the Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration. There have been debates within State and USAID regarding what the framework should look like, and different concepts have been proposed. A completion date for this framework has not been publicly announced, and few details have been released on the concepts.

one drawback to CSO self-run exercises is that they will not be as well resourced as DOD exercises

In the realm of training, CSO hopes to test new standard operating procedures built for the CSO to work with other elements of government, and will seek to conduct more exercises that provide individual training for the CRC on work with civil affairs and train and advise teams along with more field-based training and exercises. Additionally, more civilian-only exercises are planned where DOD would be brought in to observe. S/CRS, which originally depended on DOD support, has since developed in-house capacity to design and evaluate its own exercises. This capacity, if retained in the new CSO, would enable the Bureau to carry out the ambitions articulated previously. One drawback to CSO self-run exercises is that they will not be as well resourced as DOD exercises (given the disparity in funding between departments) and thus may not provide as many opportunities for exercising civil-military integration for stability operations. The CSO team

will need to focus its work and collaborate with military counterparts to come up with creative ways to bridge the resource gap and provide such opportunities.

On the topic of resources, the budget austerity measures under the congressional Budget Control Act will certainly affect the ability of the CSO to develop its own internal bureau capacity as well as the CRC cadre. The draft version of the FY12 State and Foreign Operations budget for the CSO, which includes CRC funding, has already been cut severely from the original submission. The domestic agency member departments of the CRC rely on CSO funding to hire and fund their CRC expert cadres, as stabilization operations are not within their core agency mandates and most do not have internal funding authorized to support stabilization operations. Even if they had such funding, domestic agency budgets are being cut so dramatically that it is unlikely they would be able to take up the slack from any CSO budget cuts.

These two issues, budget austerity measures and the QDDR reform efforts, will likely affect the further development of civilian capacity for stability operations along with prospects for interagency integration into them. The outlook seems headed more toward development of a smaller core civilian capacity for planning and assessment than originally envisioned, with some surge capacity expertise in specific functional areas to support small- to medium-size crisis prevention and response missions run out of U.S. Embassies, which may sometimes support international efforts.

The current trajectory does not indicate that Washington is developing an interagency capacity capable of handling something on

the scale of the efforts in Iraq or Afghanistan. The U.S. Government has not been able to develop civilian targets to fully support the ambitions for those missions, and with reductions in budgets, that is not apt to change in the near future. Accordingly, ambitions for involvement in future stability operations engagement should be scaled back to match the likely capacity. Prospects for civil-military integration will probably be more possible on a much smaller scale in more targeted sub-mission areas.

What does this mean for DOD as it moves forward with implementation of DODI 3000.05 and other guidance related to stability operations? DOD should take the above factors into account when developing its contingency plans for stability operations and adjust its planning assumptions accordingly. Recently revised DOD Joint Doctrine 2011 on planning and operations will need to be revised once again when there is more clarity on the status of the CSO Bureau in the State Department and future capacity and role of the CRC, and when a more concrete concept for the IORF exists. In the interim, DOD doctrine will lag behind reality regarding State Department operational constructs. To avoid misplaced expectations, DOD will need to ensure that its planners and operators are trained and kept current on the state of transitions within civilian agencies (to include the fluidity of civilian capacity for stability operations) so they can carry out their work successfully.

Despite the lower capacity levels of civilian counterparts and the lack of operational structures for civil-military integration for stability operations, this should not mean complete DOD disengagement with civilian counterparts or the end of interagency

coordination. To the contrary, during times of austerity it behooves DOD and its civilian counterparts to work on ways to engage more strategically to ensure that limited U.S. Government resources are applied to the best effect. DOD should continue to seek interagency coordination for steady state planning to foster prevention and avoidance of crises requiring stability operations missions. This includes interagency coordination in theater campaign plan development all the way down to the country plan level, and appropriate engagement with the CSO on its prevention activities.

For contingency planning, DOD should seek continued senior-level engagement with State to coordinate on priority countries to include the 25 to 30 that are envisioned for CSO focus.

Finally, if it is not already happening, State should invite DOD inputs to the QDDR implementation discussions specifically related to stability operations to ensure that DOD can adjust accordingly and better complement future U.S. Government civilian activities. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ Department of Defense, *Report to Congress on the Integration of Interagency Capabilities into Department of Defense Planning for Stability Operations* (May 2009), 15, available at <[http://pksoi.army.mil/doctrine_concepts/documents/Rpt%20to%20Congress%20on%20the%20Integration%20of%20IA%20Caps%20into%20DoD%20Planning%20\(May%2009\).pdf](http://pksoi.army.mil/doctrine_concepts/documents/Rpt%20to%20Congress%20on%20the%20Integration%20of%20IA%20Caps%20into%20DoD%20Planning%20(May%2009).pdf)>.

² Presidential Decision Directive/National Security Council 56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations* (May 1997), available at <www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm>.

³ *Ibid.*, 2–3.

⁴ Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, *Applying Iraq's Hard Lessons to the Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations* (February 2010), 5, available at <www.sigir.mil/applyinghardlessons/index.html>.

⁵ Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) Mission Statement, available at <www.state.gov/s/crs/about/index.htm>.

⁶ National Security Presidential Directive 44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization* (December 7, 2005), available at <www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html>.

⁷ The seven domestic agencies are the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, and Transportation. The Department of Treasury, one of the original six Civil Response Corps members, withdrew; Energy and Transportation were added in spring 2010.

⁸ Interview with mid-level S/CRS management staff, August 30, 2011.

⁹ Interview with Dr. Cynthia Irmer, Senior Conflict Prevention Officer, S/CRS, August 26, 2011; Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework applications worksheet, received from Dr. Irmer, S/CRS, August 24, 2011.

¹⁰ Drawn from an Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) study conducted for U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) by the author. References to IDA USEUCOM study results drawn from publicly released summary findings in Caroline R. Earle, “Bridging the Interagency Gap for Stability Operations,” *IDA Research Note* (Fall 2010), 7, available at <www.ida.org/upload/research%20notes/rn_fall2010.pdf>.

¹¹ Interview with Dr. Janine Davidson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, August 31, 2011.

¹² Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3141.01D, *Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans* (April 24, 2008), available at <www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3141_01.pdf>.

¹³ Davidson.

¹⁴ Earle.

¹⁵ Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team Handbook* (February 2011), 43–44, available at <<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/11-16/11-16.pdf>>.

¹⁶ Interview with Tom Baltazar, former Deputy Senior Civilian Representative, Regional Platform RC–Southeast, U.S. Agency for International Development, September 8, 2011.

¹⁷ Interview with IDA adjunct staff member Waldo Freeman regarding his research findings on Provincial Reconstruction Team training, August 16, 2011.

¹⁸ Information on the stand up of the Bureau of Conflict Stabilization Operations based on an interview with S/CRS staff, August 30, 2011.



British soldier prepares to attach load onto Chinook helicopter during resupply mission at Camp Bastion, Afghanistan

After 2015 The Next Security Era for Britain

BY JOHN MACKINLAY

The great international intervention in Afghanistan is due to run down to a token presence by 2014. Foreign troops are returning home already, and their continued reduction will change the nature of the operation there. Closer to Europe, the Arab Spring has displaced more than a million people along the north coast of Africa. The efforts of those refugees to migrate toward Europe could begin to unsettle the region. Meanwhile, the European economy seems to be heading for long-term decline, and last summer's rioting in the United Kingdom (UK) has alarmed

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politicians and damaged British urban areas. Looking ahead, this article argues that 2015 may mark the start of a rather different security era, one in which the British government may have to determine whether the safety of its own population takes priority over supporting U.S. operations overseas.

the next security era may bring the need for and prospect of a new type of armed force

Following the relative calm of the Cold War, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) armies have experienced a turbulent 20 years of campaigning punctuated by several dramatic changes in their operational concept. After the collapse of the Berlin Wall, there have been three short but distinct security eras, starting with a period of peacekeeping led by the United Nations. Global disillusionment after Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia led to the next period, characterized by peace-support operations under NATO leadership. The current period, which began after September 11, 2001, has been dominated by coalition interventions led by the United States. Each of these successive chapters has been defined by a different leadership, an increasingly muscular approach, and a change of doctrine: “peacekeeping” was followed by “peace-support operations,” which was followed by “counterinsurgency.”¹ The start of an entirely different security era could arise in 2015. If that is a probability, should the British not be asking with greater determination what the approaching chapter might look like? Will the consequences of global change, climate change, migration, and above all popular opinion at home compel the British to abandon

their expeditionary pretensions and alter the nature and role of their armed forces?

The next security era may bring the need for and prospect of a new type of armed force. For several centuries, the worst scenario facing most states has been invasion by another state. Armed forces could be raised for expansionist ambitions, but the worst-case scenario remained the possibility of invasion. For this reason, the role and status of the armed forces has for some time been fixed into the state’s hierarchy by constitution, academic theory, and public sentiment. Their deployment or adaptation for any other purpose—such as emergency relief or even countering insurgency—meets with disapproval and resistance. Socially and constitutionally, the armed forces in most NATO countries have a rigid function that requires them to prepare constantly for an attack by the armed forces of another state. This role is enshrined by military conservatism, academic orthodoxy, and the prospect of the awful consequences of their failure to protect the state.

In 2011, the idea that being overrun by another state is the worst thing that can happen may be under pressure. Climate change and migration bring with them invasions of another kind that are just as violent and deadly as an attack by another state. In distant regions in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, urbanization and desertification have shifted populations from rural areas, concentrating them along the coastlines. In 2004, when a tsunami swept across Southeast Asia, the wave and its aftermath could be regarded as the worst-case scenario for the 200,000 dead and the millions who were displaced. In Japan, the devastation of the 2011 earthquake and tsunami, complicated by a nuclear emergency, was reminiscent of damage caused in 1945. Also in 2011, 29,000 children died in 90 days during an emergency in Somalia fueled by violence, drought, and famine; and in Pakistan, 1,500 died and 200,000 were

made homeless by repeated floods. Dealing with these catastrophes has been a major test for individual nations as well as for the international community, and it raises the question of whether the threat of invasion is the most likely worst-case scenario, especially for those devastated populations.

Is it unimaginable that Britain may soon find itself in need of armed forces that are much more versatile and have greater capabilities for dealing with other kinds of worst-case scenarios? In 2011, the short-term success of rioters and demonstrators associated with the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Iran, Libya, Bahrain, Oman, Djibouti, Kuwait, and Morocco seemed to push the techniques of political violence over the threshold of a new chapter. Across the region, the images and techniques of mass deployment by the population of one state seemed to incite violence in another. The crowds that surged into the streets were impulsive, leaderless, and without a deliberated manifesto. Their guidance through the streets relied on the widespread possession of cell phones and access to the Internet. In the UK, similarly leaderless crowds using similarly impulsive networking methods surged onto the streets of London, Manchester, and Birmingham.

Looking ahead, especially in view of the speed of these physical and social changes, there is a strong possibility that the next security era after 2015 may turn out to be surprisingly disconnected from recent experience. When the troops come home from Afghanistan, their future tasks may lie well beyond traditional military competencies. However, if these tasks are likely to be different and surprising, there are at least some factors and planning assumptions that can be anticipated.

In particular, there are three known issues that must influence the British approach to the next security era. First of all, the British may have reached the end of their brigade-level

expeditionary competence, and future overseas operations, such as they may be, will have a different scale and purpose than the forces that went to Afghanistan and Iraq. Second, population migration and the effects of global change may start to put pressure on the UK's own stability as part of Europe. Third, the British at present have no plausible design for using armed forces in the nontraditional roles suggested by these changes and therefore need to develop one as a matter of urgency.

The Expeditionary Era Ends

A variety of factors oppose the notion that for Britain, the post-2015 era will be a continuation of the current security regime. For a decade, the British have accepted that overseas expeditions will be provided from the military, and the police will deal with terrorism at home. This tidy assumption is set to change. The likelihood of further military expeditions is diminishing, and their enormous cost in treasure and manpower sits badly with their tangible but minimal benefit. British politicians have not been able to explain to their constituencies how operations in Iraq and Afghanistan improve security in the streets of the homeland.² After several Parliamentary Defence Committee hearings, the population and its key communicators are measurably unconvinced about the necessity, success, and professionalism of military expeditions. News of the staggering cost of these operations comes at a time when Europe and the United States are struggling with the mother of all financial crises.

Moreover, the Bush-era security imperatives, which launched the war on terror and the military expeditions that followed, are eroding. Al Qaeda and its affiliates have altered their game, and their inspirational potency has greatly diminished. Military expeditions to deny al Qaeda the territory from which to plan and put together

their operations are not an absolute necessity for British survival. The government's insistence that the 120 or so UK-domiciled individuals who have so far been convicted for Islamist-related offences were inspired and mentored from al Qaeda bases overseas sits uncomfortably with nongovernmental research that finds 68 percent of these individuals "have no direct links with any organisation currently proscribed by the UK government."³ In the next security era, the government cannot reasonably use the al Qaeda bogeyman to justify further expeditions. Politicians have begun to point out that the tenuous benefit to national interests in terms of improved home security does not warrant the human cost of a military expedition.⁴ The public can see for themselves that al Qaeda is faltering, and that for several years it has failed to grab the front-page media space that it strives so hard to reoccupy. Hardcore war-on-terror enthusiasts will say that that is a victory for former President Bush and his antiterrorism strategy, but the continuing evolution of insurgency provides more powerful reasons why al Qaeda's significance is waning. During the violent surges of the Arab Spring, the only published pictures of al Qaeda's iconic leader were of a frail old man watching his best television moments on a home video shortly before his death.

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Public support for UK expeditionary missions has been in decline for some time, and a large-scale, regime-changing, regime-supporting intervention seems inconceivable after 2015. In 2003, the UK decision to send British tanks and

troops to Iraq provoked the largest peacetime demonstration ever held in London.⁵ UK politicians who had supported the U.S. invasion met with public abuse from their constituencies and some were dismissed in later elections. Looking ahead, regardless of failing public support, the Foreign Office will argue for its continuing desire to influence events overseas using British armed forces. However, at present there is no plausible strategy that justifies or underwrites a brigade-level intervention capability. Moreover, in the present fiscal climate, hopes to retain or, at some future date, resuscitate that capability are unrealistic. To be credible, a UK strategy would have to show that intervening overseas would be an act of absolute necessity and not merely a desire to retain that choice. The British population is more certain that "boxing above its weight" with the United States is not intelligent, adds little to security, and that the cost in terms of dead and wounded is more than it needs to pay.

Converging Pressures on Europe's Domestic Stability

Meanwhile, in the UK, the scale of immigration since 1948 and its social consequences have become a condition for disaffection. In May 2001, several months before the attacks on New York City and Washington, DC, rioting between Muslims and "white youths" in the greater Manchester area caused £25 million (approximately USD 38.7 million) worth of damage, and more than 200 police officers were injured. A Home Office commission found that the cultural isolation of migrant communities had encouraged separation, ignorance, and fear between the immigrant communities and the UK's majority culture.⁶

Although in the intervening decade there has been a great effort by successive governments and the Home Office to encourage social cohesion, the continuing concentration of immigrants

into particular boroughs is now being reinforced by internal migration. White populations are moving out of areas with a high ethnic minority population, which has resulted in a rapid increase in the relative size of migrant communities living in the same areas. Integration becomes more difficult to achieve in these large and socially isolated communities, and when pressure on schools, public services, social care, and housing becomes acute, then interethnic tension begins to rise. Meanwhile, migration into the UK continues to increase, and in 2010, the annual net migration was the highest figure on record.⁷ Looking ahead, we need to know whether the Home Office has set right the problems of cohesion and exclusion that have led to interethnic rioting. According to the 2010 Parliamentary Commission on the *Prevent Strategy*, it has not been wholly successful. If this is correct and the UK is barely managing to keep its head above the water in this respect, then the obvious questions for the next security era seem to be how much more migration we can safely absorb, and what is likely to happen if demographic change overloads the UK living space to an unbearable degree.

Europe is unprepared for a security era dominated by insecure and migrating populations. Its defense reviewers acknowledge that population growth and climate change are increasing the scale of disasters in other regions of the world, but they seem less concerned to know whether these massive upheavals will stress domestic stability in Europe. We must hope for the best-case scenario and that Europe will be a responder to tragedies in other regions rather than to massive disturbances on its own territory. But the less-than-best-case scenario is that the effects of global changes may impinge visibly on the European homeland population.

Recent events in North Africa are worth considering. The southern and eastern

Mediterranean states from Syria to Morocco are, at the time of this writing, in violent transition. Huge segments of their populations are below the age of 20. All of the countries have high rates of unemployment, and in most cases their young people have been living under governments that are authoritarian and corrupt.⁸ Rioting and violent repression have created large populations of internally displaced people, as well as refugees fleeing to bordering states. In some cases, a fresh upheaval adds to an existing tide of displaced people—for instance, to the 1 million Iraqi refugees who are already in Syria having fled from their own country in 2006.⁹ In Libya, there are a quarter of a million internally displaced refugees and a staggering 1 million who have temporarily moved out of the country to Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, Niger, and Chad.

it is crucially disabling that there is no Europe-wide policy or strategy for dealing with massive upheavals overseas and their effects

It is impossible to see the long-term consequences while these massive disturbances in North Africa and the eastern Mediterranean are still continuing, but it is probable that the movement of large displaced populations so close to Europe has already resulted in an increased flow of unregistered migrants into Europe. This pressure falls on Europe as a whole and not on individual states. European border security is in principle systemic; without effective internal borders, refugees landing in Italy, Spain, or Greece from the sea have comparative freedom of movement until they reach a natural obstacle such as the English Channel. A European state's ability to monitor or control migration is dictated by the weakest point at the outer edge of the system.

At present, Europe seems reluctant to face the possibility of further stress on its living space; its borders are poorly secured, its moral position is weak, and its migration controls are systemic and therefore governed by the inadequacies of the weakest member state. It is crucially disabling that there is no Europe-wide policy or strategy for dealing with massive upheavals overseas and their effects. In the longer term, getting a consensus to deny entry by force to a new wave of migrants may not be possible, especially when a rising number of the ethnicities are also represented in the homeland population. When it comes to taking measures to head off future waves of uprooted families fleeing from the effects of global change and civil war, the moral argument favors the incoming migrants. Our own scientists and government institutions point out that it is our European industries and lifestyle that are the major contributing factors to climate change and the consequent environmental damage that now threaten the world's bottom billion.¹⁰ So it will be morally difficult for rich and safe Europeans to deny entry to a new wave of migrants when it is Europe's prosperous lifestyle (and support of the wrong dictators) that has contributed to the situation. Weakened by economic problems and without a consensus for preemptive action, the possibility that Europe may drift into a security era dominated by its own domestic pressures has to be a planning assumption for the after-2015 security era.

Finding a Relevant Operational Design


During the 9/11 security era, British forces have narrowly and intensively focused on counterinsurgency, in particular in Afghanistan where they ultimately adopted a successful method for dealing with the Taliban uprising.

Although the British army is now operationally more fit, experienced, and professional than at any time since the end of the Cold War, this excellence may have little application after 2015. The Taliban arises from a uniquely poor and underdeveloped society, and the UK and U.S. doctrines for dealing with it offer a strong continuity to the past, but not to the future. The latest version of British and American counterinsurgency doctrine is essentially derived from a methodology to counter Maoist insurgencies; its principles can be traced through the DNA of previous British doctrine back to 1934. The problem is that while British and U.S. troops have been dealing with the ancient societies of Afghanistan, the rest of the world has been moving on at a fast pace, especially in the European region.

In stark contrast to Afghanistan, in postindustrial societies the techniques for uprising and insurgency have continued to evolve rapidly and, particularly after 9/11, the relationship between terrorism and insurgency has altered in an important way. Understanding this progression in the techniques of insurgency is now crucial to what may arise after 2015. A traditional Maoist insurgency was (and in traditional societies still is) largely a political process in which the insurgent's success hinged on having the support of a population that was territorially defined. The insurgency's objectives were tangible: overthrowing a regime, decolonization, secession, and so forth. The significance of the terrorism-insurgency relationship was that terrorism was subordinated to the overall insurgent purpose; it was just one of several techniques that could be used (see figure).

Without popular support, a purely terrorist organization *on its own* could not become a successful uprising, and by definition a terrorist organization that acquired a political wing

Figure. Insurgency Techniques



to organize popular support was on the way to becoming an insurgent movement.

In postindustrial societies, the terrorism-insurgency relationship has become inverted. The pressures of mass migration, diffusion of mass communications, and increasing facility for the man on the street to view televised images from another city or country in real time made it easier for insurgent organizations to challenge fragile governments. It no longer required labor-intensive preparation to organize an insurgency; it was possible to reach a disaffected population spread over several countries and to push them toward activism by other means. Images of terrorist acts transmitted by satellite news channels across the world have an instantly rousing, activating, and recruiting effect. Insurgents were swift to see this, especially in populations where there was a high use of social media or mass communications. In less than two decades after the publication of British counterinsurgency doctrine in 1969, insurgencies arising from swiftly modernizing societies had moved on to become the antithesis of Maoist phases and structure.¹¹ Insurgency was losing its Maoist definitions; it was now more complex, deterritorialized, leaderless, and horizontally structured, with a bottom-up creative energy and an amoeba-like capacity to regrow itself organically.¹²

The vertical structures of the 1950s and 1960s began to resemble the hubs and chains of the Internet; the individual terrorist now lay prominently at the center of a network of activists. The overall insurgency's aims had become ethical and less concerned with physical outcomes. The terrorist act—the bomb blast that would become the visual icon for the movement—was now top priority, and the object was to stage one attack after another.

The problem caused by this inversion is that politicians and security officials failed to understand that insurgency had evolved into other forms. Faced by the effects of a post-Maoist uprising, they made counterterrorist responses to what they hoped was terrorism. Certainly terrorism, was now the visible and sensational start point for every security discussion, but there remained a significant and barely understood anomaly: the violence they faced was more than terrorism, because to survive in the past, the terrorist group had to have effective popular support from its local populace. That was no longer a condition for postmodern terrorism, which can draw on support from a global audience.

The danger by 2015 will be the tendency to see every new form of political violence as terrorism. Political leaders like to blur definitions, and they prefer to call insurgents “terrorists.” Their

defense officials have to be more precise; they cannot rely on opting for a counterterrorist campaign if they are faced by something that is fundamentally insurgent. The planners who are looking ahead must recognize that in a post-industrial society, insurgency evolves more rapidly than their ability to conceptualize a response. This realization becomes crucial to Britain's domestic security and its ability to alter the game in its favor.

Responding to Smart Mobs

Insurgency and the techniques of uprising have recently evolved in other ways. In addition to counterterrorism, government forces will have to deal with the outrage of disaffected communities within the population, and in the future this may become a more serious and difficult task. In the North African region, several factors facilitated the Arab Spring—in particular the possibility that while the government institutions in many affected states were structured vertically (in the fashion of a 19th-century bureaucracy), the young effervescent populations they sought to control, in stark contrast, were organized horizontally in a very 21st-century manner. The result was that the 21st-century populations easily outwitted the slow moving 19th-century metropolitan authorities.

Looking ahead, Europeans should learn from this experience. Summer rioting in UK urban areas has become a growing phenomenon, and according to damage and disruption statistics, the August 2011 riots greatly exceeded those of 2007. The fact that UK summer rioters and their counterparts in North African cities, politically speaking, have absolutely nothing in common is not important. In respect of the security of our populations, what is far more interesting is that there are now more effective techniques for outraged communities, *whatever their cause*, to assemble and cause irrepressible

violence and disorder. This is not about the targets and the causes but rather the “smart mob” techniques that are now being used.

Anticipating this as a possible scenario for the next security era, the problem for future planners is that they will not find many control structures on the government side suited for stabilization in a European context. A campaign to anticipate excessive migration into Europe, secure borders, counter terrorism, deal with urban disorder, and make a humanitarian response to overseas disasters would require an extensive redesigning of the UK's own 19th-century security structures. The first Duke of Wellington would instantly recognize Whitehall's existing arrangements for ministerial control, the vertical lines for operational direction, layered decisionmaking apparatus, and on the ground, the basic military and police units; they still have a familiar 19th-century rigidity.

But in North Africa and Europe, the people in the streets have moved on; they live in the horizontal plane; they form relationships by joining communication highways with their mobile phones and the Internet and as a result have much faster collective decisionmaking cycles than their governments. In a disaffected community, when outrage boils over, they can quickly take over public spaces where they move and communicate spontaneously like a huge flock of starlings in flight, changing direction at a moment's notice to head off to a new destination. As an organism, they have no formal leadership structures, and they act impulsively and change their short-term direction much more quickly than the vertically organized security forces that seek to contain them. The convulsions of the Arab Spring (using the same principle as the urban rioters in the UK) seem to demonstrate that a smart mob can seize the guts of a city and bring it to a halt. What

happens after that is still unclear, but the initial success of the Arab Spring is undisputed.

British thinking in response to this latest evolution is at a standstill. In Whitehall, setting up a relevant comprehensive structure is discussed but not practiced. Throughout the post-9/11 security era, government structures to conduct expeditionary operations overseas have been separated from the ongoing counterterrorist operation in the UK. Doctrinally, the British do not have a bank of researched ideas to help them find a pathway into the next security era. Existing counterinsurgency doctrines describe a concept for campaigning in the world's poorest and most backward societies, but not in London, Manchester, Birmingham, or further afield in Europe where the proliferation of mass communications is, comparatively speaking, sky high.

At the ground level, planners will need to think in terms of a security force that is relevant to a 2015 Europe. In addition to existing police and warfighting arms of the military, a new security force might take the form of gendarme-style units, made up by local reservists with the collective ability to patrol an international border, quell a riot, speak relevant languages, understand how to do stabilization, and travel abroad at short notice. A debate on these lines would recognize the evolutionary gap that has opened at ground level between Europe's 21st-century populations and the 19th-century government structures that are supposed to protect them.

Conclusion

In 20 years, the British have moved with uncomfortable speed through three distinct security eras in which primacy has been given to their expeditionary forces. Each era has demanded a different approach. Consequently, British forces have had to adapt themselves to peacekeeping, peace-support operations, and

counterinsurgency. After 2015, UK planners once again will face the uncertainty of transitioning to the next security era. In this case, the growing relevance of global change, climate

planners will need to think in terms of a security force that is relevant to a 2015 Europe

change, mass migration, a collapsing European economy, and more immediately the effects of the Arab Spring raise the possibility that unimaginable contingencies will confront them. These contingencies will have little continuity with the past. Defense officials cannot reasonably be expected to plan for the unimaginable; however, it is possible to reduce surprise by identifying some anticipated conditions, which may influence the future. These conditions should become planning assumptions:

- ❖ The end of expeditionary operations. The British public and many members of Parliament are not likely to mandate future expeditions on anything approaching their previous scale to support U.S. military missions. After more than a century of overseas campaigning, ending the primacy of expeditionary forces will have a radical effect on the role and organization of the armed forces.
- ❖ Giving primacy to domestic security. In a decade dominated by the unexpected, it must be considered a possibility that the net effect of global changes, migration, a failing European economy, and failure to secure European borders will erode the stability of Europe's urban populations.

- ❖ The need to keep up with the evolution of insurgency. Insurgencies reflect the societies from which they arise. Current doctrines address a 20th-century form of insurgency, which is relevant to traditional societies but not to the kind of insurgency that is being experienced in post-industrial Europe. In addition, European governments have fallen far behind in developing an acceptable response to smart mobs, which can seize control of urban spaces.
- ❖ The need for unimaginable changes. The next security era will *not* be a continuation of the previous century of expeditionary campaigning. Unimaginable changes may be needed to the controlling structures of British security forces and to the role and nature of the forces themselves. This will require an unimaginable change of attitude in Whitehall and some effort to organize a deliberate program to engage a wider community of experts in consideration of these possibilities. This effort should begin now, not in 2015. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ Each period is represented by a unique doctrine: United Kingdom (UK) Army Field Manual Vol. V, *Peacekeeping Operations* (London: Ministry of Defence, 1988); UK Permanent Joint Headquarters (JWP 3–50), *Peace Support Operations* (London: Ministry of Defence, 1996); UK Army Field Manual Vol. I, *Countering Insurgency* (London: Ministry of Defence, 2010).

² House of Commons Defence Committee, “Fourth Report: Operations in Afghanistan,” July 6, 2011.

³ Robin Simcox, Hannah Stuart, and Houriya Ahmed, *Islamist Terrorism—the British Connections* (London: Centre for Social Cohesion, 2010).

⁴ House of Commons Defence Committee.

⁵ BBC News claims over 1,000,000 protestors, but police counted 750,000 on the streets of London. See “‘Million’ march against Iraq war,” BBC News, February 16, 2003, available at <news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2765041.stm>.

⁶ See Home Office, *Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team*, available at <<http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/documents/2001/12/11/communitycohesionreport.pdf>>. See also Bradford Vision, *Community Pride, Not Prejudice: Making Diversity Work in Bradford*, available at <www.bradford2020.com/pride/report.pdf>.

⁷ Official for National Statistics, *Migration Statistics Quarterly Report November 2011—Statistical Bulletin*, available at <www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/migration1/migration-statistics-quarterly-report/november-2011/msqr.html>.

⁸ From a consolidation of United Nations–researched figures made by Migration Watch UK, “Demographic Pressures and Political Instability in North African Countries,” Briefing Paper no 9.29, n.d., available at <www.migrationwatchuk.org/pdfs/briefingPaper_9.29.pdf>.

⁹ Chris Ulack, “Arab Spring’s Looming Refugee Crisis,” *Foreign Policy Online*, June 23, 2011, available at <http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/06/23/the_arab_spring_s_looming_refugee_crisis>.

¹⁰ David King and Gabrielle Walker, *Hot Topic: What We Can Do About Global Warming* (London: Bloomsbury, 2008). Sir David King was once the UK Chief Scientific Advisor.

¹¹ UK Army, *Counter revolutionary Warfare* (London: Ministry of Defence, 1969).

¹² Not all insurgencies across the world are equally evolved; in less developed parts of the world, there are less evolved insurgencies that are still essentially Maoist.

Celebratory atmosphere pervades
Msallata, Libya, on 93^d anniversary
of the Republic of Tripolitania

UN (Jason Founten)



Libya

The Transition Clock

BY JULIAN LINDLEY-FRENCH

I am proud to stand here on the soil of a free Tripoli and on behalf of the American people I congratulate Libya. This is Libya's moment, this is Libya's victory; the future belongs to you.

—Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, October 2011¹

These are heady days in Libya. In the wake of the slaying of former dictator Muammar Qadhafi on October 21, the National Transitional Council (NTC) moved quickly to issue a “declaration of liberation.” The October 22 announcement establishes a timetable for the abolishment of the NTC and lays out a road map to political transition. Elections for a public

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national conference are to be held within 8 months, which will in turn appoint a new prime minister, an interim government, and a constituent authority charged with drafting the new constitution that will then be put to a referendum. If the constitution is approved, general elections will take place within 6 months.

the country is awash with weapons and some old scores are being settled violently even though the violence is far less than that exercised by the old regime

Libya's political transition toward democracy is already being painted by many in the West as the first real success of the so-called (and poorly named) Arab Spring, with the now almost forgotten struggle in Tunisia a close second.² However, the political dust has yet to settle on the 2011 War of Libyan Succession. This article considers the state of the Libyan transition by applying the five endstates of transition, established in 2009 by the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) and U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), and then places the process of political transition on a 12-hour transition clock.³ Much has been made of transition in light of efforts in Afghanistan to draw down major combat forces therein by 2014. However, transition by nature is entirely context dependent. In Libya, it is almost completely driven from within itself, with some marginal external support and influence. Transition in Libya is thus necessarily ambitious, moving from an illegitimate regime to a legitimate self-sustaining regime that is neither a threat to its own people or others. The NTC/interim government has only just embarked on the road to

the critical endstate of political stability. On the 12-hour transition clock, Libya is at best at 3 o'clock. In order for it to keep moving forward, much more needs to be done and greater support must be made available.

This article is thus a snapshot of Libya's transition in November 2011. It considers the achievements thus far and the challenges ahead, and where Libya is now compared to where it needs to be. Now that Qadhafi is dead, a peaceful future for Libya looks more assured. Too often in the past, however, the West has declared the final whistle blown when in fact it is only halftime. Given the complex tribal loyalties that make up Libya, a hastily formed new government could all too easily be tempted to swap one form of oppression for another unless a truly representative form of government can be established.

A Long Road Traveled

That said, there is much to be positive about in Libya today. What started with the arrest of a human rights activist in Benghazi on February 19, 2011, led—some 9 months later—to the fall of one of the Arab world's most oppressive regimes headed by a dangerously and increasingly deranged leader. The fact that the liberation of Tripoli on August 21, 2011, was driven essentially from the west rather than the east eased fears of an all-out civil war driven by visions of a Benghazi-led supremacy. The liberation of Tripoli took place with the city left relatively unscarred. However, the interim government is a loose confederation of anti-Qadhafi forces ranging from putative democrats to hard-line Islamists. The country is awash with weapons and, in spite of pleas by the new government, some old scores are being settled violently even though Human Rights Watch suggests the violence is far less than that exercised on a daily basis by the old regime. However, the arbitrary arrests of thousands by the militia, beyond

the control of the new government, point to a very difficult postconflict period in which the ability of the interim government to exert real control will prove the decisive factor in transition.

The interim government itself grew rapidly out of a group of Benghazi-based human rights lawyers and admits that its legitimacy in the country is tenuous at best, despite having declared itself Libya's sole legitimate representative on March 5, 2011. The international legitimacy afforded first by Arab states and then the West, most notably Great Britain, France, and the United States, was critical. Moreover, the military support of these three countries proved crucial when Benghazi seemed about to fall to Colonel Qadhafi's military that same month.

Now the interim government has to find a way to bring the many regional and clan interests together under what will necessarily be a broad political roof. Paradoxically, the very military strategy adopted by the interim government might make that goal more complicated to achieve as the council promoted a decentralized approach to give the impression that Libya was liberated by a simultaneous uprising of all Libyan society. Certainly, given the divide and rule strategy employed by the old regime, it will take a long time before some semblance of national unity and purpose can be fashioned, and yet such unity is the all-important commodity upon which successful transition is founded.

To its credit, the NTC leadership under former Justice Minister Mustafa Abdul Jalil has tried to consciously avoid the mistakes made in Iraq and elsewhere. In some ways, the interim government's approach is reminiscent of the British in their sector in postwar Germany when some former Nazi Party members were retained in post to keep essential systems working. Where possible, the interim government has permitted some members of the so-called Revolutionary

Committees to continue their work to ensure a semblance of stability in the transition.

The support of the international community was essential and, for once, impressively fast. Following the seizure of Misrata on February 24, 2011, the United Nations (UN) Security Council imposed sanctions on the regime. As Qadhafi's forces approached Benghazi on March 17, the UN Security Council authorized "all necessary means" under UN Security Council Resolution 1973 to be used to protect civilians. Critically, Qadhafi had little support within the Arab world, and the Arab League was swift to give its backing to Western-led efforts to prevent a massacre in Benghazi. Western intervention proved critical because it tipped the balance of forces in favor of the interim government. Although the effect was not rapid, the air and sea embargo essentially starved Qadhafi's forces of resupply, and British, French, and U.S. special forces played a crucial role as trainers for the ragtag group of militias that made up the NTC forces. This was reinforced by the vital role played by the special forces as forward air observers directing air strikes.

Equally important was the political solidarity of the international community. The Chinese and Russians grumbled about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led operation overstepping the limits of the UN Security Council Resolution. Also, South Africa objected to the release of funds to the NTC, which it did not regard as the legitimate government of Libya. Little effort, however, was made to impede the operations in support of the NTC—for what they were rapidly became clear. Furthermore, with Tripoli only 182 miles from NATO's southernmost tip, the conditions for a successful air policing war were uniquely in favor of the Alliance. Air operations began on March 19 with first British, French, and U.S. aircraft and then units from other coalition members halting the

armored column that was approaching Benghazi. Thereafter, several thousand sorties were flown with surprisingly few leading to the infamous collateral damage of old. There were tragedies of course. One among many took place on April 30, when a NATO air strike killed Qadhafi's three grandchildren. Some estimates have the death toll in the war as high as 8,000.

Furthermore, there was concern that the issuing of an arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court on June 27 would make it more difficult to end the conflict. In fact, it seems to have further delegitimized Qadhafi and the regime.

it is far too early to tell if Libya can survive the transition politically intact

The key test for the interim government will be the willingness of the 40 or so armed *katibas* (brigades) to either stand down once the fighting is over and/or join the new Libyan army. Privately financed, many of these *katibas* are closely linked to regions and towns and thus are intensely factional. It is alleged that one of them, the Abu Ubeidah Ibn al-Jarrah *katiba*, was responsible for the July 28 murder of General Abdul Fatah Younis, the NTC's top military commander, who was trying to unite the various factions under a unified command.

A Safe and Secure Environment (3 O'Clock)

The first transitional endstate is a *safe and secure environment*. This is defined as the "ability of the people to conduct their daily lives without fear of systematic or large-scale violence."⁴ With combat operations still ongoing and much of the country effectively lawless, the key components of such an

endstate are far from being realized. Public order is virtually nonexistent.

The next year or so will thus act as the pivot for the transition process. The announcement by the NTC on October 22 demonstrates the importance of political legitimacy via national elections. However, before that can happen, the rules of the game will need to be established with the key power brokers. The interim government is certainly ambitious having established elections for the Public National Conference by mid-2012. The need to move quickly is understandable as there are already rumors that the NTC was making deals to sustain its political base with a few special interest groups such as the Muslim Brothers and the hitherto-exiled National Front for the Salvation of Libya. These needed to be quashed; hence the October 22 road map to transition. Whatever happens, these are well-organized groups and thus they are likely to do fine in the elections. Once the fighting—the kinetic phase of transition—is over, much greater emphasis will need to be placed on political transition, especially because that will be the focus of the Libyans and their foreign backers. It is far too early to tell if Libya can survive the transition politically intact. A particularly important aspect will be the treatment of minorities such as the Berbers, who played an important role in the fighting apparently supported by British special forces.

The physical challenge alone is daunting. Even though 90 percent of Libya's 6.5 million people live on the coastal strip, the country is roughly the size of Alaska with 679,358 square miles of territory. The coast alone is 1,099 miles long with land borders totaling 2,723 miles. Furthermore, with so many militias operating in this space, it is going to be some time before legitimate state monopoly over the means of violence is reasserted or control over the borders is reestablished along with physical and territorial

security. Here, parallels with Afghanistan and Iraq are appropriate. Critical to the entire transition process and, indeed, one of the key indicators will be to what extent, and at what pace, the interim government can weld all the militias into a single national army. That will in itself require the new government to consider the level of sanction it imposes on the officer corps of Colonel Qadhafi's army. This question exerts a pivotal paradox on the interim government. Does it disband the army and start again à la Iraq? Or, does it keep some of the senior officers in place and risk offending both the militias and those former officers of the army who did defect? In Afghanistan, it was the reappearance of hated figures after the fall of the Taliban in November 2001 that did much to discredit Hamid Karzai's Kabul government and by extension the broader coalition effort.

Libya is far from becoming a safe and secure environment, and the claim of the interim government to represent all Libyans will by and large stand or fall on its ability to create such an environment. Failure there will mean that all other aspects of the transition will also likely fail. Libya is thus at 3 o'clock on the transition clock as it seeks to reestablish a secure environment.

Rule of Law (3 O'Clock)

Rule of law is defined as the "ability of the people to have equal access to just laws and a trusted system of justice that holds all persons accountable, protects their human rights and ensures their safety and security."⁵

A just legal framework for the whole of Libya will not only take time, but it is likely to prove an intensely political process. Some of the Islamist groups will insist on the adoption of a strict interpretation of Shariah law, a position that led to Berber representatives walking out of at least one meeting held to discuss transitional arrangements.

Public order, another key facet of rule of law, is fragmented and uncertain. This will also take some time to restore because Libya's new democratic institutions will require meaningful oversight of a form of public order administration very different from that of the Qadhafi regime. Logically, the first order principle for the interim government will be to establish the equitable rule of national law in Libya's two major population centers—Tripoli and Benghazi—and then expand its writ once the seat of said government has been firmly established and protected.

Furthermore, accountability under the law, access to justice, and eventually a culture of lawfulness—all of which are vital—will likely require the establishment of an entirely new system for the administration of justice. Judges and administrators will need to be trained and a police force created that acts with the consent of the people and not against them. Libya is therefore only at 3 o'clock on the transition clock in its search to create legitimate rule of national law across the entire country.

Stable Governance (4 O'Clock)

Stable governance is defined as the "ability of the people to share access or compete for power through non-violent political processes and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of the state."⁶

Libya is in early postconflict transition, which must not be confused with political transition. *Conflict transition* is defined as "the point where the host nation is on a sustainable positive trajectory, where it can independently manage the dynamics causing violent conflict. Conflict transformation requires reducing the drivers of conflict while supporting those that mitigate conflict across security, economic, and political spheres."⁷ Political transition embraces conflict transition but in effect takes a

helicopter view of stability with a specific focus on the rebuilding of sustainable and legitimate political institutions. Thus, the interim government is only engaged in the first and most tentative steps toward representative government. It is trying hard to provide basic and essential services and, thankfully, has access to a relatively large and skilled workforce that in time should be able to get food and energy supplies moving.

there is every reason to believe that Libya will in time pay for its own reconstruction

Libya's natural resources will be at the center of the entire process of transition. Indeed, effective stewardship of state resources is a critical aspect of stable governance and here there are grounds for cautious optimism. *Cautious* is the key word because, as the *Economist* recently stated, "Guns, not civilian politicians, are currently determining Libya's future, and could yet precipitate a squabble for the country's tantalizingly rich resources."⁸ Libya's greatest assets (apart from its people) are its high-grade hydrocarbon and gas reserves, which Qadhafi did much to squander on military expenditures and foreign adventures. Encouragingly, the NTC has already moved to establish new contracts with potential partners, and there is every reason to believe that Libya will in time pay for its own reconstruction. At an estimated 41.5 billion barrels, Libya has the largest proven oil reserves in Africa—about 3 percent of the global total—with much of the country unexplored due to past sanctions. The geology, however, looks very promising. Even without further discoveries, Libya has some 20 years of reserves at 2009 production rates. Libyan oil is also easy to recover. In addition, the country

has proven gas reserves of 52 trillion cubic feet, making it the world's 14th largest producer.⁹

Other aspects of stable governance are less promising, at least for the moment. Political moderation and accountability will depend largely on the nature of governance. If there are genuine elections in which power is vested in a representative parliament, then there are hopes that political control will in time be passed to relatively moderate, accountable, and above all replaceable regimes. However, a mistake the West has repeatedly made is to believe that places and spaces with no tradition of such structures can magically reproduce them. What is more likely is some form of hybrid structure among secular, tribal, and Islamist elements with all three vying for supreme state authority. How this equilibrium is institutionalized with the checks and balances in place to ensure that no single group dominates will be a critical test of transition. While Libya is by no means as politically fragmented as, say, Lebanon, there are sufficient divisions within the society to lead to squabbling and infighting, thus creating the conditions for the return of a Qadhafi-like figure. The early establishment of a structure robust enough to ensure civic participation in the political process and the empowerment of all with a stake in legitimate government will be just one of many challenges faced by the new regime.

Certainly this is one area where the European Union (EU) could play a very important role, the efforts to support the Libyan people having been thus far lamentable. In August 2011, the EU appointed a special representative for the Southern Mediterranean with a remit to assist in the promotion of good governance. Subject to the request of the new Libyan government, the EU could play as important a role in supporting stable governance as NATO could in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; security sector reform; and democratic control over armed forces.



U.S. Army (Brendan Stephens)

Egyptian citizen refugees arrive back home from Tunisia on U.S. Air Force C-130J

Taken in the round, there are reasonable grounds for optimism that Libya will enjoy some degree of stable governance, but much needs to be done. Libya thus stands at 4 o'clock on the transition clock with regard to stable governance.

Sustainable Economy (2 O'Clock)

A *sustainable economy* is defined as the “ability of the people to pursue opportunities for livelihoods within a system of economic governance bound by law.”¹⁰ According to the UN Development Programme Human Development Index, Libya ranked 53^d out of 169 states prior to the civil war.¹¹ This suggests a relatively educated population with enough of a middle class to provide an entrepreneurial impetus to the economy. Indeed, one of the telling images of the war has been the prominent role that class played in ousting the old regime.

One of the first order requirements for the new government will thus be to reestablish macroeconomic stability as measured by key indicators such as consumer price inflation, real growth in gross domestic product over one or more business cycles, changes in measured unemployment and employment, the effective management of fluctuations in government finances, and stability of the currency. This in turn will only come once sound economic and financial regulatory frameworks have been established. There is little evidence that the Qadhafi regime ever established such sound economic governance and best practice. State wealth was seen as the personal fiefdom of the colonel to use for personal aggrandizement and to fund the massive system of patronage through which the regime wielded power. At the very least, there is likely to be a significant rebalancing of

wealth between the west of the country, which was favored under the Qadhafi regime, and the east, which was starved of resources.

Perhaps the greatest challenge in establishing a sustainable economy, however, will come when the regime tries to exert control over the illicit economy that has long been established. The various rent seekers on both sides of the divide have or are accumulating huge reserves of financial muscle that will represent an economic threat to Libya's peace and will need to be tackled.

Given the lack of any real instruments over Libya's conflict-torn economy and the need to create the functioning structures critical for effective economic governance, Libya is at best at 2 o'clock on the transition clock in the construction of a sustainable, functioning economy open to and supportive of all its people.

Libya is a society at war with itself as those who hitherto have benefited from Qadhafi's patronage are dispossessed by those who suffered from the regime's oppression

Social Well-Being (2 O'Clock)

Social well-being is defined as the "ability of the people to be free from want of basic needs and to coexist peacefully in communities with opportunities for advancement."¹² Libya is a society at war with itself as those who hitherto have benefited from Qadhafi's patronage are dispossessed by those who suffered from the regime's oppression. The rebalancing of political and economic power will inevitably be a difficult and bumpy process but it must be managed. If not, the almost certain insurgency could well gain rapid support.

Furthermore, in these early days of the postconflict period, whatever efforts the interim

government is making to prevent the settling of scores, a rudimentary form of "restorative justice," will be unavoidable. There are already signs of tensions between the rural-based militias that did much of the fighting and the city dwellers who sat on the fence for much of the conflict, particularly in Tripoli.

That is one of many paradoxes faced by the interim government because Tripoli is in many ways the key to national stability. If the interim government spends too much time trying to "buy" Tripoli, however, the sense of social injustice that has pervaded Libya's regions for decades could be reignited as hope is expunged. Further fighting thereafter would be almost inevitable. Yet, much of the country's intellectual capital is in Tripoli, and only if the city is safe and secure with essential supplies restored will expatriate Libyans begin to return and the international community will have a sense that progress is being made. In that regard, Tripoli is the transition litmus test for the international community; thus the early reestablishment of a functioning seat of government in a functioning capital is hugely important.

Equally, there are other indicators that the interim government should establish early for the whole of the country to ensure there is a sense of balance for all. One of these key indicators will be the early reestablishment and development of education across Libya. Paradoxically, Qadhafi's Jamahiriya (state of the masses) claimed to promote political decentralization and a form of direct democracy. The structure was created right down to municipal level but was politically hollowed out. Ironically, education was meant to be the showcase for this system. Following Qadhafi's September 1969 seizure of power, education was given a high priority. However, a shortage of teachers, interference in the curriculum, and lack of effective technical training

undermined the utility of the many tertiary education institutions that developed after 1975. This led to an overreliance on foreign labor. On the positive side, an impressive educational infrastructure is in place that could be developed rapidly as soon as a functioning education policy is established.

These indicators will also affect one of the other key indicators that transition is working: the return of refugees from abroad and of internally displaced persons. Only then can social reconstruction, which is perhaps the most important driver and indicator of transition, really get under way.

Libya is still a state at war with itself. Before real social well-being can be said to be reestablished, much will need to happen. Libya can only be said to be at 2 o'clock on the social well-being transition clock.

Libya: The Transition Clock Is Ticking

Political transition is a difficult and dangerous process that must be established through the application of consistent principles if the essential endstates are to be reached. These principles are: a safe and secure environment, a just rule of law, stable governance, a sustainable economy, and social well-being. The USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI call such ideas the crosscutting principles of stability and reconstruction. The political objectives of transition are host-nation ownership and capacity, and Libya is well-placed for both compared with Afghanistan and Iraq. Political primacy, an early political settlement as the cornerstone of a sustainable peace, is probably still some way off, but the decision to draft an inclusive constitution gives some grounds for hope. Political legitimacy is the oil in the machine of transition based on three elements, all of which are achievable but problematic:

the degree to which the Libyan nation as a whole accepts the mission and the mandate of the new government, the extent to which the new government is accountable to the people and is seen to be so, and the degree to which the Arab world and the wider international community accept the legitimacy of the government that eventually emerges.

if the EU could move beyond theory and start practicing what it preaches, then support for the Libyan people could act as an indicator for much of the region

Now that the first phase of the Libyan succession war has been won by the NTC and Qadhafi has been removed from power, a further critical indicator of transition will be to what extent unity of effort can be maintained and fostered. This will require all postconflict parties to share a continued understanding of the environment and to maintain cooperation across a broad coalition toward agreed short-, medium-, and long-term objectives. That unity of effort will need to take place in parallel with conflict transformation in which the drivers of conflict—political, security, rule of law, economic, and social—are removed even as capacity for effective governance is constructed. Hope and trust are the stuff of transition. However, transition also inevitably leads to friction with powerful actors who could delay elections until all-important rules of the political game can be established. Getting the balance right between power and legitimacy will be tricky.

Libya is thus at a very sensitive moment and is at best at 3 o'clock on the transition clock. If the remaining 9 hours are to be successfully negotiated, Libya will need much support from the international community. In this

regard, the signs are less hopeful. Much of the Arab world is locked into its own political tumult, particularly close neighbors to Libya such as Tunisia and Egypt. Already the Western press is turning away, implying the job is done and citing Libya as the victor of the Arab Spring. Critically, if for once the EU could move beyond theory and start properly practicing what it preaches, then support for the Libyan people could act as an indicator for much of the region, which, after all, is in Europe's backyard. Recently appointed EU Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean Bernardino León stated:

*Europe has to take the lead in Libya and Europe is aware that the international community is expecting this. The first step is providing basic services like water, electricity, fuel, medicine. Providing security and economic reconstruction will also be very important, as will the recovering of assets from abroad, which seem to be in many different places because of the actions of the former regime and particularly Qadhafi. We will also have to contribute to building a government in a post-conflict Libya.*¹³

However, Europe is at the very nadir of the Eurozone crisis, and the appetite for supporting neighbors to the south will likely be lost in the pressures to support EU members to the south. Moreover, EU offers of early humanitarian assistance have remained precisely that—offers.

It looks like you again, America. Sorry. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ "Clinton Hails 'Libya's Victory' on Tripoli Visit," *The Daily Herald*, October 19, 2011, available at <www.thedailyherald.com/us/3-news/21709-clinton-hails-qlibyas-victoryq-on-tripoli-visit-.html>.

² In fact Tunisia is perhaps in the lead. On October 23, 2011, Tunisian voters went to the polls to elect a 217-seat assembly that will draft a new constitution and appoint an interim government.

³ "Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction" (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace/U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2009).

⁴ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*, 29.

⁸ "The Birth of Free Libya," *The Economist*, August 27, 2011, 18.

⁹ "FACTBOX-key facts about Libya's gas sector," Reuters, available at <<http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/05/29/uk-libya-gas-factbox-idUKL297607920070529>>.

¹⁰ "Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction," 19.

¹¹ "International Human Development Indicators: Libya—Country Profile of Human Development Indicators," available at <<http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/LBY.html>>.

¹² "Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction," 19.

¹³ "Europe needs to take the lead in Libya—EU Special Representative," September 2, 2011, available at <www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/content/20110826STO25372/html/Europe-needs-to-take-the-lead-in-Libya-EU-Special-Representative>.

Hearts, Minds, and the Barrel of a Gun

The Taliban's Shadow Government

BY ANTONIO GIUSTOZZI

The predominant image of the Taliban is a military organization bent almost exclusively on wreaking havoc on the Afghan state and whoever sides with it. However, for all their reputation of “warrior mullahs,” the Taliban have not altogether neglected the civilian dimensions of power. In the early post-9/11 period, as an insurgent organization, they were indeed little more than roving bands of warrior mullahs who were trying to regroup and relaunch an insurgency. They did not have the resources or capacity to develop a shadow government structure. After 2003, however, the situation gradually changed and the Taliban started investing greater resources in their shadow government. Apart from the increased availability of financial resources, what might have driven the Taliban's desire for building their own shadow government was their thirst for legitimacy. They wanted to show that they were the authentic government of Afghanistan and not merely an opposition military force. Another reason appears to have been that the Taliban actually realized that a shadow governance structure brought them some practical benefits, such as a greater ability to interact with the population. Particularly since the Taliban started entering relatively heavily populated areas in 2006, their commanders were no longer skilled enough to deal with the villagers. In a sense, the Taliban realized that they could not outfight the forces arrayed against them, which included the strongest military on the planet and a series of allies, also of respectable military capability. They tried, therefore, to outgovern their rivals, identifying the ineffectiveness of Kabul's government as their greatest opportunity.

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Afghan National Army soldier
defends against attempted Taliban
attack in Kunduz, Afghanistan

U.S. Army (Christopher Baker)



“Outgoverning” a competitor should not be misunderstood as an alternative rendering of “winning hearts and minds.” As we shall see in greater detail, governing is not just about offering better services to the public; it is also about the efficient and effective utilization of coercion, a basic ingredient of the art of government. One example might help clarify this point. A basic but key component of government is the ability to administer justice. However, no government can administer justice without first imposing its own monopoly over it. This is because the administration of justice is inherently divisive: for every individual or community satisfied with a verdict, there might be as many who are unhappy with it.

If the emergence of the Taliban’s shadow governance structure can be explained, what has always been difficult to assess is its actual impact on the economy of the conflict. Observers, mostly from the media, were either wholly dismissive of anything the Taliban seemed able to achieve on this front, or uncritically supportive of Taliban success. Thanks to interviews carried out with commanders, judges, and other cadres of the Taliban, as well as with local elders, we can attempt in this article to throw some light on the issue.

The Taliban’s Governors

The first signs of Taliban provincial governors date back to 2003, when the Taliban started controlling significant chunks of Afghan territory. From about 2006, district governors and “chiefs of security” also started being reported. By 2010, 33 provincial governors and about 180 district governors were said to be in existence. The only province without a governor was Panjshir, which

was placed under the responsibility of the governor of Parwan.

Many observers believed that the new governance system was merely a facade and that its purpose had more to do with public relations and propaganda than anything else. It was a kind of mimicking of the government structure by a movement that had no interest whatsoever in governance and was just bent on destruction. While public relations might well have been a major concern in the rolling out of the new governance structure, it also appears that it gradually started kicking into activity. As of late 2008, there were about two dozen districts in Afghanistan where the Taliban had overwhelming influence; in 11 of those districts, the government had no presence left whatsoever, and at least some of them seemed to be run by Taliban district governors.

This is not to say that the Taliban did not experience serious problems in getting their administrative structure to function. In some cases, the “governors” were judged by the leadership to be too accommodating with local communities and elders and were therefore removed. Some governors proved ineffective. In other cases, there were conflicts among different Taliban networks who could not agree over the governor’s identity, thus ending up with multiple governors. In other cases still, the governors complained about being bypassed by military commanders who paid little respect to their roles and efforts to present a more civilized image of the Taliban to the wider public.

Still, by 2009–2010, the role of the governors seemed to have grown in significance due at least partially to successful efforts to institutionalize the process of appointments. Their duty was mediating disputes among elements of the population and between the Taliban and the population, but the villagers were

mostly afraid of lodging complaints against the Taliban. Within a given community, most of the time some form of dispute regulation exists in Afghanistan, reducing the demand for external judicial services considerably.

no government can administer justice without first imposing its own monopoly over it

The Taliban were therefore mostly successful in mediating among communities, where they faced little competition. Their ability to back up dispute settlements with military force in many formerly ignored corners of the countryside was a key asset as long as they were able to be fair in their judgments. An oppressive or partial rule would have caused revolt. At least in some cases, the Taliban would also negotiate ad hoc agreements with local communities, or among communities, acting as a broker to allow pro-Taliban communities to bypass longstanding rivalries and cooperate in the interest of the jihad against the foreigners. Some of these agreements were remarkably sophisticated, such as one among some Alizai subtribes in Helmand Province over the sharing of narcotics revenue. Such agreements often collapsed, leaving a bitter taste of “governance in Afghanistan” in the mouth of the Taliban cadres; but by and large, the Taliban seem to have greatly benefited from their ability to mediate disputes among communities. It could be argued that such ability is a major source of legitimacy for the Taliban. Perhaps as importantly, should the Taliban be pushed back from a particular area, such agreements could easily collapse, creating a demand for its return.

The Taliban governors played a greater role in some provinces than in others, even if their influence would extend to only some areas. This is not surprising given the extent of the average province and the inevitable constraints the Taliban faced when traveling.

the main shortcoming of the Taliban governors was their inability to provide much in terms of services aside from dispute settlement

Although the Taliban proved proficient at imposing their own law and order in the areas they controlled, it usually did not happen through a specialized police force—which did not really exist—but through their system of informers and armed groups. The position of “security commander,” mimicking that of the Kabul government’s chief of police, remained for all practical purposes an honorific one that was hardly known to villagers, a fact that reflects the Taliban’s desire for outward (international) legitimacy as well.

The main shortcoming of the Taliban governors was their inability to provide much in terms of services aside from dispute settlement. The Taliban grew acutely aware of this limitation over time, as we shall discuss.

The Taliban’s Judges

The exact timing of the introduction of Taliban judges in Afghanistan’s districts after 2001 is unclear. The Taliban claim it was planned from the beginning and rolled out as they started acquiring control over significant territory. By 2009, in any case, the judges were present in most districts where the Taliban operated. The Taliban judiciary is managed by a Provincial Judicial Shura, which represents

the highest level of judicial authority inside Afghanistan. Ultimately, the local judiciary is subordinated to a central Judiciary Shura based in Pakistan that liaises directly with the provinces concerning general directives but seldom gets involved in local disputes. The shadow provincial governor typically leads the Provincial Judicial Shura but does not control it. The judiciary is therefore quite independent and can mostly afford to judge cases free of external interferences. As of 2011, the fact that the judges were mostly nonlocal increased their autonomy. Often the villagers are not certain who the judge is or where he comes from. This policy appears to be a conscious effort to keep individual judges or commanders insulated from involvement in personal and tribal politicking, from building personal power bases, and from displaying favoritism and abusing their positions of power in their home districts.

This “institutionalization” of the Taliban’s judiciary is the result of the establishment of a rotation mechanism that is managed centrally. Judges are usually rotated over varying periods of 1 to 2 years. Each district is supposed to have four to seven judges depending on its size and the degree of Taliban control, although in isolated pockets (such as parts of northern Afghanistan) the number may be lower. Every district has a chief judge who is responsible for supervising his colleagues. There are also a number of other judges, some of whom may be junior judges who act as assistants and are not entitled to decide cases alone.

The large majority of the cases handled by Taliban courts are civil matters, mainly disputes, despite the fact that the Taliban encourage the villagers to take recourse to the elders for resolving small disagreements. The judiciary simply

does not have the human resources to rule over every petty dispute that might turn up in a village. The Taliban also leave enforcement of the judges' decisions to the villagers and only intervene when these are not able or willing to deliver. This attitude involves the population in the Taliban's judiciary and makes the two parties co-responsible—another incentive for the villagers to keep the Taliban in. One could expect retaliation should the government reestablish its presence in any area that had been under Taliban influence for some time because the losers in disputes and criminal cases could turn to the government for support.

The Taliban actively advertise their judiciary as armed groups travel and invite villagers to bring cases to the courts. Although the transition from fixed courts to mobile courts in 2010–2011 made it more difficult to contact the Taliban judges, mobile numbers are distributed to help villagers contact judges when needed. The Taliban also claim to allow appeals, but in practice this seems to be a rare occurrence because many villagers are afraid the judges would not appreciate the gesture.

The courts have a reputation for impartiality even among those who do not sympathize with the Taliban. Occasionally there have been cases of judges being accused of corruption, but they appear to have been dealt with swiftly. The reliance on Shariah helps the Taliban because the villagers easily understand the judgments. How do the Taliban manage to keep their judiciary largely corruption-free? They use a system of internal oversight with two channels of reporting—the judges themselves and the commanders and informers who operate in the villages. Because the latter is completely separate from the judges, it exercises effective oversight; the judges are from out of the area while the

informers are local and have had little or no contact. The basic conditions for the functioning of a system of oversight are thus met.

The Taliban's Schools

State schools were an early target of the Taliban; in 2002–2003, the burning of schools and killing of teachers (and sometimes students) were common. The campaign against state schools gradually escalated and reached its peak in 2006. At that point, there was no effort by the Taliban to offer alternatives to the villagers except by telling them to send the village children to madrassas. The backlash from the villagers, who in many cases wanted their children to be educated, forced the Taliban to reconsider.

private schools had to adopt the Taliban curriculum and textbooks to stay open

Already in 2007, the Taliban announced that they would open their own schools in areas under their control, providing “Islamic education” for boys and later even for girls in six provinces under Taliban influence (Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzgan, Helmand, Nimroz, and Farah). The Taliban announced that the schools would use the same textbooks used under their rule elsewhere and that preparations were already being made to print them; USD 1 million was allocated for these schools, of which one was planned for each of 10 districts. While it appears that in the early years of the insurgency they might have banned all nonreligious schools, the Taliban have been permitting private schools to operate from at least 2007 under some kind of mostly informal supervision. These private schools had to adopt the Taliban curriculum and textbooks

to stay open. In fact, the Taliban say that they invite families to send their children to private schools. Sometimes, state-run schools seem to have reopened as private schools. The Taliban seem to have developed an idea of facilitating more private schools as a way to square the circle of making the communities happy and at the same time rejecting the role of the state in education. It is worth noting that in recent times the Taliban started distributing pens and religious textbooks to the pupils of private schools, although the extent of the practice is unclear.

The reliance on private schools proved insufficient to appease the villagers, who often could not afford to pay for their children's education; moreover, not every village could count on an entrepreneur to open a private school. During 2007, the Taliban started negotiations with Kabul's Department of Education to reopen schools. The Taliban again imposed conditions such as the adoption of their curriculum and textbooks and the hiring of some teachers loyal to the Taliban, but by 2008 the first boys' schools started reopening. Initially implemented in the south, the policy of co-opting state schools later spread to wherever the Taliban arrived.

the Taliban are investing considerable human resources in bringing state schools under their control

Over the following years, a kind of Taliban educational policy has gradually taken shape. It features the long-term strengthening of the role of madrassas and Koranic schools. It also features an expanded role for private schools (that is, they are

neither state-run nor madrassas), although it is not clear how long term this will be in the Taliban's strategy. Finally, the Taliban are investing considerable human resources in bringing state schools under their control.

Even when the trickle of state schools reopening started expanding greatly from 2010 onward, the Taliban continued inviting families to send their children to madrassas or Koranic schools during winter when state schools were closed and other times when state schools did not operate.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Taliban's educational strategy as it developed from 2007 onward concerns their effort to establish control over state and private schools. At least in some provinces like Ghazni, Paktika, Kunar, and Kunduz, the schools were being supervised in a rather systematic way, with a commission established for the task. The Taliban imposed one of their own representatives as a teacher in each school, vetted the recruitment of the other teachers, enforced school discipline and attendance, and sometimes deployed inspectors to make sure everything functioned properly. The Taliban also relied on their network of informers to collate information about teachers and their behavior and ideological leanings. Teachers who refused to conform to the Taliban's standards were first warned and then intimidated into submission. Occasionally, the execution of recalcitrant teachers was reported.

The Taliban's effort concerning schools could be described as significant by 2011, mobilizing considerable energy and human resources. Seen within the context of the wider Taliban effort to form a shadow government inside Afghanistan, it might be regarded as an attempt to address their weakness

U.S. Army (Daniel P. Shook)



Afghan National Army team leader speaks with villagers about Taliban influence in Maiwand District, Kandahar Province, during clearing operation

in providing services to the population by “hijacking” state education and reshaping it in its own image. The inspections in the school contribute to this by ensuring that the quality of the education provided is better than in schools under state control.

The Taliban and Nongovernmental Organizations

The Taliban’s policy toward nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) has always been mixed: a small number of NGOs appears to have always been able to operate in southern Afghanistan despite the high level of violence. From about 2010 onward, however, the Taliban have widened the spectrum of NGOs they are willing to cooperate with, resulting in more informal agreements. The Taliban have preconditions for

allowing NGOs to operate in territory under their control. They raise taxes on projects, reject any NGO funded by some of the Western aid agencies more closely connected to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) military effort, vet projects, and sometimes impose the employment of individuals linked to them. NGO workers point out how over time the Taliban’s chain of command and control has strengthened and the discipline of its combat groups has improved, making it easier to negotiate deals and see them implemented. Some sources report a team of Taliban inspectors operating in Kabul and tasked to examine projects and authorize them as they are judged to be compliant with the Taliban’s criteria. In the provinces, NGO offices are often searched by the Taliban, who seem to have developed the

human resources necessary for these types of investigations. Educated cadres, increasingly with English language skills, are attached to a growing number of Taliban units.

While attacks on NGOs and, in particular, the kidnapping of NGO workers were still occurring frequently in 2011, the intent appeared primarily to be intimidating those NGOs and aid organizations that were not linked to the Taliban by any agreement. The fluidity in the areas of control in some parts of the country, with the Taliban's influence sometimes expanding and sometimes contracting, represented a major factor of uncertainty.

the question is whether the Taliban strategy of expanding nonmilitary operations is having an appreciable effect in terms of the level of support they enjoy

The rationale behind this change of attitude toward NGOs is that the Taliban feel a need to satisfy at least the communities' demands for employment and cash to some extent. Although government-run or government-sponsored projects throughout the countryside have not had much success in terms of kick-starting the processes of economic development, the ensuing donor-fed economic bubble has created employment and driven higher salaries in the areas affected. The villages under Taliban control would like to be part of that too, forcing the Taliban to face a conundrum. The answer is to selectively allow portions of the new wealth to trickle to the Taliban's villages, hoping to maintain a degree of control over the process.

Impact of the Taliban's Shadow Government

On the whole, the weight of the Taliban's effort is still heavily on the military side, which is unsurprising given that the odds favor the military and that any human or financial resource dedicated to nonmilitary tasks would appear puny in comparison to the massive expenditure by donors and charities in any case. The question, however, is whether the Taliban strategy of expanding nonmilitary operations is having an appreciable effect in terms of the level of support they enjoy and of their popularity.

In this regard, the evidence is contradictory. The Taliban judges are mostly popular and respected, but they are also feared because their rough justice does not leave much space for mistakes. The reliance on witnesses for issuing judgments leaves room for abuse even when the judges themselves are keen to do their job fairly. Villagers do say that the Taliban's ban on using government courts is a factor in driving them toward the Taliban courts. As always with judicial systems, even fairness does not bring universal happiness; somebody will always be unhappy or feel they have been punished too harshly regarding the resolution.

Concerning schools, the gradual relenting of opposition to state institutions has eased the resistance the Taliban have been facing and has somewhat bridged the gap with the communities. Few villagers seem concerned with the switch to the Taliban curriculum, and most are instead happy with the near cessation of attacks. On the other hand, few villagers are heard praising the Taliban for their supervising efforts, although that might also be due to the fact that relatively

few schools are supervised by the Taliban countrywide. Moreover, the number of children attending schools tends to be lower than average, which is not particularly surprising in a war zone.

The Taliban, in other words, seem to have limited the damage that their aggressive campaign against state schools was inflicting, but otherwise they have gained little additional legitimacy from their new policy on schools (yet). In part this is due to the fact that occasional violence still occurs. The Taliban deny responsibility except in a few cases where teachers were accused of being government spies or of heterodox behavior. Whatever the truth, some villagers still perceive the Taliban as far too violently opposed to schools.

The case of NGOs is also controversial. Although many NGOs report a change in approach on the Taliban's side, the overall level of violence and intimidation is only moderately down; the severity of the violence, of course, matters. It does appear to be more discriminating than before. However, to those who observe it from a distance and ignore local dynamics, the violence still conveys a negative image of the Taliban. This is even more true when it affects the civilian population despite attempts by the leadership to control it. The improvised explosive device campaign in particular tends to be indiscriminate because of its nature. The actual number of projects implemented via the Taliban's consent or even sponsorship is probably not negligible, but as with the Afghan government, little of the work done by NGOs accrues any legitimacy to the political "sponsor" even when it is the Taliban. Therefore, if a message is meant to emerge from the Taliban's development of a civilian structure, it tends to be mostly suffocated by the violence the wider strategy creates.

ISAF's own military strategy helps dampen the impact of the Taliban strategy of out-governing rivals. The strategy of targeting the local Taliban command structure has driven the governors largely underground, often preventing them from playing the role of interface with the local communities they were at least in part designed for. Similarly, being on the run has complicated the judges' task even if it has not prevented them from executing it. The real advantage the Taliban enjoy over their rivals in Kabul is that the latter have little permanent presence in the villages. The Taliban, moreover, make sure that this modest presence decreases all the time with their campaign of targeted killings. The numbers of civilian administrators and elders assassinated by the Taliban is probably not very high (many of the hundreds reported each year are security forces personnel), but the intimidating effect is very strong and drives scores away from the villages into the relative safety of the towns.

the real advantage the Taliban enjoy over their rivals in Kabul is that the latter have little permanent presence in the villages

The Taliban's coercive power is also apparent in the functioning of the judiciary, as highlighted earlier in the article (using government courts is banned) and in the co-optation of the NGOs. It would be wrong, however, to see the strong role of coercion in the Taliban's system of governance as necessarily a weakness. This is because the choices available to Afghanistan's villagers are ultimately limited. They cannot mobilize for collective action without a framework in place to allow them to coordinate their efforts. The Taliban provide such a framework

for those who want to join their side, whereas there is rarely any such alternative for opposing the Taliban. Coercion is therefore a key component of the Taliban's campaign to out-govern Kabul; they are able to achieve only limited objectives in terms of establishing a shadow governance system. Moreover, they must expect to be hampered at every step by their adversaries (with arrests and killings), so they have to count on the necessity of keeping the Kabul government's ability to govern even lower than their own. Their coercive capacity also allows the Taliban to impose their authority and their own solutions and present them as the only option available. In other words, they establish a local monopoly of violence—a precondition for any system of governance to function effectively. **PRISM**

CERP in Afghanistan

Refining Military Capabilities in Development Activities

BY GREGORY JOHNSON, VIJAYA RAMACHANDRAN, AND JULIE WALZ

Carl Schramm, president and chief executive officer of the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, published a paper in *Foreign Affairs* in 2010 entitled “Expeditionary Economics,” arguing that the economies of Iraq and Afghanistan have shown few signs of progress. Schramm makes the case for the military to engage broadly in midconflict and postconflict reconstruction using a variety of tools. Economic reconstruction must be a part of a three-legged strategy, following invasion and stabilization. To do reconstruction, the military needs to expand its areas of competence, rid itself of its central planning mentality, and become a more flexible force that can facilitate economic growth while trying to stabilize the regions in which it is engaged.

The challenges of implementing expeditionary economics are daunting. The overarching question is whether it makes sense for the military to engage beyond the limited aims of stabilization. In this article, we take a practical view, arguing that the military is *already* substantially engaged in both stability and development activities in Afghanistan and other conflict and post-conflict zones, and that we need to figure out ways in which it can do its work more efficiently and effectively. We emphasize that our recommendations do not advocate that the military take over all development activities for the U.S. Government. They are, however, designed to address the military’s capacity to carry out what it is already doing in Afghanistan and in other *in-conflict*

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situations, where the military is playing a significant role because of the security concerns or lack of ability of other government entities to carry out development assistance.

Emergence of Stability Operations in the Military

The recent doctrinal emergence of stability operations in the military is based primarily on the changing international dynamics that followed the end of the Cold War. Types of U.S. operations radically shifted in the 1990s after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and conclusion of major combat operations in the Gulf War. The military became more engaged in so-called operations other than war,¹ which included peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, security assistance, counterdrug, and nation assistance missions. Deployments became frequent and diverse and spanned the globe. Moreover, the United States was involved in a stability engagement every 18 to 24 months following the Cold War.² Nevertheless, the operations outlined in “other than war” were doctrinally not identified as core missions for the military, and many in the Defense Establishment viewed them as distractions from the military’s primary role of preparing for and winning the Nation’s wars.

A monumental shift in thinking occurred following the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The realization that the attacks materialized from individuals and entities who operated from unstable, weak, and failing states directly led to a strategic security shift in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS). The 2002 NSS recognized development as a primary security mechanism on par with defense and diplomacy. The aligning of the “three Ds” of national security raised awareness of the potential that foreign development assistance could have in stabilizing

regions and in mitigating terrorism and potential insurgencies.³ Meanwhile, military operations had begun in Afghanistan and would soon begin in Iraq, thrusting the military into operations that would become counterinsurgency engagements. The military incorporated seized Iraqi funds to create a program that was designed to pay for projects that would help stabilize military units’ operating areas.⁴ This program evolved into the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), which was formally initiated in late 2003 using U.S.-appropriated funds for both Iraq and Afghanistan.⁵ Designed to enhance interagency cooperation, improve stability, and build capacity by working closely with local officials, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were established in Afghanistan and later in Iraq.

A 2004 Defense Science Board report recommended that stability operations be recognized as a core mission for the military.⁶ This recommendation was codified in Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations* (2005). The new directive stipulated immediate and long-term goals for stability operations that included providing security, restoring essential services, and meeting humanitarian needs of the local populace while encouraging long-term development of indigenous capacity, fostering a viable market economy, and promoting rule of law and democratic institutions. Additional stability manuals, handbooks, and instructions have emerged since 2005, but they have only refined and built upon the policy set forth in Directive 3000.05. In short—in a span of just over 15 years—the military significantly altered its operational framework, which increased its responsibilities and requirements in an effort to improve stability, foster economic growth, and

engage in reconstruction activities in locales where it is engaged.

Objectives and Funding

In U.S. operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, foreign assistance plays a key role in stability and reconstruction efforts. Since fiscal year 2002, nearly \$62 billion has been appropriated for relief and reconstruction in Afghanistan.⁷ Since 2003, over \$61 billion has been appropriated for Iraq.⁸ A large portion of this assistance is committed to economic and social development efforts, which are increasingly seen as a key component of counterinsurgency efforts and stability operations. In Afghanistan, 26.2 percent of total foreign assistance is for governance and development, second only to security-related aid at 56.4 percent of the total.⁹

From the data described in the figures to follow, it is clear that the military is increasingly taking an active role in not only security, but also reconstruction, stability, and development activities. In Afghanistan, over 60 percent of U.S. funds supporting reconstruction are allocated via DOD. Other government agencies are involved, but their participation pales in comparison: 18 percent of the appropriations have gone to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 4.6 percent to the Department of State, and 16.7 percent to other agencies including the Departments of Justice, Agriculture, and Treasury.¹⁰ Due to security concerns and the kinetic nature of certain regions in which other agencies cannot operate well or will not operate, the military is engaged in both stability and development efforts. For instance, PRTs in Afghanistan are key implementers of U.S. assistance programs and are designed to be comprised of both government civilian and military personnel. The reality is that PRTs are

directed and influenced by military officers, who are responsible for administering CERP funding, life support, logistics, and security requirements for the entire team. Historically, there have been only 3 to 5 civilians out of 50 to 100 personnel in most PRTs. A report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction in January 2009 showed that there were 1,021 military personnel and only 35 civilians in all U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan.¹¹

since fiscal year 2002, nearly \$62 billion has been appropriated for relief and reconstruction in Afghanistan

Over the past 2 years, however, there has been a significant increase in the civilian presence in Afghanistan due to calls for a civilian surge. According to the Department of State, the number of civilians increased from 261 to 1,300 between January 2009 and June 2011, and the total is projected to rise to 1,450 civilians operating in the region by mid-2014.¹² Many of these civilians were incorporated into military tactical units at the brigade level and into newly created District Support Teams, which resembled PRTs in structure but were operationally focused on projects at the district level. The military also began deploying agribusiness development teams (ADTs) in 2008 to augment PRTs and agricultural expertise and to assist in the revitalization of Afghanistan's agribusiness sector.¹³

Regardless of their numbers, USAID and State personnel assigned to PRTs and District Support Teams have access to several different funding mechanisms to promote stability and development in their regions. These mechanisms, however, are not always available or timely for use, and civilians, in turn, rely on CERP funding to carry out projects.

Military funding requests for CERP have increased dramatically since its inception in late 2003, from \$40 million for CERP in Afghanistan in 2004 to over \$1 billion in 2010.¹⁴ The allocation is now about 5 percent of Afghanistan's gross domestic product.

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To date, Congress has appropriated \$2.64 billion for CERP in Afghanistan and \$3.98 billion in Iraq.¹⁵ In Afghanistan, the money allocated for CERP alone is almost equal to the entire amount appropriated to the State Department during that same period (\$2.86 billion).¹⁶ CERP is becoming an integral piece of reconstruction funding and efforts and is a clear example of how engaged the military is in reconstruction and development-like projects in conflict environments. The Task Force (TF) for Business and Stability Operations is another fund to support economic development, including the private sector, financial systems, agricultural diversification, energy development, and local procurement, among others.¹⁷ Figure 1 shows foreign assistance disbursements in Afghanistan by agencies for the period 2004–2009, while figure 2 shows total military disbursements including that of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). CERP alone represents a significant source of assistance funding (figure 1); when the ASFF is included in total DOD spending (figure 2), it is clear that DOD receives the majority of foreign assistance funding for Afghanistan.


This funding is channeled into tasks traditionally reserved for USAID and other development agencies. A breakdown of CERP spending projects by sector in Afghanistan (figure 3) could easily be mistaken for a breakdown of USAID projects, as all sectors listed are traditionally considered to be in the development space. Over time, CERP funding has increasingly gone to transportation projects; investments in roads have also increased the average cost of CERP projects. The fiscal year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act created the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund, transferring \$400 million to specifically fund large-scale projects such as power generation.¹⁸

A map of CERP spending in 2010 illustrates that the areas to receive the largest amount of money are also the least secure and most violent areas with the largest number of troops (figure 4). The prioritization of unstable areas is a point of contention for many Afghans, who believe they are penalized for peace. However, even USAID recognizes these areas as a priority. It has stated that its programs are part of the larger strategy and that it will focus on areas of military importance.¹⁹

In sum, the military is already substantially engaged in the development realm beyond stability efforts, and it is likely that it will continue conducting development-like projects in Afghanistan and perhaps around the globe for years to come. Our goal, then, is not to discuss whether the military should be involved in development. Rather, noting that it already is, we examine how to make this involvement as effective as possible.

Challenges and Tensions

Mode of Operation. The primary difficulty in implementing expeditionary economics is that the party carrying out development


Figure 1. Foreign Assistance Disbursements in Afghanistan by Agency, 2004–2009

Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, "USAID Greenbook."

assistance is also the party engaged in conflict. David Kilcullen has termed this phenomenon "opposed development," and argues that it presents a different set of challenges than traditional postconflict activities where the kinetic phase is completed and/or has been carried out by another party (for example, Bosnia). Kilcullen argues that there are multiple scenarios in which development activities take place.²⁰ The classic environment in which USAID was designed to operate is peacetime or postconflict, meaning there is no enemy and development professionals face the usual problems such as corruption and lack of sustainability. A second scenario is an environment with an active terrorist organization present, where there are the usual problems as well as the presence of an enemy, which dramatically raises the risk of operations. The third scenario (which most closely reflects the reality in Afghanistan) is running aid programs in a counterinsurgency environment, where there is a threat of terrorist activity as well as an organized enemy that is running its own development and political programs. Professionals are confronted not only with carrying out development activities in a high-risk environment, but also with competition for the delivery of public services. The target population has a choice between our efforts and services and those of the enemy.²¹ How does the military, then, prepare to face such in-conflict challenges?

Goals. The goals of economic development and stability have dominated the discourse on Afghanistan and Iraq. In theory, they complement each other, but in practice, the pursuit of these goals has raised a number of challenges. First, there is confusion between the aims and implementation strategies of stability, humanitarian assistance, and economic development. Time horizons of implementation and expectations for success clash since development programs often cannot be conducted and proven successful in a limited timeframe. In current military doctrine, there appears to be

Figure 2. Foreign Assistance Disbursements in Afghanistan by Agency, 2004–2009 (DOD includes CERP, ASFF, and other military assistance)




Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, "USAID Greenbook."

Note: Military assistance includes Peacekeeping Operations, Military Assistance Program Grants, International Military Education Training, Foreign Military Financing Program, Transfer from Excess Stock, and ASFF.

a conflation among humanitarian assistance, economic development, and stability.²² Humanitarian aid is a rapid response that saves lives by providing food, water, and basic services. Development programs, on the other hand, are often focused on building local capacities, institutions, and sustainable projects. There are clear instances where humanitarian assistance is necessary because basic needs must be met before long-term sustainability can even be discussed. Yet humanitarian assistance over a long period can undermine development efforts. Food aid or "food for work" projects are a good example; they provide immediate consumption and will satiate a population. Yet over time, the provision of free, donated food undermines incentives to increase agricultural production and might even destroy nascent local industries. The balance between critical short-term relief and long-term capacity-building is delicate, and both types of responses are needed in places such as Afghanistan.

The goals of development and stability may also contradict each other. Efforts to rapidly modernize can be a strong force for destabilization. Rapid growth is not simply capital accumulation; it involves vast changes in the structure of the economy, distribution of income, and the way people live and work. These fluctuations put pressure on the social fabric of an environment; traditional classes and relationships can be destroyed by social mobility provided by income growth. Essentially, rapid development creates winners and losers when there is a zero-sum mentality and not everyone is guaranteed to succeed. The tension between the winners and losers can act as destabilizing forces in both the social and political spheres, especially when situated in an already unstable environment. Andrew Wilder has argued that the country's history does show that efforts to rapidly develop have not led to stability. For instance, large aid flows during the Cold War fostered new social trends including the Islamist and Communist movements at Kabul University that fueled political

Figure 3. CERP Disbursements by Sector in Afghanistan, 2004–2009




Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, "USAID Greenbook."

instability.²³ It is important to recognize the unintended consequences of rapid and unplanned development. Prior to implementing development programs, there needs to be a comprehensive understanding of the local culture and how income growth might disrupt traditional social structures.

Too much aid money can also destabilize. Afghanistan may not be able to absorb external aid flows the size of the entire economy, and large quantities of money spent with little oversight may fuel corruption and generate perverse incentives.²⁴ One study estimated that as much as 10 percent of the money for DOD logistics contracts ended up in the hands of insurgents.²⁵ This problem does not go unnoticed; perceptions of corruption are the main criticism of international aid efforts among Afghans and have the potential to erode confidence and trust in government and international forces.²⁶ A recent analysis of reconstruction and development assistance in Helmand Province concluded that aid "may have as many negative, unintended effects as positive ones and, at the very least, is not a panacea."²⁷

Strategies for the implementation of development and stability projects designed to win hearts and minds may also be in conflict. Both Kilcullen and the authors of U.S. military counterinsurgency doctrine make the argument that the fundamental requirement for a successful counterinsurgency is control.²⁸ But CERP is designed for a much broader set of objectives: to legitimize actions of the military and to create goodwill within the local population while also addressing instability and providing some development assistance.²⁹ Some observers have suggested that CERP is most effective at stabilization by buying support and loyalty from locals through quid pro quo transactions. The difficulty is that, as of yet, there is no proven link that aid leads to goodwill or that job creation reduces insurgency.³⁰ Current strategies are built on the assumptions that poverty is a key driver of insecurity; economic development will stabilize a region; and aid will help legitimize the government. These assumptions need to be recognized as such.³¹ It is difficult for aid programs to address

Figure 4. CERP Disbursements by Sector in Afghanistan, 2004–2009




all of the various factors of insecurity.³² Nonetheless, aid can be a worthwhile tool, and CERP is an experiment that may well yield valuable lessons on how to do “opposed development.”

Stability and Development Frictions. The emergence of CERP has created some friction between the military and existing agencies that deliver foreign assistance. In its district stability framework, the USAID Office of Military Affairs lays out a blueprint for how stability and development activities can be delineated between USAID and the military. It argues that “[d]evelopment assistance is [not] stability assistance” and “[d]evelopment assistance is [not] a military task.”³³

Although one can divide the concepts of stability and development in theory, it becomes much more complicated in practice. The reality is that it is difficult for the military to remain within the lines of stability, focusing projects only on sources of instability. The construction of a road can be a development project to build infrastructure, connecting local suppliers to markets and lowering transaction and transportation costs in the region. Yet it also assists military operations, helping transport supplies and equipment and increasing visibility of buried improvised explosive devices. A look at figure 3 shows that a fairly large share of CERP funds are being spent on things that are

Figure 5. CERP Disbursements by Sector in Afghanistan, 2004–2009



related to both stability and development or else are hard to define. Does \$985 million spent on transportation and construction of roads help achieve the goal of stability, or does it promote longer term development? What are the effects of \$118 million spent on infrastructure? How does the \$154 million spent on education programs and school construction assist in stabilizing Afghanistan? It is difficult to distinguish stability and development objectives in all but a few cases. One can think of the activities of the military and USAID along a continuum as in figure 5.

There is no clear line that can be drawn down the middle dividing stabilization from development activities. The reality is that both the military and USAID are often operating in the same space. The development activities funded by CERP need to be acknowledged in this context. Both organizations have their strengths and weaknesses; USAID cannot operate in some of the most dangerous yet strategically important areas. CERP projects are often criticized for building schools without teachers or clinics without nurses. Perhaps these criticisms also identify space for collaboration, where the comparative advantage of CERP and USAID can be used to provide development assistance in conflict situations.

Five Practical Solutions

How can CERP achieve its objectives and work better with its partners including USAID? We present five practical solutions inspired by the concepts of expeditionary economics and based on the challenges identified above.

1. Improve Education and Training. The military should augment its current educational and training programs so officers can cope with the complexities, challenges, and issues involved with conducting stability operations and in-conflict development.

Require economics, business, and development courses in funded undergraduate education. Currently, these types of courses are not mandatory for the majority of military officers, and many may graduate from universities without any significant knowledge of these topics. Requiring such courses would alleviate this shortcoming while providing a base of knowledge that could be expanded through graduate studies, military education courses, and training. Basic-level micro- and macroeconomic courses and courses that teach business principles and analysis, marketing, finance, and trade would provide a robust base of knowledge at the beginning of an officer's career that could be applied within almost any operational assignment.

Revise military education courses. These courses should be revised to reflect the realities of the current operating environment. Stability and counterinsurgency based operations have dominated U.S. operations since the end of the Cold War, yet curricula have not shifted adequately to reflect it. More focus should in turn be placed on preparing officers to operate in complex environments where understanding local social, economic, and political issues is paramount to mission success. Military education courses should then expose officers to basic anthropological, conflict mitigation, and negotiation concepts; how to conduct a needs assessment; and project management. All are critical skills needed to navigate today's complex operating environment and to implement CERP authority. One way to tie many of these topics together is by using case

more focus should be placed on preparing officers to operate in complex environments where understanding local social, economic, and political issues is paramount to mission success

studies and practical exercises that illustrate how to utilize the District Support Framework or other needs assessment frameworks to determine best uses for CERP.

Broaden assignment opportunities and experiences. Military officers' careers are dominated by assignments within their own Services and primarily at the tactical and operational levels. While this has helped to develop highly skilled tacticians, it does not sufficiently broaden the exposure to the types of U.S. agencies, international entities, and divergent concepts they will face in the current and future operating environment. There are programs that place officers into

nonmilitary environments, such as the Army's Interagency Fellowship Program and Training with Industry Program, but these are limited in scope and involve relatively few officers.

These programs should be expanded, increasing the number of officers involved and broadening the number of organizations that participate. Interagency exposure is important, and the numbers of officers detailed to USAID, Agriculture, and State and its Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, as well as others, should be significantly increased. Also important is broadening the opportunities for officers to be exposed to a greater number of U.S. businesses, entrepreneurial organizations, and government think tanks such as the United States Institute of Peace, U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, RAND Corporation, and Center for Complex Operations. Experiences and interactions with cross-discipline policy organizations, entrepreneurs, and business ventures would provide officers a breadth of knowledge that could be used in today's operating environment. Nongovernmental organizations focusing on international development should also be considered.

Enhance training scenarios at military training centers. Combined training centers (CTCs) and formal military exercises should develop complex scenarios that test the military's competency in economic sector assessments and implementation of CERP projects. The focus of the scenarios could be on identifying the social, political, and economic drivers of a particular operating environment and conducting a realistic sector assessment, which would then be linked to identifying CERP projects. Replicating the CERP decisionmaking process at CTCs would help prepare military units to carry out CERP authority more efficiently while

deployed. Many of the recommendations made by Rebecca Patterson and Jonathan Robinson in “The Commander as Investor” should also be infused into the training scenarios at CTC.³⁴ Important concepts such as consulting local leaders, creating project transparency for the local populace, incentivizing stability instead of violence, knowing how to identify entrepreneurs, and focusing on outcomes not inputs are key lessons that military personnel should be well versed on prior to deployments.

Incorporating actual U.S. agency civilians into training exercises would also help replicate the operating environment the military will encounter while deployed.³⁵ Simulating a board of directors approach to implementing CERP at CTCs would give military units a unique understanding of the many government stakeholders and viewpoints involved in an operating environment such as Afghanistan.³⁶ Another potential solution for agency participation is to use the U.S. Civilian Response Corps (CRC) for training events. The CRC was designed as an expeditionary entity that could be rapidly deployed to conflict zones to provide stabilization assistance.³⁷ Linking the CRC to military units preparing to deploy, in turn, seems like a logical connection. Including ADTs, previously deployed military veterinarians, and Corps of Engineers personnel would also provide military units a deeper contextual knowledge not only of capabilities already inherent in the military but also of the diverse types of projects being undertaken by the military in places such as Afghanistan. Weaving these themes and stakeholders into CTCs and training events would broaden the military’s understanding of operations and better prepare them to implement CERP projects.

Create training support packages. The military should partner with agencies, universities, and the private sector to develop a series of training

support packages (TSPs) that can be used by units preparing to deploy.³⁸ Subject matter could be diverse and cover development topics in particular regions or countries. Most useful would be TSPs that create tools and illustrate how to conduct assessments of the value chains in the agriculture, manufacturing, processing and production, and construction sectors of the economy. Included in the TSP should be definitions and examples for what a value chain is and questions that military personnel could ask to determine the value chain and techniques on how to collate information into meaningful outcome-based uses. Assessment frameworks that could be used include the USAID District Stability Framework when trying to determine sources of instability, or the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization’s Rapid Rural Appraisal when outcomes are primarily development based.³⁹ TSPs should also cover the fundamentals of project management, monitoring and evaluation techniques, outcomes versus inputs and outputs, the differences between stability and development outcomes and specific types of CERP projects that support each, and economics and business principles as they relate to military operations. The military could build on many of the Center for Army Lessons Learned handbooks that have been developed over the past few years and incorporate material from other training programs such as the Agriculture Training Program for Afghanistan and the U.S. Army’s Veterinarian Stability Operations course when developing new TSPs.

2. Reform Authorities, Doctrine, and Structure. To successfully revise training and education programs, the military must also change doctrine accordingly while obtaining permanent authorities that clarify and support the continued use of CERP in military operations.

Revise CERP authority and guidelines. Rigid guidelines set restrictions that are often contrary

to the goal of stimulating economic development. Paragraph 270301 of DOD Financial Management Regulation Summary of Changes to CERP (January 2009) explicitly states that “[a]ppropriated funds made available for the CERP shall not be used for the following purposes. . . . (K) Support to individuals or private businesses (except for condolence, former detainee, hero or battle damage payments as well as micro-grants).”⁴⁰ The loophole cited in subparagraph (K) allowing microgrants to private businesses and individuals is extensively used by the military in Afghanistan, making the prohibition cited in paragraph 270301 seem an unnecessary formal barrier. That barrier causes potential confusion, and the reality is that all

business; small firm-level support is a crucial step to generating economic opportunities and conducting expeditionary economics.

More importantly, CERP authorities need to be unambiguous and less restrictive in what the military can and cannot do. Currently, MAAWS-A guidelines prohibit the use of CERP funds to give “loans or capitalization of lending institutes.”⁴¹ Although the military itself is not equipped or designed to conduct microlending and microcredit programs, these programs may be useful in providing the poor or businesses access to financial services such as loans, savings, and insurance.⁴² Shortages of capital and a lack of access to loan and savings programs may undermine confidence in the government and lead to increased instability. A lack of financial institutions also provides an opportunity for insurgent groups or participation in illicit activities to act as alternate sources of funding. The military should be provided increased flexibility in CERP funds to support programs that will help achieve the dual goals of stabilization and development. The military does not have the capacity or long-term time horizons to conduct programs itself, but it should be allowed to support private entities, including local microfinance institutions. In Iraq, for instance, USAID already manages a microloan program in addition to three international microfinance institutions and six indigenous microfinance institutions that are supported by the U.S. Government.⁴³ If these are effective in providing entrepreneurs with capital, CERP funding should be allowed to support and expand such institutions.

Revise stability operations and counterinsurgency field manuals. The concepts of expeditionary economics should be infused into current military doctrine, including more discussion and explanations of the drivers of economic growth, economic development principles, how to foster business

rigid guidelines set restrictions that are often contrary to the goal of stimulating economic development

payments under CERP are essentially microgrants. The same prohibition of funding individuals and small businesses is outlined in the most recent U.S. Forces-Afghanistan Publication 1-06, *Money as a Weapons System Afghanistan* (MAAWS-A), published in February 2011. The MAAWS-A provides a screenshot from the process of submitting an Afghan Development Report for a CERP project. One must formally affirm that the project does not support individuals or private businesses. This seems an unnecessary hurdle as well as a contradiction, considering that MAAWS-A has an entire chapter on microgrant issuances to businesses.

This unclear and contradictory guidance could easily be altered to provide clarity and increased flexibility in the field. CERP authorities need to be changed to allow the military a broad range of options to stimulate private

creation, how to do sectors assessments, and how to carry out effective project management. The issue of sustainability also needs to be addressed, providing guidance on how to create local buy-in and ensure that proper training and equipment are provided to locals so projects can be sustained in the long term. The inclusion of these key concepts would provide the regulatory reasoning to dramatically alter military education and training. Understanding these concepts would also help units better prepare for operations in places such as Afghanistan, as well as other potential operating environments in the future.

Instructions and tools for conducting both rapid and comprehensive economic sector assessments should be included in both stability operations and counterinsurgency field manuals. No military-funded project should be initiated in the field without a broader understanding of the sector. Knowledge of local or national programs is also important. An assessment framework would provide the military a guideline to determine what is present and, through analysis, what the needs of that sector are. Creation of projects would then be based on those assessments. The military should continue to use the expertise of agency civilians in places such as Afghanistan, but a doctrinal framework would prepare the military to select stability or development projects only after a sector assessment was conducted.

A project management framework should also be incorporated into military doctrine, which should include specific monitoring, evaluation, and reporting requirements designed for stability operations and in-conflict development. Guidelines on the differences, interconnectedness, and potential usages of stability and in-conflict development projects should also be included, and CERP usage should be recognized as a critical tool in stability operations.

Institutionalize agribusiness development teams. The military should formalize the ADT structure in the Army National Guard and institute similar unit structures in Reserve and Active U.S. Army civil affairs units. Agricultural training courses could be created at the Civil Affairs School so agriculture can be identified as a military occupational specialty or an additional skill identifier. Formalizing the ADT structure and expanding into civil affairs would significantly build military capability to operate within unstable environments where agriculture is the main driver of the economic sector.

3. Understand the Dominant Sectors in the Economy. Understanding the key economic sectors and their components is critical for the military in a complex operating environment. The military should focus more on learning about and developing the tools to identify information in the agriculture, manufacturing, processing and production, and construction sectors. Thoroughly understanding these sectors is also important for effectively utilizing CERP authority. For instance, understanding that the agriculture sector in Afghanistan constitutes 33 percent of the value-added gross domestic product and employs approximately 80 percent of the workforce is crucial to using CERP effectively. Surprisingly, as shown in figure 3, CERP expenditures in agriculture from 2004–2009 constituted only 5 percent of the total executed during that period. Understanding the importance of each sector, its value chains and systems, and its components will lead to a more holistic understanding of a region's needs. This information can then be used to stimulate the economic sectors most appropriate for identified stability or development outcomes and in turn improve the effectiveness of CERP funding.

The military should also fully engage in government programs designed to build

knowledge in particular economic sectors. One such emerging program is the Agricultural Training Program for Afghanistan. The Department of Agriculture and a consortium of U.S. universities have designed a 6-day program that focuses instruction within an Afghan context. The program is designed to prepare U.S. personnel, including the military, to conduct agricultural and capacity-building activities. The program covers a diverse set of topics, including identifying the myriad U.S. agricultural stakeholders, policies and strategies, funding mechanisms including CERP, agriculture assessments, agriculture extension skills, and the agricultural calendar as well as Afghan horticulture, crops, and livestock. Specific social and cultural topics particular to Afghanistan are also covered in the training, including land tenure and water rights issues, Kuchi migration and rangeland management, and the use of local contractors to implement CERP projects. The military should fully participate in this type of program, which builds the capacity of trainees to understand particular economic sectors and to implement projects using CERP funding. The military should also consider using American universities to conduct training programs that would build understanding and knowledge of other economic sectors. Universities maintain a significant amount of expertise, and the military should tap into this resource to build its own capacity.

Conduct in-depth sector assessments. Key to understanding the dominant sectors of an economy is the ability to conduct in-depth assessments. As discussed previously, the military should create assessment tools that enable units to determine what the key components are in particular sectors. Through analysis, the military can then more effectively determine projects that enable desired outcomes. One example is

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Southeast Afghanistan Water Resources Assessment. Prepared in October 2009 for TF Yukon, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, the assessment was used by TF Yukon to directly identify projects that were then funded through CERP. The assessment was also used to identify projects by the unit that replaced TF Yukon in early 2010, illustrating the importance of conducting and maintaining in-depth assessments and linking them to projects. The military should broaden its ability to conduct sector assessment, which in turn can be used to execute CERP funding more efficiently.

Create an accessible knowledge bank of key economic sector information. The military should create and maintain an accessible informational knowledge bank that notes key economic sector information, such as markets, trade corridors, value chains, economic systems, businesses, agricultural crops, manufacturing and production centers, and supporting infrastructure. Information should be collated to the lowest regional level, such as province and district in Afghanistan. Key economic sector information should be based on assessments done by military units, government agencies, and other partners and organizations. A vital component to creating an accessible knowledge bank is interagency information sharing. The military and agencies must work together to form a robust picture of the economic sector, which over time should become a comprehensive source used for predeployment training, military education courses, and determining CERP projects while deployed.

4. Monitor Outcomes. If the military is to remain substantially engaged in efforts beyond stability, monitoring and evaluation efforts are crucial. Currently, there are few evaluations

and little evidence regarding the connections between stability and development, job creation and insurgency, poverty and instability, or winning hearts and minds.⁴⁴ They are connections that are certainly worth exploring, and economic development should remain a key aspect of counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. But they are also connections that need to be closely monitored and evaluated if development is to become the third tier in military and counterinsurgency strategy across the board.

There should be three types of results measurement. First, short-run inputs such as the purchase of goods and services and where CERP money is actually spent must be tracked. Due to the decentralized design of CERP spending, there are often gaps in records. When the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction evaluated 173 CERP projects in Iraq in 2006, it found only 122 project files. Pentagon auditors were not able to account for \$135 million in allocated funds.⁴⁵ It is impossible to track success of the program if the spending itself is not accounted for.

Second, intermediate outcomes such as increased local government funds for social programs, successful construction of infrastructure projects, and local ownership must be measured. One U.S. commander, finding a recently constructed water treatment plant with no electricity, decided to spend CERP money on a generator. New commanders came in and the process was repeated—three times. As Ginger Cruz, Deputy Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, states succinctly, “at the end of the day, they’ve paid for the same generator three different times. . . . Nobody’s been there long enough to follow through.”⁴⁶ CERP funding will be nothing more than wasted money if projects are not monitored with appropriate management and oversight.

Third, long-term results such as real unemployment, school enrollment and literacy rates, and growth of agricultural exports must be measured. This set of outcomes may be beyond the time horizon and capabilities of the military. That is where collaboration with other agencies and nongovernmental organizations is vital, since they can continue to track results long after the military has concluded official engagement. Without careful evaluation on all levels, there is a real risk of continuing to spend money on development projects with unknown outcomes. Careful evaluation is crucial to shaping stability strategies and defining in-conflict development programs and reconstruction efforts in the future.

CERP funding will be nothing more than wasted money if projects are not monitored with appropriate management and oversight

5. Do No Harm. There are unfortunately no easy answers in creating stability or economic development. There is no standardized approach that will work across regions; it is impossible to have one single plan for a country, or even a province. Practitioners must understand local conditions and capacities at the most micro level. And they must pay attention to the changing conditions and shifting environments and perceptions. A localized needs assessment is crucial before beginning to implement any activities and must be maintained and revised as projects are implemented.

Greater attention must be paid to unintended consequences. The military must understand that large flows of aid will affect social stability, power relationships, and social and

cultural norms. Nothing is done in a vacuum. Immediate relief efforts may undermine long-term development goals. It is crucial to recognize the tradeoffs and dynamics between goals of humanitarian assistance, stabilization, and economic development. Consistent assessments of local conditions should be done to remain aware of changing conditions and minimize the possibility of being blindsided by unintended consequences.

Conclusion and Next Steps

Going forward, there is a need for further research into the links between CERP-style development spending and stabilization outcomes. There is also scope for further study into the boundaries between civilian and military players, and among stabilization, humanitarian, and development goals. We need to understand better what types of situations lend themselves to military-led projects and which to civilian efforts.

Much can also be learned from analyzing the military's use of CERP during in-conflict situations, such as in Afghanistan. A broad survey of military members involved in executing CERP should be undertaken to determine the commander's intent for its use and how projects were prioritized; what assessment mechanisms were used to determine projects; how monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is taking place; and what outcomes were identified for each project and how M&E is linked to ensure desired effects are met. The surveys would assist in the building of informative case studies that could be used to assist in the implementation of our five recommendations, while also adding to the current literature and data available on this topic. **PRISM**

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²⁶ Wilder, 145. Wilder references the research by the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University directed by Stuart Gordon.

²⁷ Stuart Gordon, “Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province,” Feinstein International Center, April 2011, 54.

²⁸ “Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency,” remarks by David Kilcullen at the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference, Washington, DC, September 28, 2006; U.S. Army FM 3–24, *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006.

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of CERP that allows confidence in the conclusions due to data, conflation of goals, and difficulty in measuring the intended effects, among other reasons.

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⁴⁰ Summary of Major Changes to DOD 7000.14–R 12, chapter 27, “Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP),” DOD Financial Management Regulation, January 2009, available at <http://comptroller.defense.gov/fmr/12/12_27.pdf>.

⁴¹ *Money as a Weapons System Afghanistan*.

⁴² In recent decades, the popularity of the microfinance industry has exploded as a new tool against poverty. Academic studies, however, contradict each other; Pitt and Khandker (1998) published one of the most popular works finding that microcredit does raise household consumption. Others have disagreed, including Banerjee et al. (2009), Karlan and Zinman (2009), and Roodman and Morduch (2009). We do not aim to resolve this debate. We simply point out that microcredit can be a good option, especially when insurgents are the only other providers of capital.

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⁴⁵ Dana Hedgpeth and Sarah Cohen, “Money as a Weapon,” *The Washington Post*, August 11, 2008, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/10/AR2008081002512.html>.

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The Expanded Nontraditional Role of the AFP

A Reassessment

BY DENCIO SEVERO ACOP

This article argues that the experiences of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) during decades of counterinsurgency have had both positive and negative consequences for the AFP as an institution, as well as for state-building in the Philippines. Positive experiences can be attributed to the AFP contribution of its military values to its external environment, while many of the negative experiences are accounted for by its expanded interaction with its external environment. This kind of interaction, though essential, managed to undermine its professionalism and values, specifically from graft and corruption. Furthermore, the article argues that though there are seemingly insurmountable problems, the situation for the AFP and the state is not entirely hopeless. This optimism lies in good leadership from the top, especially political leadership.

The article also examines the traditional role of the AFP. In doing so, it takes a look at its history of security and development and then its current national security challenges. To assess both the relevance and the adequacy of AFP participation and contribution to the overall developmental effort, the resource capacities of national civilian institutions and AFP are examined. This includes identifying public expectations of the AFP and risks associated with its expanded role. Essentially, the gaps between the AFP and civil government, civil society, and the average citizen are brought to light. Finally, the article concludes with a summary of findings.

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Traditional Role of the AFP

The National Defense Act of the Philippines specifies the traditional role of the AFP as defender of the state and protector of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. This role is consistent with the universal role given to the armed forces of any country. Though formalized soon after the Philippines gained its independence from the United States in 1946, the AFP's less formal beginnings already saw defensive actions during the revolutionary war against its former colonial master Spain in 1896–1898, against the United States in 1899–1901, and against

the left hand offered developmental projects while the right hand firmly dealt with the rebels who challenged the authority of the government

Japan during World War II. Following independence, the AFP defended the state against Filipino rebels who wanted to overthrow the government. Some degree of revolt has persisted to this day. The AFP decisively defeated the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) and its military arm, the Huk army, in 1954 following an insurgency war that began in 1951. The AFP continues to fight the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm, the New People's Army, which has rebelled against established authority since 1968. The AFP fought against the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in Mindanao from the early 1970s until 1996 when a peace treaty was signed. That notwithstanding, a breakaway faction called the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has managed to wage war since 1975. In fact, although the MILF has taken part in peace talks with the government,

another breakaway group, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement/Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, continues to wage war. Then, of course, there is the extremist Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which continues to operate in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao and occasionally inflicts casualties on the AFP.

The AFP is neither as large nor technologically modern as most of its regional counterparts. In fact, it is arguably among the weakest militaries in the area. The army is the largest among the three branches of service, comprising some 10 infantry divisions with 3 brigades each.¹ The navy is next in size, followed by the air force with around 15,000 personnel.² While the army is relatively better equipped (probably because its equipment does not cost as much), the latter two branches leave much to be desired in terms of mission-essential gear. Since U.S. forces left in 1991, the AFP has experienced a serious degradation of its combat arsenal, including combat support and combat service support. Despite a modernization law in effect since 1995, the AFP has not become a more capable force. It has in fact deteriorated. Worse, the massive corruption within its ranks has not made the situation any better.

Nontraditional Role of the AFP

Although many believe that the nontraditional role of the AFP began with its developmental role during the martial law period under Ferdinand Marcos, the role actually began as early as 1951 during the Huk campaign when President Ramon Magsaysay, advised by Colonel Edward Lansdale and the Central Intelligence Agency, had the AFP adopt the “left-hand/right-hand” approach toward decisively defeating the original

AFP marine stands watch as USS *Chung-Hoon* arrives in Puerto Princesa to participate in Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training Philippines 2011

U.S. Navy (Robert Clowney)



communist insurgents in 1954. The left hand offered developmental projects to rebels who needed them, while the right hand firmly dealt with the rebels who refused and challenged the authority of the government. In fact, this highly successful formula of employing the security and developmental roles of the AFP became the blueprint for succeeding strategies against the insurgencies that carry over to this day. From that time forward, it was no longer strange to find support for national development, economic development, or law enforcement in AFP campaign plans.

History of Security and Development

The history of the AFP can be summarized as the history of using the blueprint of the left-hand/right-hand approach to resolving insurgencies. The period between the beginning of the Commonwealth Era in 1935 through World War II and independence in 1946 was largely characterized by the traditional role of the AFP, but all subsequent years saw variations of the left-hand/right-hand approach in action.

Confronted by the second communist insurgency posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA), as well as the secessionist insurgencies from the MNLF and MILF, the pre-martial law years between 1946 and 1972 saw the AFP gradually assume participation in socioeconomic and occasional political functions and programs, such as election duties, nationwide civic action programs, expansion of engineering units, use of military C-130s

for socioeconomic purposes, extensive AFP involvement in infrastructure development, development and utilization of reservists along the citizen army provisions of the National Defense Act for socioeconomic purposes, the president-directed Home Defense Program unifying the AFP reserve force development, community relations, civil assistance, and agromilitary activities.³

the government aimed to decisively defeat the communist insurgency using the triad concept of civil military operations, combat operations, and intelligence operations

The martial law period between 1972 and 1981 under Marcos intensified the direct participation of the AFP in governance. There were active-duty military officers who occupied what used to be elective or bureaucratic posts within the civilian government. Some officers sat as directors and managers of government owned or controlled corporations while concurrently occupying line or staff positions in the AFP. Still other officers performed as diplomats in Philippine embassies and consulates and listening posts overseas for years. AFP campaign plan Katatagan was written and implemented during this period. It signaled the beginnings of the triad concept or the synergistic employment of combat operations, intelligence, and civil-military operations. The involvement of the AFP in election duties continued during this time. Arguably, this involvement partly began the erosion of the AFP's core values, as was borne out by later consequences.⁴

The People Power Revolution on the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (or EDSA, the main highway of Metro Manila) in 1986

transformed the nontraditional role of the AFP. Up until that moment in Philippine history, the AFP merely played a developmental role that was limited to winning rebels back into mainstream society by supporting civilian government programs and projects. But suddenly in 1986, the AFP played a prominent part in regime change, thereby strategically affecting the lives of the citizenry in the years that followed through the kind of leadership that it helped install in power. Before accidentally helping reform the national leadership, the Reform the Armed Forces Movement, or the reformist faction of young and idealistic officers within the AFP, only sought to change their own organization.

The left-hand/right-hand approach continued following EDSA 1986, but this time with a fresh zeal of idealism untainted by the hypocrisy of the deposed regime. The involvement of the AFP in election duties also continued during this period. Realizing the need to first restore peace and order before any meaningful economic progress could take place, the new Aquino government was right to exploit its legitimacy toward pursuing fresh peace initiatives with the enemies of the state. It was in this spirit that Aquino tried to make peace with the Cordillera People's Liberation Army of Conrado Balweg in the north. To a great extent, the government was successful in making peace with the CPP/NPA breakaway group. The AFP was directed to support the government's program to establish a politically and economically stable country through reconciliation, protection of the people, economic and social improvement, and strong social structures based on valued institutions.⁵

Later, the government introduced field-validated enhancements into the security

and development strategy of the AFP, which resulted in significant results for the counter-insurgency campaign. The government aimed to decisively defeat the communist insurgency using the triad concept of civil military operations, combat operations, and intelligence operations. The plan was so successful that it cleared 13,000 affected communities between 1988 and 1994, but it encountered problems with the economic development phase.⁶

The other extreme of the transformed nontraditional role continued throughout the Aquino administration. Military rebels led by Colonel Gregorio Honasan launched a series of attempted power grabs between 1986 and 1989 that all failed. Accusing Aquino of being too friendly with the Left, Honasan and his cohorts aimed to form a ruling civilian-military junta wherein the military would play a major role.

The administration of Fidel Ramos took over from the Aquino regime in 1992 and immediately sought to make peace with any insurgent group that was receptive to the offer. Ramos, a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, was a former general and defense chief who understood the importance of achieving strategic peace before any meaningful political stability and economic progress could take place. As chief of the Philippine constabulary for 14 years, Ramos understood the effectiveness of security and development toward achieving the goals of his administration. If Aquino's watch was plagued by one coup attempt after another, the Ramos presidency experienced no such threat.

Ramos made strategic peace with military rebels in 1992, appealing to them instead to positively affect Philippine development through nonviolent means. As a result, Letter of Instruction 42/94, "Unlad-Bayan," was

launched. This letter was the campaign plan for the development or nation-building role of the AFP. It sought to rectify where "Lambat-Bitag" had failed. Specifically, the plan advocated the lead agency concept, involvement of civic and sectoral organizations and military commanders at all levels, delivery of basic services, AFP economic development projects (livelihood projects), cooperative development, disaster preparedness, use of reservists, AFP modernization (anchored on self-reliance), and environmental protection and preservation.⁷ The Army Concern on Community Organizing for Development, for instance, was in line with the implementation of "Unlad-Bayan."

After attaining peace with the military rebels, Ramos next made peace with the MNLF, led by Nur Misuari, in 1996. Although it appeared as if Ramos was making peace with the enemies of the state one by one, the fact was that governmental peace overtures were offered to various insurgent groups almost simultaneously. Even while meaningful progress had already been achieved with the military rebels and MNLF, there were likewise ongoing peace talks with the CPP/NPA and MILF. In fact, inroads toward achieving a similar peace accord as that sealed with the MNLF were already in the works when the Ramos administration had to put everything on hold as it turned over power to Joseph Estrada, who succeeded Ramos in 1998.

Ramos took advantage of the generally progressive political and economic atmosphere by issuing a change in approach.⁸ He hoped to turn the counterinsurgency over to the Philippine National Police, thus allowing the AFP to focus on modernizing itself in order to become capable of deterring *external* aggression after decades of addressing *internal* rebellion.

While the AFP prepared for its modernization as a traditional organization, it had to continue on the path of traditional and nontraditional undertakings as the need for development in many remote areas continued. Among these projects were the Community Assistance and Rural Empowerment through Social Services program and the Army Literacy Patrol System program of the Philippine army. Through these programs, army units delivered basic services such as medical and education missions to remote communities.⁹

the Arroyo administration continued the proven formula of security and development as its strategy toward the insurgencies

The Estrada administration declared an all-out war against the MILF in 1999 following the collapse of peace talks. That irresponsible action threw out all the painstaking gains toward achieving lasting political stability made by the two previous administrations. Estrada's ill-advised decision certainly used the AFP's traditional role toward resolving a long insurgency at the expense of its nontraditional contributions. Moreover, while the AFP succeeded in driving the MILF forces away from the territories they occupied, the victory was merely tactical and came at the expense of the strategic opportunity for lasting peace.

By early 2001, Estrada was deposed by the same military organization whose loyalty he had courted by supporting the generals who wanted an all-out war against the MILF forces in 1999. Estrada refused to resign following his impeachment on accusations of corruption.

The AFP under Gloria Macapagal Arroyo continued the strategy of security and

development to win its wars. The updated AFP security and development plan, code-named Operation Plan Bantay-Laya I (2001), complemented security operations with the delivery of basic services needed by communities to win them back from the influence of the CPP/NPA. Among such undertakings were the Kalahi Projects of the Army's 2^d Infantry Division in Southern Luzon and CODE (community development). These projects, generally delivered by army units in their respective areas of responsibility, included livelihood enterprises, technical assistance, provision of equipment and utilities, and simply facilitating coordination with relevant local government units.¹⁰

The continued involvement of the AFP in election duties was hampered by an unfortunate turn of events in 2004 with the eruption of the "Hello Garci" scandal. A wiretap from the Intelligence Service, Armed Forces of the Philippines, smuggled out by one of the unit's agents, revealed allegations of vote-rigging by the incumbent president, Gloria Arroyo, who was running against the populist actor Fernando Poe, Jr. The scandal also alleged substantive involvement by some members and units of the AFP in the vote-rigging, including Hermogenes Esperon, Jr., who eventually became one of Arroyo's many AFP chiefs of staff. In November 2011, Arroyo was prevented from leaving the Philippines and arrested for the vote-rigging incident. The scandal was not the first time the AFP's involvement in election duties was put to question. Like its predecessors, the Arroyo administration continued the proven formula of security and development as its strategy toward the insurgencies. In truth, it will take a great deal of time before the insurgencies can be resolved; they will continue to exist as long as their root causes are

present. The AFP under Arroyo implemented Operation Plan Bantay-Laya II in 2007, which saw the establishment of the AFP National Development Support Command (NDSC). The NDSC is one of the largest units of the AFP and has the authority to work with any unit of the AFP to accomplish its mission. Initially meant to implement national development projects in internal security operations (ISO)-related areas, the NDSC was later authorized by the Arroyo regime (in 2008) to undertake national development projects even in non-ISO-related areas or designated AFP-supported national development priority areas under the purview of the Inter-Agency Transfer Fund, civil works projects, special projects (flagship programs or those designated by the president), civil-military operations, base services and support development, and those programmed by the Bases Conversion and Development Authority.¹¹

The Arroyo AFP has other initiatives all under the umbrella of the security and development strategy. One is the National Internal Security Plan, which tries to accelerate the assumption of responsibility for the developmental programs by the local government units and agencies from the AFP.¹² Another is the mandated support given by all AFP unified commands to integrated disaster risk management, which comes in handy during times of crises.¹³

Separate peace talks with the CPP and MILF initiated by previous governments are continuing under the administration of Benigno Aquino III. Even the employment of peace talks to resolve long-running insurgencies is indicative of the effectiveness of the security and development strategy as peace talks use the language of development to address the unmet needs of the insurgents. Apart from these talks,

Aquino's AFP is implementing Operation Plan Bayanihan, which is a strategy to improve the Philippines' Global Peace Index rating between January 1, 2011, until the end of President Aquino's term in 2016 and to comply with the human rights requirements of international humanitarian law through effective community development programs.

The implementation of the various letters of instruction and operational plans on security and development has led to the AFP's significant contribution of its engineer assets toward directly performing what is usually the responsibility of the Department of Public Works and Highways, amounting to not only millions but also billions of pesos in infrastructure projects throughout the country. As of June 2008, for instance, the AFP Corps of Engineers completed 596 civil works projects amounting to 2.8 billion Philippine pesos (PhP) (est. US\$65.1M).¹⁴ Between July 2008 and December 2009, the Corps of Engineers implemented 501 infrastructure projects worth PhP 439.7 million (est. US\$10.2M) benefiting 367 communities.¹⁵ From January 2009 to January 2011, the AFP NDSC constructed public health centers in 179 communities nationwide amounting to PhP 90.2 million (est. US\$2.1M).¹⁶ Illustrating the types of civil projects implemented by the AFP NDSC, the command constructed 531 school buildings, 366 water systems, 482 farm to market roads, 160 electrification projects, 9 foot bridges, and 18 assorted others (path walks, toilets) nationwide between 2005 and 2009.¹⁷

Current National Security Challenges—Primary

The primary national security challenge confronting the AFP continues to be the threat posed by the CPP/NPA. This insurgency is active nationwide, although its presence is felt

mainly in the remote hinterlands. It espouses an alien ideology that is vastly different from the way of life and values that Filipinos have known throughout their history. It has an underground political organization and army whose presence is felt nationwide and that has used unconventional warfare quite effectively. Although the AFP estimates that CPP influence, strength, and weaponry have dwindled, it is difficult to measure this insurgency based on statistics alone. Many of its elements cannot really be quantified.

Filipinos are predominantly Christian and generally abhor violence or dictatorship

One factor does seem consistent. The insurgency feeds on public discontent with the status quo. The more discontent there is, the more the insurgents fuel it—and the stronger the insurgency becomes. The fact that the insurgency has been around for more than four decades and refuses to go away proves this point. Despite this strength, the insurgency has weaknesses. A profound failing is its espousing a godless ideology through violent dictatorship. Filipinos are predominantly Christian and generally abhor violence or dictatorship. The fact that this insurgency remains just that after more than 40 years illustrates this point. The government continues to dialogue with the CPP in the hope of finding lasting peace. So far, the effort has not been successful, but the government feels it is worth continuing.

Another primary security challenge, next only to the CPP/NPA in severity, is the secessionist threat from the MILF. Beginning in 1975, this insurgency continues because there are enough Filipino Muslims who are unhappy with the way they have been treated by the

predominantly Christian nation and therefore want to live in a territory of their own, namely a portion of Mindanao. The problem with this proposition is that it dismembers the Philippine Republic. Although not as dangerous as it once was, the MILF is still counted by the AFP as a threat due to its not having abandoned its secessionist agenda and the presence of its army. As with the CPP, the Philippine government continues to hold peace talks with the MILF in hopes of finding lasting peaceful coexistence despite significant cultural differences.

There are other armed threats, such as the MILF faction Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and Jemaah Islamiyah. Certainly these groups cannot be discounted, but they are minor threats compared to the CPP and MILF in terms of size, capability, and reach. Despite the Abu Sayyaf Group's notoriety, it is really more a criminal threat using religious extremism as a tool than a serious political organization.

Current National Security Challenges—Secondary

The characteristics common to developing countries also become the national security challenges to so-called soft states. Recurrent issues such as the general lack of resources due to poverty, endemic graft and corruption, incompetence, weak institutions, lack of political will, and oligarchic political and economic control are the security challenges from within. In a way, these issues are arguably the primary rather than the secondary challenges to national security. In most developing countries, these attributes fuel insurgencies. Seldom or never is it the other way around. The same is true with the Philippines.

However, graft and corruption are probably the primary enemies within the AFP in

particular and Philippine society in general. Despite its unique values that highlight honor and sacrifice, the AFP is ultimately only a microcosm of the larger society it remains a part of; it cannot insulate itself from its environment. Its commander in chief is a civilian. Its developmental role demands that the AFP directly engage in civil works and projects and even election duties, which are all prone to corruption. Various media reports have recently highlighted the rampant practice of conversion in the AFP's management of its financial resources and the involvement of senior officers in the practice. *Conversion* is the misappropriation of public funds to make the money appear as if it was spent as intended, when in reality it was used elsewhere. The recorded testimony of former disbursing officer Colonel George Rabusa in congressional hearings provided detailed accounts of the malpractice. Former AFP comptrollers Generals Carlos Garcia and Jacinto Ligot were tried for plunder. Garcia is currently serving his court martial conviction in a national penitentiary, although for a lesser sentence. The public exposure of the malpractice is believed to have led to the suicide of former AFP chief and Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes. These facts are highlighted to show that a significant portion of the threat confronting the AFP is found within itself.

Resource Capacity of National Civilian Institutions

Still a developing economy, the Philippines is often plagued by the perennial lack of resources needed to fund developmental programs and projects implemented by its agencies. It also needs to reform certain elements in its political and economic systems in order to generate more funds needed for

development. A general review of the annual national budget reveals that around 40 percent goes to debt servicing while 25 percent is lost to corruption, leaving only 35 percent for development.¹⁸ Even if not much can be done about reducing the amount of public funds that are used to repay past loans, eliminating or radically reducing the staggering amount lost to corruption would be significant. For instance, the government still needs to find an effective way to increase the tax collection efficiency of significant revenue generating agencies such as the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of Customs. Conversion must also be controlled. External borrowing is always an option, but further borrowing will only exacerbate the country's already precarious financial posture.

to supplement its limited capacity, the AFP gets some external support from allies such as the United States and Australia

Capacity Resource of the AFP

AFP resources are part of the 35 percent remaining in the budget after debt servicing and what is lost to corruption. The AFP is completely dependent on whatever is allocated to it by the national government. It is also in need of internal reforms in how it handles resources. Although largely composed of dedicated men and women, the AFP is among the weakest militaries in the region and is still undergoing modernization. In 2004, it embarked on a historical project to rationalize its budgeting process aligned with national security, defense, and military strategies down to tactical plans. Unfortunately, this project does not appear to

have rooted down to the level of coherent and sustained implementation.

To supplement its limited capacity, the AFP gets some external support from allies such as the United States and Australia. For instance, in 2003, under the umbrella provided by the Philippine Defense Reform program consequent to the Joint Defense Assessment with the United States, some support for nontraditional threats was provided to the AFP by the Republic of the Philippines–U.S. Security Engagement Board.¹⁹ During the Republic of the Philippines–U.S. Exercise Balikatan 2002, participating U.S. forces highlighted what appeared to be a newly discovered formula for winning insurgencies, except that it was the same left-hand/right-hand formula known by the AFP since the victory over the Huks in 1954.

Employing the right hand, U.S. forces provided technical intelligence that allowed the AFP to better seek and engage the ASG in Basilan. Using the left-hand approach, U.S. forces combined civil-military operations and engineers to do a detailed assessment of Basilan's demographics. They identified 30 *barangays* that were ASG strongholds, and with assistance from the U.S. Agency for International Development, they built 80 kilometers of roads, 4 bridges, 2 piers, 25 water projects, 16 schools, and 3 medical clinics; repaired 2 hospitals and an airfield; and conducted Medical Civic Action Programs for 20,000 patients on Basilan Island over a period of 6 months.

Strengthening the argument for the security and development model, U.S. forces found little ideological support—just government inability to provide for the basic needs and security of the people. Furthermore, implementing security and development projects in local areas

restored the government's legitimacy in the eyes of the public, thereby eroding the base of support for the insurgents.²⁰

Public Expectations of the AFP

Similar to what is expected of the armed forces in any democracy, the Filipino people expect the AFP to fulfill its constitutional role as protector of the people and state. Looking at the history of the AFP, it appears to have performed these roles quite well. Though lacking the sophistication of a professional armed force, the colonial militia was able to defeat the mighty Spanish garrisons and delay the conquest of the even mightier U.S. Army of the Philippines for 2 years—down to the last general, Miguel Malvar, at the turn of the 19th century. During World War II, the Commonwealth Army again outdid itself, gallantly defending the archipelago against the far superior imperial forces of Japan side by side with the Americans down to the last prisoners of war in Capas. The AFP even sent contingents to foreign wars under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) such as the Philippine Expeditionary Force to Korea in the early 1950s and Philippine Civic Action Group to Vietnam in the late 1960s. Today, the AFP continues to send contingents to select UN missions.

As a partner in development, the AFP has been known to help the victims of crises and emergencies. Aside from hurricanes and floods, there are also occasional earthquakes and volcanic eruptions that necessitate intervention by the AFP, such as the Baguio quake in 1990 and the Mount Pinatubo eruption in 1991. The people have also come to expect the AFP to intervene on their behalf during serious political crises, as happened during the EDSA People Power Revolution that ousted Marcos in 1986. The same was true in 2001 when President

Joseph Estrada was impeached for corruption and plunder but refused to step down. In addition to these instances, the AFP has been known to help deliver public goods and services (medical, dental, educational, spiritual) to remote communities.

Risks from AFP Expanded Nontraditional Role

There are a number of risks from the expansion of the AFP nontraditional role. The first is that AFP resources dedicated to development are resources taken away from the AFP's core function of warfighting. Although its developmental role is important, its main task remains winning the nation's wars. There is no other organization in the Philippines that has that role. The country is also still developing and therefore lacks resources, as does the military. Any resources taken away from the AFP's already limited supply further denigrates its capacity to perform its traditional role. Engineer equipment removed to construct civil projects is combat support removed from combat operations. Limited air assets used to support Medical Civic Action Programs or to ferry high-ranking government functionaries to the field are air supports detracted from combat operations—not to mention medical evacuation in case there are casualties. A Civil-Military Operations (CMO) unit diverted to provide basic education to children in remote communities is combat support deducted from the triad of intelligence, combat operations, and CMO as they synergistically interact to attain a tactical or operational objective in a specific theater of operations.

Another risk is the overall impact of the nontraditional role on the core competency of the AFP. General Douglas MacArthur once said

that the main mission of soldiers is to win the nation's wars each time the war tocsin sounds. Although the left-hand/right-hand approach to winning insurgencies is a proven formula, it also has a critical weakness. If left to the AFP to perform both roles, the left-hand role could ultimately weaken the right-hand role. What happens to the unique ability of soldiers to fight and win battles if they end up doing more developmental tasks? Don't "civilian" tasks tend to "soften" soldiers who are fundamentally indoctrinated and trained to kill the enemy? My observation is that the developmental tasks performed by Filipino soldiers over years of exposure in the counterinsurgency campaign appear to have threatened their ability to carry out that unique task. Soldiers of old lament how the AFP seems to have deteriorated in terms of its ability to win wars. Apart from its success over the Huk insurgency in the 1950s, the AFP has not won a single victory over any of its enemies.

soldiers of old lament how the AFP seems to have deteriorated in terms of its ability to win wars

The insurgencies confronting the AFP continue to this day, and instead of dwindling, they are multiplying. Where there were only the CPP/NPA and the MNLF previously, now there are the MILF, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement, Abu Sayyaf Group, and even Jemaah Islamiyah—not to mention the Rajah Solaiman Movement. Meanwhile, the AFP, despite its relative superiority over any of its enemies, continues to suffer basic setbacks such as the recent ambush of a special forces team that claimed the lives of some 25 soldiers, including those who were captured and beheaded by the Abu Sayyaf. These incidents

AFP marine demonstrates front kicks to U.S. Marines during Filipino martial arts training, Exercise Balikatan 2011

U.S. Marine Corps (Anthony Ward, Jr.)



are nothing new in the history of fighting insurgencies. The real question that should be asked is why these incidents continue to occur despite the many lessons learned from the past. Why did the patrol wander into known enemy territory without authorization from higher headquarters, therefore jeopardizing the sending of reinforcements and the usual combat support and combat service support? Without going through the detail of every similar engagement over the years, this loss illustrates much about the state of the AFP's fundamental readiness to fight and win battles, and much more to win wars.

The more the AFP performs the developmental role in areas already cleared of insurgents, the more obvious it is when an accountable civil government fails to have basic developmental programs and institutions rooted in place to prevent the insurgency from returning and jeopardizing painstaking gains. This is the third risk. The lack of delivery in the developmental phase by the permanent stakeholders in many of the cleared localities was what doomed Operation Plan Lambat-bitag in the late 1980s to overall failure. Otherwise, it would have been as successful as were the earlier phases of clearing, holding, and consolidating. Lambat-bitag was the most successful application of the left-hand/right-hand concept since the Huk campaign. Current AFP operational plans and letters of instruction whose names have a tendency to change in every administration are mere variations of the same concept, and none has been as successful as Lambat-bitag.

The most critical risks to the core values of the AFP are graft and corruption, which have grown to become the AFP's enemy within. Direct participation in the actual implementation of

civil works projects has allowed the allure of financial kickbacks to seep into the AFP's consciousness and internal systems, undermining core values over time.

Members of the AFP, especially officers, get exposed to corruption through their involvement in political activities such as election duties and by going through the Commission on Appointments for confirmation to ranks of colonel and above. Political activities are almost always partisan. Often, soldiers pay for the roles they play in keeping electoral exercises honest, orderly, and peaceful. The peculiarities of culture also add to the complexity. Seldom are there elections in the Philippines where losing candidates do not accuse winning opponents of cheating. Soldiers who help ensure fair play during elections often get caught in the middle and accused of favoring certain candidates. Some people may endorse certain members of the AFP, who they claim offended them or their interests, to politicians who in turn could get to the targeted members through the Commission on Appointments when they go for confirmation to higher ranks in the organization. The mandated procedure of having to be confirmed has politicized the promotion process, allowing undue influence by politicians as well as their intrusion into the merit system already utilized by the AFP Board of Generals. The Commission on Appointments mandate has had the effect of encouraging political patronage.

Mitigating Actions to Address Risks

Although the developmental tasks of the AFP are apparently important to the counterinsurgency, these tasks tend to take away from the primary responsibility of the armed forces, which is to win the nation's wars. The quicker the timeline for the AFP to relinquish its developmental role to accountable civilian

stakeholders, the sooner the AFP can focus on warfighting. Ultimately, the left-hand tasks rightfully belong to the civilian stakeholders in the communities that are affected by the insurgency, while the right-hand tasks solely belong to the AFP as the coercive power of the state.

Nevertheless, this left-hand/right-hand (or civilian-military) partnership still needs to work efficiently and effectively as a team. Also, the AFP's exposure to corruption and partisan political activity must be quickly contained before it destroys the organization from within. Finally, the civilian-military partnership between the AFP and civilian stakeholders must be headed by leadership with the political will to resolve each of the national security challenges within the shortest time frames possible similar to the model of President Ramon Magsaysay, which decisively defeated the PKP/Hukbalahap insurgency in 1954.

seldom are there elections in the Philippines where losing candidates do not accuse winning opponents of cheating

Bridging the Gap: The AFP and Civil Government

Corruption appears to be the main gap that must be bridged between the AFP and civil government by both entities, taking the necessary steps either to eradicate or mitigate the practice that is undermining serious efforts to attain security and development. As in most developing countries, the practice of corruption in the Philippines, although illegal, is widespread. Though hidden, it is institutionalized in many parts of the bureaucracy—among them

the Department of Public Works and Highways and even the AFP. Corrupt practices affect the capacity of civilian stakeholders to step up and own development in the communities that have already been cleared of insurgents by the AFP. Initially, the AFP, through its corps of engineers, was relied on to perform dependably where civilian counterparts fell short. However, even the AFP itself became vulnerable to the systemic corruption surrounding construction projects that generate substantial margins for kickbacks. By effectively checking the incidence of corruption affecting the development phase of the counterinsurgency campaign, the much-needed quantum leap into resolving insurgencies through genuine development can be achieved.

Legitimacy, corruption, and human rights are the gaps that continually exist between the AFP and civil society. The huge overall gap in relations between the AFP and civil society was significantly narrowed by the role the former played on the side of people power at EDSA in 1986, which resulted in regime change at the expense of Marcos. However, the honeymoon was brief as relations again soured following the successive coup attempts launched by military adventurists led by Colonel Gregorio Honasan during the administration of Corazon Aquino between 1986 and 1992. Although immensely popular at the start of his mandate, actor-turned-politician Joseph Estrada was nevertheless ousted from office midway through his term in 2001 following impeachment proceedings. Civil society relations with the military once again soared to a new high.

If relations during the time of Aquino did not go well because the plotters went against a popular democracy, civil society again criticized the AFP during the term of Gloria Macapagal

Arroyo for doing the opposite in supporting a widely discredited regime. This latest gap is probably not without firm basis. Along with accusations that the AFP, owing to its role during the martial law period, endured the administration of Arroyo, this era arguably represented a new low in the history of the AFP. It was then that the AFP's legitimacy and record of human rights were put to serious doubt. The allegations were extremely embarrassing and it was believed that they led to Reyes's suicide. Allegations also led to the indictment of several high-ranking officers and helped convict former Generals Carlos Garcia and Jacinto Ligot.

Then there was the infamous and cold-blooded massacre of political rivals and several journalists in Maguindanao Province by the Ampatuan clan, who ruled as warlords. The AFP in Maguindanao turned a blind eye to the atrocities of the Ampatuans since they were favored political allies of the regime. As political allies of Arroyo, the Ampatuans were more responsible for ensuring her electoral victory not only in Maguindanao but also nationwide by padding votes sufficiently to reflect a wide margin of victory over rival Fernando Poe, Jr., in the 2004 presidential elections. The Arroyo era was indeed a low point in AFP history. From Arroyo's illegitimacy, to massive corruption, to gross human rights violations, the AFP stood down when it had a chance to stand out as it did in 1986 and 2001. Today, therefore, working to restore legitimacy, decisively addressing graft and corruption, and dramatically improving its human rights record are must-win battles for the AFP.

Conclusion

The AFP's experience from decades of countering various insurgencies that it

continues to face has had both positive and negative consequences for the armed forces as an institution as well as for state-building in the Philippines. The security and development (left-hand/right-hand) approach toward winning insurgencies is a time-tested and proven formula. It defeated the first communist insurgency waged by the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas and its military arm, the Hukbalahap. Through Operation Plan Lambat-Bitag, it could have won again in the late 1980s had it not been for the lack of developmental follow-through from civilian stakeholders. That the AFP and the Philippine state continue their counterinsurgency strategy along this line is already a giant step in the right direction.

Apart from the tendency to assess the success or failure of the counterinsurgency experience of the Philippines based solely on the final outcome of decisive victory, there are other ways of evaluating the experience, such as noting the positive and negative developments that have occurred from decades of trying to put an end to various rebellions. The positive experience can be attributed to the AFP's contribution of its military values to its external environment, while much of the negative experience is accounted for by its expanded exposure to politics, which have undermined its core values. The situation for the AFP and state is not entirely hopeless as there are ways and means to bridge the identified gaps to enhance civil-military capacity to accomplish the mission relative to the various stakeholders who are its customers and partners. The ultimate solution is good political leadership, which is always a key element or prerequisite anywhere serious challenges arise. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ The approximate size of the Philippine army is from Captain Mark Posadas of the Office of the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

² The estimated strength of the Philippine air force is from Colonel Rolando Acop, currently the Defense and Armed Forces Attaché of the Philippines to India.

³ Alfredo S. Oliveros, *The Development Role of the Armed Forces of the Philippines: A Policy Option Paper* (Quezon City, Philippines: National Defense College of the Philippines, 1998), 7.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 10–13.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 13–14.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 46–48.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 14–16.

¹⁰ Romeo L. Labrador, *An Evaluation of the Community Development Team Approach as a Strategy for the Enhancement of Internal Security Operations* (Quezon City, Philippines: National Defense College of the Philippines, 2006), 105–106.

¹¹ Ferozaldo Paul T. Regencia, *National Development Priority Area Projects: Prospects for Integration* (Quezon City, Philippines: AFP Command and General Staff College, 2008), 60–71.

¹² Ferdinand M. Friginal, *Appropriateness of the AFP in the Suppression of Insurgency* (Quezon City, Philippines: AFP Command and General Staff College, 2008), 121–124.

¹³ Erwin A. Alea, *An Integrated Disaster Response Approach for the AFP Unified Commands* (Quezon City, Philippines: AFP Command and General Staff College, 2008), 121–123.

¹⁴ Manuel S. Ramiro, *The Role of AFP Corps of Engineers in National Development: An Assessment* (Quezon City, Philippines: National Defense College of the Philippines, 2008), 135–142.

¹⁵ Wilfredo A. Visperas, *The Impact of Infrastructure Projects of the Naval Construction Brigade to Community Development* (Quezon City, Philippines: AFP Command and General Staff College, 2011), 49.

¹⁶ The data is from the Kalayaan Barangays Program Accomplishment Report as of May 12, 2011, submitted to the AFP National Development Support Command.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ The research data is from a presentation, “National Situationer: Focus on Social and Economic Development,” delivered by former Philippine treasurer Professor Leonor M. Briones before the East Canlubang Industrial Park Association, Laguna, Philippines, on August 20, 2010.

¹⁹ Elmer R. Amon, *The Non-Traditional Security Concerns Under the RP–US Security Engagement Board and Their Implications to the Capability of the AFP* (Quezon City, Philippines: National Defense College of the Philippines, 2008), 109–118.

²⁰ Kevin Lasater, *Applying Lessons Learned: The Role of CMO in Counterinsurgency in Basilan* (Quezon City, Philippines: AFP Command and General Staff College, 2010), 26–28.

Who Should Lead U.S. Cybersecurity Efforts?

BY KEVIN P. NEWMYER

Threats to computer systems, government and commercial networks—and even private citizens’ personal information—have exploded in recent years, but the U.S. Government has failed to address these threats adequately. One author has stated that “the cyber threat [is] the most pervasive and pernicious threat” facing the country today.¹ The danger is no longer random teenagers looking for thrills by hacking into the local university network, but sophisticated criminal enterprises looking to steal information or money. The same technologies used to attack financial systems can be unleashed on the Nation’s critical infrastructure. In 2007, several Cabinet Departments including Defense, Homeland Security, and Commerce were hacked and terabytes of information were exfiltrated by unknown agents.²

The discovery of the Stuxnet virus in 2010 pointed to nation-state involvement in cyber attacks at an unprecedented level and followed the Ghostnet penetrations of the Dali Lama’s networks in 2009. Cybersecurity changed from a nuisance problem in the early 1990s to a vital national security issue in the early 21st century. In one of his first acts, President Barack Obama called for a comprehensive review of U.S. policy on cybersecurity, but little has been done to implement the recommendations from the review.³ While the White House published its *International Strategy for Cyberspace* in May 2011, the document does little to address the current domestic situation. Despite the need

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for effective national cybersecurity policy, the lack of consensus on which leadership model would best achieve the desired results continues to delay policy implementation.

Several authors have proposed strategies and models for U.S. cybersecurity policy leadership. One prominent school of thought, highlighted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report *Securing Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency*, is that cybersecurity policy direction should fall under a powerful “czar” in the Executive Office of the President. The authors believe the centralization of power in the White House is the best course of action for providing the necessary policy direction. A second school of thought

despite the need for effective national cybersecurity policy, the lack of consensus on which leadership model would best achieve the desired results continues to delay policy implementation

argues that policy direction would best be accomplished through a Cabinet-level department. One study from this school argues that responsibility should remain with the Department of Homeland Security due to its role as the lead agency for response to domestic incidents.⁴ Others argue that moving the responsibility to the Executive Office of the President from Homeland Security would be insufficient and that a broader restructuring is needed to address the triad of cybersecurity (government at Federal, state, and local levels). Paul Rosenzweig presents an argument for the Department of Defense (DOD) assuming the leadership role based on the depth of talent and experience resident in the National Security Agency (NSA) as compared to the relative lack of human capital in the Department of Homeland Security.⁵

None of the present studies has provided a model that achieves the necessary political consensus on the approach to cybersecurity leadership to implement. Arguments for a strong White House role fail to address the limited success this model has had in other areas such as the war on drugs. Granting the leadership role to DOD ignores the lack of legal authorities for the military to act in domestic roles under the Posse Comitatus Act. The Department of Homeland Security, although having responsibility, has not been able to achieve necessary levels of performance for a variety of reasons. Indeed, the White House czar model offers the advantage of access to the inner circle of the President and the bully pulpit but no regulatory capability. The Cabinet department model offers regulatory power but lacks the authority of the White House in the interagency process.

Options for Cybersecurity Leadership

Policy leadership can remain in the White House with a powerful cyber czar able to set and implement policy decisions with the backing of the President. It could also be vested in one of the Cabinet departments. The Department of Homeland Security currently has a role in policy coordination among government agencies for nondefense networks and systems, but each department remains responsible for its own systems.⁶ DOD is responsible for its own systems, both classified and unclassified, as well as some defense-related critical infrastructure necessary to defend the Nation. A third alternative is the creation of a new entity within the Federal Government as a hybrid.

The History

The origins of U.S. cybersecurity policy rest in critical infrastructure protection efforts begun during the Clinton administration. President

Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 13010, “Critical Infrastructure Protection,” in 1996, which created the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection and highlighted the threat to the Nation’s economic and national security from cyber attacks. The recommendations of the commission resulted in President Clinton issuing Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63 in May 1998.


PDD 63 established several cybersecurity-related organizations within the government including the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism with an Office of Critical Infrastructure to support the Coordinator and the National Infrastructure Protection Center. It also was the first step in encouraging the formation of the sectoral Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), which have continued to develop and form a key part of the public-private partnership necessary to secure cyberspace. With these centers, the Clinton administration focused on the public-private partnership as the means to secure cyberspace.

While the George W. Bush administration initially continued the Clinton approach, the attacks of 9/11 caused it to significantly refocus from cyber attacks on critical infrastructure to physical attacks by terrorist groups. *The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace* was published in 2003 but was criticized as more a list of recommendations than a comprehensive strategy document that tied in ends, ways, and means.⁷ In addition, the Bush administration published the *National Infrastructure Protection Plan* in 2006, which designated 17 (now 18) key infrastructure sectors that required individual protection plans. The Bush administration also published the *Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative* in 2008, but critics found that its focus on the government Internet domain (.gov) was

too limited. During the Bush administration, cybersecurity responsibility was vague, with limited leadership and diluted responsibility in the White House, Homeland Security, and DOD. Homeland Security was given the overall coordination role, but responsibility still rested with individual agencies.

The Obama administration initiated its cybersecurity efforts with the “60-Day Cyberspace Policy Review.” Published in late May 2009, the document was an ambitious effort that presented a solid review of where the government was in relation to cybersecurity, but it offered little in the way of vision on how to get to the destination. The key recommendation of the review is that the President should appoint a single cybersecurity policy official to serve as the central coordinator for government and national efforts. This essentially repeats the recommendation made by the Center for Strategic and International Studies commission report in 2008. Interestingly, the White House did not name a cyber czar until December 2009, when Howard Schmidt accepted the position. In May 2011, the White House issued the *International Strategy to Secure Cyberspace*, which provided an outline of U.S. intentions at the international level, but the document is largely silent on what needs to be done within the government and the Nation to address the challenges domestically.

This brings us to the present day. Although several bills were presented in the 110th Congress and even more in the 111th Congress, no comprehensive cybersecurity legalization has been voted into law, and more than 30 separate pieces of legislation are pending before the 112th Congress.⁸ The Congressional Research Service pointed out that no single congressional committee or executive agency has primary responsibility for cybersecurity issues, and this has led to a hodgepodge



The White House (Pete Souza)

President Obama waits to be introduced at critical infrastructure CEOs meeting on cybersecurity at Eisenhower Executive Office Building

of initiatives and good ideas but no unifying focus.⁹ Many similarities exist among the documents that form the progression of U.S. cybersecurity policy under three administrations, and the outlines of the policy are sound—but difficult interagency and legislative decisions necessary for effective action remain to be taken. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) commented that cybersecurity leadership was challenged by a lack of top-level leadership and the difficulty of coordinating across multiple agencies. It is a situation that cannot be allowed to continue; there is too much at risk.

Policy Options

There are several basic options for providing cybersecurity leadership within the U.S. Government: a powerful White House–based executive/coordinator; designation of a Cabinet-level agency with the requisite authority to be directive as opposed to consultative in dealing with other departments; and creation of some hybrid entity. If Cabinet-level leadership is chosen, the follow-up question is which department will take the lead, with Homeland Security and DOD as the most likely candidates.

Option A: National Coordinator in the Executive Office of the President. A leading option for cybersecurity leadership is to establish a National Coordinator for Cybersecurity within the White House structure. This option is favored by the CSIS report and the Obama administration’s 60-day review. The CSIS plan recommended:

- ❖ appointing an assistant for cyberspace and establishing a cybersecurity directorate within the National Security Council to assume current Homeland Security Council responsibilities
- ❖ establishing a National Office for Cyberspace that would assume the responsibilities for the current National Cybersecurity Center and Joint Interagency Cyber Task Force.

The office/official would also assume oversight and control over the multiple cybersecurity functions within the Federal Government and provide a single point of authority on related policy decisions.

The CSIS report placed the blame for the current weakness in cybersecurity policy at the Federal level on “lack of strategic focus, overlapping missions, poor coordination and collaboration, and diffuse responsibility.”¹⁰ This lack of focus continued even though the Clinton administration adopted PDD 63 and established Richard Clarke as the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism.

Sharp concurred with the CSIS recommendation and pointed out the current lack of an authoritative decisionmaker in a position to compel action to respond to a serious threat to national security.¹¹ He offered two models—one based on U.S. Strategic Command and its ability to order military components within the Global Information Grid to take action, and the other based on the role played by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The DNI cannot direct subordinate agencies to take action, but it has the power to reallocate resources, make budgetary changes, and issue formal taskings that would enable a National Coordinator for Cybersecurity to be effective. The CSIS report also offered the DNI as a potential model

for the coordinator, highlighting the role the DNI plays as a strategist and network-builder. Senator Joseph Lieberman stated that there needs to be a strong cybersecurity coordinator within the White House to oversee both the civilian and military efforts in cybersecurity when he introduced legislation in 2009 to implement the CSIS recommendations.¹²

The White House cyber czar option has not met with universal approval. There are several weaknesses in the PDD 63 version, including the lack of budget authority and difficulties in getting the different departments to agree. Resources are the key in Washington, and without budget authority, the National Cyber Coordinator will have a difficult job. Fundamental to the importance of the cyber czar is the authority delegated to him by the President. To be effective, a leader requires authority commensurate with his responsibility. Empowerment of the cyber czar by the President is fundamental.

Others have questioned the effectiveness of czars in general and argue that yet another rearrangement of the deck chairs is not necessary. They believe that merely placing responsibility in the White House would be insufficient to effect change and that much more drastic reorganization would be required.

Another weakness of the White House cyber czar is the lack of accountability to Congress. The current advisor, Howard Schmidt, was not subjected to a Senate confirmation. Several administrations have rejected calls for Presidential advisors to testify before Congress. The legislation proposed by Senator Lieberman required the President to nominate a cyber coordinator for Senate approval similar to the process used for the DNI. This would instill some measure of congressional oversight and allow Congress to demand testimony from the cyber czar. Senator Robert Byrd noted that

the increased use of Presidential czars presented a potential threat to the Constitution's system of checks and balances. Senator Susan Collins resisted placing cybersecurity leadership in the White House because of the difficulty for congressional oversight of budgets and spending.¹³

Filling the job of a cybersecurity coordinator proved difficult. It took more than 7 months from the completion of the Obama administration's cybersecurity review to name the coordinator. The GAO saw the slow adoption of the policy review's recommendations as a result of the lack of authoritative guidance from the White House.¹⁴

the interagency process is far from smooth, and each department secretary values his or her direct line to the President

Option B: Place a Cabinet Department in Charge. Two primary options exist for placing a Cabinet department in charge of cybersecurity: Defense and Homeland Security. Before looking at the details involved with each one, some general observations are in order. Cabinet-level management of the problem is more in line with the traditional response to threats for the U.S. Government. It provides for congressional oversight via the confirmation and budget processes. Cabinet-level officials may be summoned to testify before Congress. Agencies operate under authorities designated in law and are normally empowered to publish regulations that are binding on individuals and companies.

There are challenges to placing a Cabinet-level department in charge. The interagency process is far from smooth, and each department secretary values his

or her direct line to the President. Placing one department in a position to mandate to another how it is to defend and operate its internal computer systems could be problematic. The Trusted Internet Connection (TIC) program that was designed to reduce the number of governmental connections to the Internet is indicative of some of the problems. TIC was launched in 2007 by the Office of Management and Budget to improve the reliability and security of U.S. Government networks, with all departments except DOD required to participate. As of September 2009, none of the 23 agencies involved was fully compliant.¹⁵

Option B (1): Placing the Department of Homeland Security in Charge. The Department of Homeland Security legal authorities allow it to protect information shared with the private sector, lead a civilian response to a cyber attack, request law enforcement and intelligence assistance from other government agencies, and offer liability protection to companies that sell and use technology to defend against cyber terrorism. Given that more than 85 percent of the government's information traffic flows over private sector networks, it is necessary that the lead agency for cybersecurity has strong relations with the private sector. Homeland Security has already established relationships with the private sector via the ISACs and has included private sector representatives on the watch floor at the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC). Homeland Security also has existing regulatory capacity.

Additionally, Homeland Security has experience with cybersecurity. Since the creation of the department, it has had significant responsibilities for critical infrastructure protection and cybersecurity. The department currently directs

the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, NCCIC, and has implemented lessons learned and modified its internal structure to address its shortcomings. With its appointment to a focal point role, it has advanced cybersecurity readiness within government, but it is far from perfect.

Among the challenges facing Homeland Security is attracting and retaining sufficient personnel to meet its current, let alone expanded cybersecurity responsibilities. In 2011, the department announced that it plans to increase its cybersecurity staff by 50 percent to 400 by October 2012. This will be particularly challenging in an age when governmental salaries are frozen and the demand from the private sector is continuing to grow.

The CSIS report recommends that the departments retain their existing operational responsibilities. Citing the concept that cybersecurity has now become an essential national security issue, the report argues that a departmental-level agency could not perform the overarching policy coordination needed and thus rejects an enhanced Department of Homeland Security oversight role. With the threat including foreign intelligence agencies and militaries, the report argues that cybersecurity is well beyond the scope of Homeland Security and critical infrastructure protection. Cybersecurity has become an international problem that significantly exceeds the capabilities and management capacity of Homeland Security.

Option B (2): Placing the Department of Defense in Charge. Others suggested that DOD be given the leadership role for cybersecurity across the government. Defense already has responsibility for defending its own systems and has been forward leaning in establishing policy and making organizational changes for cybersecurity. Among the initiatives was the establishment of U.S. Cyber Command to

have overall responsibility within the military for cyber defense and attack issues. The department has also established relationships with the private sector through its defense industrial base cybersecurity pilot initiatives, which fall under its responsibility for defense-related critical infrastructure protection.

Much of the argument for giving cybersecurity leadership responsibility to DOD is based on its combination of experience and manpower.¹⁶ NSA has extensive experience and capability for monitoring and protecting networks. In October 2010, Homeland Security and DOD signed a memorandum of understanding that allowed NSA to support Homeland Security cybersecurity efforts and established a personnel exchange between the agencies.¹⁷

The drawbacks of placing DOD in charge of cybersecurity are numerous. The legal restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act on domestic activity by military forces represent only the most basic of issues. The department for the most part lacks regulatory authority and law enforcement powers. It is also a drastic departure from the department's primary mission. Defense also would suffer many of the same challenges in interagency coordination that affect Homeland Security. Additionally, DOD relationships with the private sector are not nearly as extensive as Homeland Security's. Challenges would also be likely from civil liberties groups and Congress to a greater militarization of cyberspace.

Option B (3): Create a New Cabinet-level Agency for Cybersecurity. Creating a new agency that combines all cybersecurity functions offers a chance to address the deficiencies of the current models. Precedents exist with the National Security Act of 1947, which created DOD in response to the new threats emerging from the Cold War and the aftermath of World

War II, and with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002 in response to the attacks of 9/11. Several experts and politicians have claimed that the threat of cyber attack and other cyber risks have exceeded the capabilities of current arrangements and that cybersecurity

a Cabinet-level agency allows for congressional oversight of budgets and leadership consistent with normal constitutional process

is now an issue of national security. Creation of a new agency allows for the combining of cyber offensive and defensive operations. With proper legislative action, the new agency could be given the necessary regulatory and law enforcement authorities to execute its missions. A Cabinet-level agency allows for congressional oversight of budgets and leadership consistent with normal constitutional process.

Consolidation within one department clarifies the lines of authority and centralizing control over budgets and policy. It counters the lack of unity of effort that is often cited as one of the significant failures of the current system.

The creation of a new agency is not a panacea. As the experience with Homeland Security demonstrated, it is not easy to combine agencies from different departments with different organizational cultures into an effective organization. The delays in properly organizing for cybersecurity and taking effective action are already a national security issue. Turf wars are already an issue with cybersecurity policy. A new agency would also face the same issues as other departments with interagency coordination and compliance among equals.

Option C: Create a Director of Cybersecurity. A variation of the White

House cyber czar would be the creation of a powerful coordinator for cybersecurity along the lines of the DNI. Created in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks to unify the efforts of domestic, international, and military intelligence programs, the DNI serves as the head of the Intelligence Community. The office establishes objectives and priorities across the intelligence agencies to meet the needs of the executive and legislative branches as well as the Armed Forces. Of critical importance, the DNI develops and executes the budget for the National Intelligence Program based on inputs and priorities from the Service and agency components.

A similar position could be created for cyber security, a Director of Cybersecurity (DCYBER). Implementing legislation could allow for budget oversight across the Federal Government, Senate confirmation of the director, and establishment of clear lines of authority and responsibility with the government as well as for relationships with the private sector.

Analysis of Options

None of the options available is perfect. While several bills have been introduced to Congress over the past several years, progress has been slow. Cybersecurity must compete on the legislative and executive agenda with other significant issues. Health care, financial reform, public debt, and ongoing wars continue to dominate the news and the legislative agenda. It is clear, however, that current structures are insufficient to achieve cybersecurity. Repeated studies and reviews have yielded remarkably similar recommendations.

The centralization of cybersecurity policy initiatives in the Executive Office of the President remains a leading contender; it offers the power of the Presidency to achieve

WHO SHOULD LEAD U.S. CYBERSECURITY EFFORTS?



U.S. Army (Martin Greeson)

USAF Brigadier General Gregory Brundidge discusses need to aid collaboration and improve empowerment of cyber defense personnel, technology, and processes

cross-organizational agreement within the executive branch. Strong leadership is clearly essential for achieving sufficient cybersecurity.

The most significant limitations on a White House cyber czar center on his authority to compel compliance from the disparate executive branch agencies. Without a clear establishment of authorities in legislation, the individual would only have the referent power and authority granted by his standing with the President. Lack of strong backing from the President would constrain his effectiveness in executing his mission. To be effective, the position needs a legal structure solidified in legislation similar to the DNI, which would imply greater congressional oversight.

In examining the various Cabinet-level department options, it is difficult to argue that any of them could overcome the problems of the current structure. The present system has obviously failed as repeated penetration of DOD and other governmental systems has entailed the loss of terabytes of data.

Placing the responsibilities in DOD presents numerous challenges. While defending systems from foreign attack could become a defense mission, the department has little experience with regulatory matters and procedures. The civil liberty implications of using the military in domestic intelligence activities are enormous. The Posse Comitatus Act would have to be significantly revised to allow for military activity beyond training inside the United States. This would cause civil liberties debates greater than those over the USA PATRIOT Act. Placing the military in charge of cybersecurity for civilian systems would not be politically viable.

Creation of a new department to focus on cybersecurity would achieve many of the objectives listed in the CSIS report. It would allow for collection of the many siloed activities currently under

DOD, Homeland Security, Commerce, and State. The establishing legislation would have to clarify authorities, regulatory powers, and relationships with the existing departments. The budget and nomination process provides for the needed congressional oversight.

The challenges to a new department are daunting. Starting something in Washington at the Cabinet level normally requires a dramatic trigger event along the lines of 9/11 or an indefatigable champion willing to expend the political capital necessary to carry the battle. To date, this has not occurred on the cyber front. Other issues have occupied the political space and pushed cybersecurity to the rear. A new department would also face significant growing pains. In the current budget and political climate, it is unlikely to garner the support needed in Congress. While it may provide the best operational and constitutional solution, it is the least likely in the near to mid term.

Retaining cybersecurity leadership within the Department of Homeland Security is the most likely alternative among the Cabinet-level organizations. As previously discussed, the department has the basic regulatory functions necessary and significant experience in cybersecurity issues. The relationship with DOD has improved significantly in cybersecurity and a cooperative strategy is in place.

What Homeland Security lacks in the cybersecurity leadership role is consistent Presidential and congressional focus. It has a coordination role given to it by the President in a series of decision documents, but coordination is not control. Homeland Security cannot truly compel other departments to adhere to its policies and decisions. The department itself is still growing and developing. Less than 10 years old, it does not have the longstanding policies and cultures of the Department of State or DOD. Congress

has not helped the problems at the department and must clarify its committee jurisdiction issues regarding not only cybersecurity but also all of the missions assigned to Homeland Security. At present, more than 80 committees have a role in the department's oversight.¹⁸

The other significant hurdle for Homeland Security is building the human capital necessary to establish and implement policy and operations in support of cybersecurity. The department has announced ambitious plans for growing its cyber forces, but it will not be easy. Recruiting and retaining these specialists will be a constant challenge.

Recommendations

Cybersecurity is a daunting policy problem, and a simple solution is not apparent. The choice will be a compromise among various options that must occur within a political environment with a limited attention span and several competing priorities. The President and Congress should do the following:

- ❖ Establish a Director of National Cybersecurity. The director role would be modeled on the DNI with some significant enhancements. With proper legislative action, the DCYBER would have clear budget and operational authority over cybersecurity programs across the Federal Government. Individual departments would not be able to reprogram funds without DCYBER approval. The position would be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate as other political appointees. DCYBER would have a fixed 5-year term with the possibility of reappointment for 1 additional term. Fixed terms allow for a

measure of independence from political concerns and are used in other Federal agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Equal Opportunity Commission.

- ❖ Enact legislation to provide Homeland Security clear directive authority for cybersecurity across nondefense agencies. Simple coordination has not been effective in improving cybersecurity across Federal agencies. A definitive authority is required for Homeland Security to mandate action and adjust the priorities of other agencies for this critical national security issue.
- ❖ Enact legislation to establish a U.S. Government Cybercorps. To attract and retain qualified personnel, the standard General Schedule has proven insufficient. A better alignment of incentives and streamlined recruiting with flexible personnel policies is necessary. Positions within agencies would be allocated for Cybercorps-designated personnel in much the same manner as Intelligence Community and acquisition specialists are currently designated. Funds would be established for continued professional education and training for Cybercorps personnel to remain current.
- ❖ Formalize personnel exchanges between Homeland Security and DOD for cybersecurity personnel. The existing memorandum of understanding between the two departments should be codified in legislation. Congress needs to outline the limitations on intelligence exchange between military and law enforcement for cyber related issues.

- ❖ Establish a permanent position for private sector participation in DCYBER. With the vast majority of computer networks and other critical infrastructure under private sector control, it is imperative that they have a continuous voice in the policymaking process. Confidentiality and liability issues are manageable.

Conclusion

Cybersecurity concerns have only grown with the expansion of digital technology into all aspects of daily life and daily government operations. President Obama in the *International Strategy to Secure Cyberspace* stated that cybersecurity is part and parcel of everyday life for all Americans and much of the world. Maintaining the status quo of scattered responsibilities and patchwork policy solutions is not only poor governance but also potentially places the Nation's critical assets at risk.

Establishing a strong DCYBER at a Cabinet-equivalent level would provide the necessary leadership within the Federal Government. The Department of Homeland Security would continue to play an important role in protecting civilian governmental systems and coordinating with the private sector. DOD has already taken several steps to improve its capabilities for action, and senior leaders are addressing cybersecurity in a responsible manner.

Congress and the President need to demonstrate the political leadership and expend the political capital to make the needed changes in legislation and structure on the domestic front. Waiting for a perfect solution to appear is not an option. Decisive action is required now. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., “The Past, Present and Future of Cybersecurity,” *Journal of National Security Law & Policy* 4, no. 13 (2010), 13–16, available at <http://insct.org/jnslp/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/03_Sharp.pdf>.

² This problem continues unabated. During the presentation of the Department of Defense Cyber Security Strategy in July 2011, Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn III commented that another major loss of sensitive data occurred in early 2011.

³ See the *Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2009), available at <www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf> and the follow-on critique *Cybersecurity Two Years Later*, A Report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency (Washington, DC: CSIS, January 2011), available at <http://csis.org/files/publication/110128_Lewis_CybersecurityTwoYearsLater_Web.pdf>.

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¹¹ Sharp, 15–16.

¹² Patrick Marshall, “Cybersecurity,” *CQ Researcher* 20, no. 8, February 26, 2010.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ David A. Powner, *Cyberspace Policy: Executive Branch Is Making Progress Implementing 2009 Policy Review Recommendations, but Sustained Leadership Is Needed*, GAO-11-24 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, October 2010), available at <www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-24>.

¹⁵ Gregory C. Wilshusen, *Concerted Effort Needed to Consolidate and Secure Internet Connections at Federal Agencies*, GAO-10-237 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, March 2010), available at <www.gao.gov/new.items/d10237.pdf>.

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¹⁷ “Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense Regarding Cybersecurity,” September 2010, available at <www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/20101013-dod-dhs-cyber-moa.pdf>.

¹⁸ See Timothy Balunis, Jr., and William Hemphill, “Escaping the Entanglement: Reversing Jurisdictional Fragmentation over the Department of Homeland Security,” *Journal of Homeland Security & Emergency Management* 6, no. 1 (2009).

The Civilian Uplift and Unified Action

Organizing for Stability Operations in Regional Command–East

BY DENNIS J. CAHILL

For Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)–82, assigned to Regional Command–East (RC–E) from June 2009 to June 2010, rotation 10 of Operation *Enduring Freedom* was a time of major transition for military operations in Afghanistan. Several changes were made in the way that U.S. forces approached engagement with the civilians and Afghan military forces during that timeframe. Among those changes were the expansion of the presence of U.S. Government civilian agencies in the country and the requirement to integrate representatives from those agencies with military organizations throughout the area of operations. This “civilian uplift” represented the largest deployment of U.S. agencies to a combat zone since the Vietnam War.¹

The CJTF–82/RC–E headquarters was organized around the headquarters, tactical operations centers, and the special troops battalion of the 82^d Airborne Division from Fort Bragg. These units consist solely of U.S. Army Active Component Soldiers. In June 2009, upon deployment and designation as a CJTF, the units were reorganized under a joint manning document that added positions for U.S. Army Reserve Component Soldiers, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, civilian personnel, and contractors. A limited number of government representatives

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were assigned to the CJTF headquarters and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), but not enough to meet mission requirements.

The civilian uplift began on September 1, 2009, with the arrival of eight representatives of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) at the Joint Operations Center at Bagram Airfield. By April 2010, the civilian platform grew to nearly 175 personnel primarily from the Department of State (including the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization [S/CRS]), USAID (including the Office of Transition Initiatives), and Department of Agriculture. While some remained at the CJTF headquarters at Bagram Airfield, the majority were pushed down to subordinate units throughout the area of operations.

the biweekly Joint Network Targeting Board briefing tended to disrupt the focus on security operations in a time-constrained session

This article provides a look at the evolution of the stability operations section during the CJTF-82 deployment from June 2009 to June 2010 and how RC-E organized itself to integrate civilians into operations. It draws heavily from the author's notes and input from civilian and military staff members to the unpublished stability operations after action report in May 2010.

Making Room for Stability Operations

The CJTF-82/RC-E campaign concept focused on four key lines of operation (LOOs): information, security, governance, and development. Each LOO was headed by

a colonel; the Deputy Commanding General (DCG) for Operations oversaw the information and security LOOs, while the DCG for Support oversaw the governance and development LOOs. With the expansion of U.S. and coalition government civilian participation and the creation of "civilian platforms" at the regional commands, the U.S. Embassy converted the political advisor position to senior civilian representative (SCR) of the Ambassador in July 2009.

The CJTF-82/RC-E commander had been wrestling with how to "operationalize" governance and development since before the unit's deployment to Afghanistan. During July and August of 2009, the governance and development LOO staffs provided a weekly drill-down briefing of a different district in the area of operations to the commander and primary staff. Realizing this was not enough to focus the governance and development efforts, the staff attempted to integrate discussion of stability policy and objectives into the biweekly Joint Network Targeting Board briefing, but this proved untenable in that it tended to disrupt the focus on security operations in a time-constrained session. By mid-October, with the civilian staff arriving in greater numbers and organizing and integrating itself at several organizational levels, the commander designated a separate battle rhythm event in the week opposite the biweekly briefing, which became known as the Interagency Stability Operations Review Board. This event put governance and development on an equal footing with security and information operations by offering the brigade commanders and their senior civilian counterparts an opportunity to review progress in those areas and to receive guidance directly from the commander and SCR.

Afghan girl holds lamb born from sheep studied by Kentucky Agribusiness Development Team II during parasite project in Khenj District



ISAF

On September 12, 2009, Dawn Liberi was appointed as the new SCR, and Ambassador Karl Eikenberry issued a letter outlining her role in coordinating and directing all civilian personnel and programs. In particular, she was “responsible for achieving the unity of civilian effort and effective implementation of an integrated civilian-military strategy essential to our success in Afghanistan.”² As SCR, she would “coordinate and direct the work of all [U.S. Government] civilians under Chief of Mission authority,” “convene periodic meetings of Chief of Mission personnel,” and manage civilian assignments and other issues through lead civilians at subordinate organizations.³

crosscutting functional specialty teams provided expertise in concepts and programs that applied to all geographic areas of operation

The Ambassador’s letter also directed the SCR to “serve as the U.S. civilian counterpart to the military commander in the Regional Command, to senior coalition civilians and to senior local Afghan officials. [She] will also provide foreign policy and area advice to the commander and receive security advice from the commander.”⁴ In this role, the SCR cosigned—with commanding general Major General Curtis Scaparrotti, USA—the CJTF-82/RC-E campaign plan for Operation *Champion Sahar*. The appointment also slightly altered the LOO concept as, in deference to the SCR as the acknowledged expert in governance and development, the DCG for Support moved into a secondary role with respect to these two areas. This was particularly crucial to the daily management of stability operations as, coincident with her

arrival, the CJTF-82/RC-E began executing combined action, a paradigm in which the DCGs deployed from the Joint Operations Center with two division tactical operation centers (TACs) to live and work the majority of the week with the two Afghan National Army (ANA) corps whose operational areas comprised the RC-E area of operations and Kabul.

Within 2 months of the CJTF deployment (July 2009), many on the primary staff saw the efficacy in consolidating the governance and development LOOs into a combined staff section that focused on stability operations along the lines of a Civil-Military Operations Center.⁵ Among the reasons for doing so were to create synergy among related functions on the CJTF staff and to replicate the functions and activities of staff counterparts organized under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Stability at the two headquarters above the CJTF. This initiative was further supported by the arrival of eight USAID civilians who were specialists in the areas of water, agriculture, governance, rule of law, program management, and economics—specialties that crossed between the governance and development LOOs.

The consolidation of functions required a new organizational structure. The initial organizational design planned by the governance and development LOO chiefs, in conjunction with three senior USAID representatives in early October 2009, retained a concept of provincial desk officers, each having general knowledge of the environment and activities in an assigned task force area of operations. Superimposed on these officers were crosscutting functional specialty teams that provided expertise in concepts and programs that applied to all geographic areas of operation

within RC-E. The intent was for these teams to have linkages through the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), ISAF Joint Command (IJC), USAID, and the Embassy to the various ministries of the government. Issues requiring Afghan government attention would be injected into various functional working groups that were just organizing themselves in Kabul in mid to late October 2009.

When presented to leadership, the SCR held that this organizational design did not adequately support the major elements of the campaign plan, which was under development at that time. She redirected the staff to organize in a way to support the CJTF's four major objective areas: development in three key provinces (Nangarhar, Kunar, and Laghman), support to four pilot districts (Baraki Barak in Logar Province, Sayed Abad in Wardak Province, Khogyani in Nangarhar Province, and Sarkani in Kunar Province), transition to lead security responsibility in two provinces, and stabilization throughout the area of operations. A new design was put in place by the end of October 2009.

This new organization represented a true melding of civilian and military capabilities to meet planning needs. It also represented the first step in *unified action*, which is the term used to describe the broad scope of activities that occur under the overall direction of a unified command or joint task force commander and includes "the synchronization and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental agencies . . . to achieve unity of effort in the operational area."⁶ Over time, the stability operations section created and refined internal processes and connected to national level programs and processes in Kabul that allowed it to provide the support and representation needed by subordinate

brigade task forces and PRTs to bring their issues to IJC, ISAF, USAID, and the U.S. Embassy, and vice versa.

The Interagency Deputies

The SCR had access to the staff through the chief of staff, an Army colonel who supported her as equally as he did the commanding general. Over time, she acquired a small

the stability operations section created and refined internal processes and connected to national level programs and processes in Kabul

personal staff consisting of a military aide (Army captain of the Air Defense Artillery branch), enlisted aide (Army civil affairs [CA] master sergeant), driver (Navy petty officer), and executive assistant (civilian hired as part of the uplift). Four positions were designated for senior members of State, USAID, Agriculture, and the Department of Defense (DOD) to serve as interagency deputies to the SCR. Their primary role was to "coordinate and direct the work of all [government] civilians under Chief of Mission authority within the region, ensure coherence of political direction and developmental efforts, and execute U.S. policy and guidance."⁷ Only two of these positions were occupied in October 2009. All four positions were filled by April 2010.

Teams under the Chief of Stability Operations

Nangarhar, Kunar, and Laghman Team.

This team was staffed with a diverse group of professionals that included lawyers, engineers, and experts in economics, agriculture,

governance, and rule of law from USAID, State, Agriculture, and DOD. It focused initially on assisting Task Force Mountain Warrior's efforts to build and reinforce the competence, capability, and credibility of the Afghan government to protect the population, be relevant to the people, and lay the foundation for sustained economic growth.

the DSF was a planning methodology that helped practitioners to identify key sources of instability

The team was led by a USAID civilian program manager assisted by a CA officer. Among its many accomplishments by May of 2010 were the formation of an overall economic development strategy that identified existing efforts and lessons and recommended the overarching strategies to guide future activities, including plans to redirect hundreds of millions of dollars to power, roads, and watershed management; development of programs that allowed Afghan government capacity and businesses to grow at a sustainable pace; creation of a marble training and development institute in Jalalabad to provide training; and coordination of the first-ever East Region Economic Growth and Investment Promotion Conference in Jalalabad, attended by over 520 participants as well as 5 Afghan ministers and 2 provincial governors in March 2010.⁸

Key Terrain District (KTD) Team. Led by a USAID civilian development expert assisted by a CA officer, this team was initially organized as the Pilot District Team. Its original focus was to monitor and support the Afghan-led Pilot District Program, in which the districts listed previously would

receive focused governance and development programming under the District Delivery Program (DDP), as coordinated by the Independent Directorate of Local Governance. In January 2010, with the publication of an IJC fragmentary order, KTDs emerged as the key organizing principle for application of the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. The directorate moved rapidly to expand the national scope of the program from 6 pilot districts to, ultimately, 80 KTDs, 41 of which (with an estimated population of approximately 4 million) were located in RC-E.⁹

In February 2010, RC-E established a multifunctional KTD working group, cochaired by CJTF-82/RC-E's Security Operations and CJ5 Future Plans sections, with representation across the staff, to coordinate and synchronize all cross-functional activities related to achieving objectives. Within the Stability Operations section, the team evolved into the KTD Team and took responsibility for managing, coordinating, monitoring, and reporting on governance, development, and stabilization programs. Ultimately, overall metrics of progress and success would be based on assessments of improved stability conducted under the District Stability Framework (DSF), public perceptions of support for and confidence in Afghan institutions (including the Afghan National Security Force and Afghan Uniformed Police), and governance and development metrics outlined in the IJC District Stability Assessment Tool.¹⁰

Stabilization Team. This team was designed to focus on key population centers and transportation corridors by coordinating and facilitating operational-level support to field-level efforts and to capture,

understand, and respond to trends and patterns in order to strengthen and extend stability into outlying areas. Led by a USAID civilian development specialist assisted by a CA officer, the team facilitated the coordination of resources for brigade and battalion task forces to develop and improve analytical assessments and measurements using the DSF, and coordinated with Afghan ministries to improve provincial budgeting and deal with other issues. The DSF was a planning methodology that helped practitioners to identify key sources of instability, develop and plan activities that mitigate these sources, monitor/evaluate the impact of locally applied stability assistance, and measure the progress of stabilization efforts.¹¹

By design, the team supported the efforts of four brigade task forces with the same level of staffing as the objective teams that focused on single task force areas of operations. With the introduction of the KTDs, the Stabilization Team's efforts became less geographically aligned and more focused on synchronizing the efforts of DSF implementation with the DDP roll-out schedule. While members of the team still supported and coordinated efforts with the major road activities, the primary mission became focused on the implementation of DSF training to the task forces, PRTs, and District Support Teams that contain KTDs. By May 2010, the team planned to reevaluate its activities to determine if the change in focus would allow for some of its mission to be incorporated into the missions of other objective teams or if a further change in its operations was warranted.¹²

Provincial Recognition Status (PRS) Team. This team had several name changes since it first formed as the Transfer of Lead Responsibility (TLR) Team. The TLR Team

was tasked to address the initial objective of Operation *Champion Sahar* to nominate Bamyan and Panjshir provinces for transfer to the Afghan government by June 2010. From the start, the team realized that the term *TLR*, and its derivative *TLSR* (Transfer of Lead Security Responsibility), inaccurately described the intent of the operation since the Afghan government as a sovereign government already had responsibility for security, as well as governance and development in general. In Bamyan and Panjshir in particular—the two provinces considered as the lead candidates for TLR or TLRS—an international security presence was limited and the security/stability enjoyed in these provinces was due not to the efforts of the coalition forces, but to the ethnic makeup, geography, and history of the provinces themselves. Additionally, IJC and ISAF used at different times the TLR or TLRS terminology, but since the January 2010 London Conference, the term *transition* has been used.¹³

the Stabilization Team's efforts became less geographically aligned and more focused on synchronizing the efforts of DSF implementation with the DDP roll-out schedule

Under the leadership of a USAID civilian program manager assisted by a CA officer, the PRS Team developed PRS as a broader concept and changed its name to reflect the desire to stay away from politically charged terms. PRS was designed to make stability a desirable goal and to fit the reality of RC-E. The team eventually defined the concept as “a province which demonstrates a sustainable, [Afghan]-led stability, governance and

U.S. Air Force (Richard Williams)



Airman inspects vehicle-mounted M-240 machinegun at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, prior to 3-day convoy to forward operating bases in Regional Command-East

economic development future will gain Provincial Recognition Status and will be offered the accompanying Provincial Recognition Package.” The package was the incentive that made PRS something to aspire to. Although undefined at the time, the package would ideally support the province with budget funds for further development of the province. Four basic metrics—stability, public perception, quality of life, and the PRT’s rating of the province—measured performance and served as a way to demonstrate to other provinces where improvements were needed.¹⁴

Teams under the Chief of Stability Integration

Operations Section. The Operations section was organized around the 82^d Airborne Division’s organic G9 (Civil-Military Operations) cell, which consisted of one CA lieutenant colonel and one CA major. The section was represented in the CJ35 Future Operations section by an experienced CA major provided by the attached battalion headquarters (minus¹⁵) and in the CJ35 Plans section by an experienced civilian planner provided by S/CRS. As the Stability Operations organization matured, it secured space in the central Joint Operations Center control room and assigned one engineer lieutenant and one U.S. Marine Corps CA staff sergeant to monitor and integrate stability operations equities into daily briefings and operations tracking. A senior noncommissioned officer representing the Agribusiness Development Teams, as well as liaison officers from France, Poland, Korea, and other coalition forces sent to work with the section, were assigned to the Operations section.

This section was designed to be the primary point of integration with the daily operations of the staff. As such, it was the entry point for external taskings to and requests for assistance from the Stability Operations section. It was tasked to provide an accurate common operational picture that allowed the commander and SCR to make decisions affecting stability operations. To support that task, it defined host nation information requirements that supported the campaign plan and developed procedures to track and report effects.

Early in the rotation, the governance and development LOOs relied on the CJ35 Assessments Team for analytical and assessment support. When an Army civilian arrived in August 2009 to augment the team, he was assigned to the development LOO to provide direct support. He was joined 1 month later by a military operations research/system analyst who was assigned to the governance LOO. With the establishment of the Stability Operations section in October 2009, they partnered as the Analysis and Assessment Team under the Support section and migrated to the Operations section as the organizational structure matured. Together, they established comprehensive processes and metrics to help the brigade task forces assess and track the progress of governance and development in emerging districts throughout the area of operations. Later, as IJC developed its own process to assess the progress of governance, development, and security in the KTDs, the two analysts developed the District Stability Assessment Tool, which was translated into Dari and Pashtu for use by the Afghan National Army and ultimately became a standard for IJC to use throughout Afghanistan.¹⁶

Special Issues Team. This team was organized to monitor, coordinate, and support

certain issues that needed special attention, such as border crossings, major road structures damaged by natural disasters and insurgents, women's issues, municipal pay, land registration, reintegration, and others. It was led by a CA officer and included CA and civilian specialists from across the Stability Operations section who worked these issues in addition to their primary duty assignments. Because of this "additional duty" nature, the team was more of an ad hoc organization that responded to tasks and requests for assistance or information as the issues gained or lessened in prominence compared to more routine and consistent focus areas.

Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) Team. This team tracked CERP expenditures and project nominations from subordinate units to ensure they stayed

in many cases, units could not conduct adequate quality assurance/quality control checks on the projects in their areas of operations

within the commanding general's guidance. The number of active CERP projects in RC-E had become excessive during the previous two rotations. Earlier focus on executing high commitment and obligation rates for transportation infrastructure and other projects resulted in approximately 1,700 active CERP projects at the beginning of rotation 10. In many cases, units could not conduct adequate quality assurance/quality control checks on the projects in their areas of operations. The team had already begun taking steps to reduce the number of projects to a more manageable level that supported counterinsurgency objectives when congressional interest and U.S.

Central Command guidance eventually made it mandatory to do so.

Midway through the rotation, RC-E was allocated \$450 million for the fiscal year 2010 CERP budget. The staff looked for areas where its resources could best be applied to produce strategic effects across the battlespace. The Stability Operations section, led by the USAID water and energy advisor and military reconstruction chief, developed a plan that would extend electric power to the provincial centers of Panjshir, Parwan, Bاميان, Kapisa, Logar, Wardak, Ghazni, and Paktiya. This significant concept was developed in coordination with the Afghanistan Engineer District and USAID. The intent was for these organizations to execute and oversee the power projects through a transfer of CERP funds and the Economy Act Order, respectively. The RC-E commander approved the concept, and the staff forwarded 10 projects to U.S. Forces Afghanistan on the same date.¹⁷

the SOIC would provide information about government and population-centric issues to decisionmakers so they could allocate resources for advancement of governance and development

Stability Operations Information Cell (SOIC). This cell had its origins in the concept of the civil information management cell of a CA battalion headquarters. Since the global force management process had eliminated this original cell and additional elements that supported it, the Stability Operations section created this capability out of hide. A team of contract civilians formed the nucleus of the SOIC. In order to serve as the unclassified information collection, production, analysis,

and dissemination adjunct to the RC-E Fusion Center's classified activities, it needed additional resources.

An attempt by Stability Operations leadership in November 2009 to obtain or share analysts from the CJ2 section to focus on civil or host nation information requirements was unsuccessful. At the same time, however, ISAF's senior intelligence officer, Major General Michael Flynn, was looking for ways to bring the Intelligence Community's understanding of the political, economic, and cultural environment on par with its understanding of the enemy in Afghanistan. General Flynn incorporated CJTF-82's fledgling SOIC concept into his "Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan,"¹⁸ began sending capabilities to SOIC-East to flesh out the organization, and provided guidance for synthesizing information into district narrative assessments and integrating current information about Afghan government and population-centric issues into the RC-E Fusion Center. The Human Terrain Analysis Team, which had long been associated with the CJ9, then the Stability Operations section, was brought under the auspices of the SOIC.

Ultimately, after some trial and error in its forming stage, the SOIC developed a plan that would make it the hub of an integrated civil information network in RC-E that would tap into existing elements and subject matter experts, at every command level, including the Stability Operations section, which routinely interacted with government officials and the populace. The SOIC would provide relevant and current information about government and population-centric issues to decisionmakers so they could effectively allocate resources for the advancement of governance and development.

Information storage and exchange would be made possible by tying into existing and future knowledge acquisition and management systems, using both theater- and U.S.-based reachback resources, that facilitate sharing and dissemination of information among coalition forces and interagency, international, and nongovernmental organizations. This plan was never fully implemented due to the inevitable end of the CJTF-82 tour and the different perspective brought by the leadership of the follow-on headquarters, CJTF-101.

Civil Affairs Teams at TACs 1 and 2

In October 2009, CJTF-82 deployed two divisional tactical operations centers (TACs) to execute combined action with the two Afghan National Army corps whose geographic areas of responsibility encompassed the terrain associated with RC-E. Initially, each TAC consisted of representatives from every major staff element except for the Stability Operations section. As issues presented themselves at each of the ANA corps headquarters that clearly required CA expertise, the DCG for Operations directed the Stability Operations section to send CA personnel to the TACs for the express purpose of partnering with equivalent staff to teach them how to work through Afghan systems and the international community to provide support to the populace.

With the advice and assistance of the commander of the CA battalion headquarters (minus) attached to the CJTF, four individuals were redirected from the Stability Operations section and CA teams across RC-E to form two two-man teams in December 2009. Their mission consisted of the following tasks, in order of priority: execute combined action with ANA civil-military staff section; train staff on CA and civil-military operations; provide a CA linkage to Task

Force S9s, PRTs, and Agribusiness Development Teams in each of the two corps areas of operation; determine and provide civil-military operations reporting from the TAC to CJTF-82; assist with acquisition of CERP and privately donated class X and humanitarian assistance supplies as needed, and coordinate the use of CERP funds with the task forces as required.

DSTs were to be staffed to maximize the civilian contribution to the integrated effort

District Support Teams

The District Support Team (DST) was an important, innovative development during rotation 10 of Operation *Enduring Freedom*. In April 2009, the U.S. Embassy proposed this new platform for integrating the civil-military effort at the district level to support the Afghan effort to build subnational capacity and implement the President's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. DSTs were to be staffed with a minimum of three civilians each, employing tailored expertise—such as agriculture, urban planning, and rule of law—to maximize the civilian contribution to the integrated effort. A key feature that distinguished a DST from the already well-known and established PRT was that in a DST, civilian capabilities were integrated into a maneuver battalion or company to form a collective capability rather than a new, stand-alone organization.¹⁹

The first three DSTs were launched in September 2009 to the pilot districts of Baraki Barak, Khogyani, and Surobi. By April 2010, civilians were fielded to 20 different DST locations, with more continuing to arrive on a monthly basis. In May 2010, however, there

remained significant challenges. Of the 20 DST locations, only 7 had the full basic staff of representatives from each of the 3 agencies due to the challenges of identifying, training, and deploying individuals (as opposed to existing units) for assignment to these austere locations. Another challenge was the identification of future DST locations, which must consider the priority among competing districts, the resources available at existing military facilities to support civilian staff, and the security situation in the district.²⁰

Conclusion

The ability of CJTF-82/RC-E to reorient and reorganize itself for a noncombat mission while engaged in combat operations is a testimony to the professionalism of the soldiers and civilians. During a private conversation with the author in early May 2010, one senior military leader, reflecting on the unique experience and challenges of stability operations and unified action over the past 11 months, stated, “We have never done this before.” He was not accustomed to working in an environment where all the resources of national power—particularly those of the diplomatic and economic variety—came together at the operational/tactical level under a single organization to achieve a common goal to the extent we did in Afghanistan. It did not have to be that way. U.S. policy and military doctrine pertaining to stability operations and unified action had evolved greatly during the last decade, but few resources had actually been allocated to support those policy and doctrine changes.

The civilian uplift in Afghanistan forced military and civilian leaders at all levels to learn to integrate large numbers of civilian specialists into established military

organizations in the midst of ongoing combat operations. Though unprepared to operate in this manner prior to the deployment, military and civilian leaders at every echelon fell back on what they learned through personal experience and limited, disconnected training in civil-military operations. Those with a CA background drew upon its doctrine and specialized training in techniques to integrate civil considerations and civilian personnel into military plans and operations, but many of their solutions were met with strong institutional resistance or were short-lived. Ultimately, several of the structures and processes put in place by CJTF-82 were modified or reversed by the next rotational unit, demonstrating the fragility of concepts that were not as developed or institutionalized as the more traditional methodologies of military operations.

Operations have ended in Iraq and are winding down in Afghanistan, but government policy and military doctrine continue to promote integrated, whole-of-government solutions to stability operations. Future named operations will require unified response by multiple U.S. agencies. The cost to agencies in terms of personnel, training, equipment, and the associated funding may be a limiting factor in preparing for those operations. The departments and agencies of the U.S. Government must review the lessons of rotation 10 of Operation *Enduring Freedom* to institutionalize unified action and place a higher priority on developing relationships and competencies through experiments, training exercises, and operations. The challenges will be to maintain interest, prioritize, and work together during the intervening years so that the next experience does not require learning under fire. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ President Obama announced “a substantial increase in our civilians on the ground” during remarks on a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan on March 27, 2009, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan>. By early May 2009, the administration began using the term *civilian uplift* to describe this increase. See also Nathan Hodge, “Danger Room in Afghanistan: Rebranding the ‘Civilian Surge,’” August 6, 2009, available at <www.wired.com/danger-room/2009/08/danger-room-in-afghanistan-rebranding-the-civilian-surge/>.

² Letter of Instruction from Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry, Embassy of the United States of America, Kabul, Afghanistan, to Ms. Dawn Liberi, United States Senior Civilian Representative, Regional Command–East, September 12, 2009.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Joint Publication (JP) 3–08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, June 24, 2011), recognizes the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) as a “focal point for operational- and tactical-level coordination with civilian agencies.” The name Stability Operations was chosen to eliminate confusion between the Joint Operations Center and CMOC, as well as to align the section with its counterpart at higher headquarters. However, the intent was for the Stability Operations section to perform the function of a CMOC.

⁶ JP 0–2, *Unified Action Armed Forces* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, July 10, 2001), 1–5.

⁷ Cable, U.S. Embassy Kabul, Subject: Creation of Senior Civilian Representatives in Afghanistan—Responsibilities and Authorities, July 29, 2009.

⁸ Condensed from input to the Stability Operations after action report (AAR) provided by David Marsden, USAID, Nangarhar, Kunar, and Laghman team leader, CJTF–82/RC–E, April 2010.

⁹ Condensed from input to the Stability Operations AAR provided by Peter Riley, USAID, Key Terrain District team leader, CJTF–82/RC–E, April 2010.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Condensed from input to the Stability Operations AAR provided by Jeffrey Kaufman, USAID, Provincial Recognition Status (PRS) team leader, CJTF–82/RC–E, April 2010.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Condensed from input to the Stability Operations AAR provided by Patricia Orlowitz, USAID, PRS team leader, CJTF–82/RC–E, April 2010.

¹⁴ Ibid. As a result of the tremendous efforts initiated by the PRS team, Bamyan and Panjshir provinces began the transition to full recognition status in July 2011.

¹⁵ The term *minus* indicates that an organization is incomplete or missing major elements.

¹⁶ Condensed from input to the Stability Operations AAR provided by Mark A. Burrough, Operations Research Analyst, and Lieutenant Colonel Doug McInvale, Operations Research/System Analyst, CJTF–82/RC–E, April 2010.

¹⁷ Condensed from input to the Stability Operations AAR provided by Lieutenant Colonel Ken Highberger, G9/Commander’s Emergency Response Program team leader, CJTF–82/RC–E, April 2010.

¹⁸ See Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, January 2010).

¹⁹ Condensed from input to the Stability Operations AAR provided by Wendy Webb, Office of the Department of State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, CJ35 Plans section of CJTF-82/RC-E, April 2010.

²⁰ Ibid.

Libya's Operation Odyssey Dawn

Command and Control

BY JOE QUARTARARO, SR., MICHAEL ROVENOLT, AND RANDY WHITE

U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) was established in 2008 as a new kind of geographic combatant command, one focused primarily on stability and engagement operations rather than warfighting. As such, many of its key leadership positions were filled by non–Department of Defense (DOD) personnel, and its civilian manning was proportionately larger than at other commands.

Events in Libya from January through April 2011 and the related coalition operation, Operation *Odyssey Dawn*, provided an opportunity to observe how this new type of command would perform in a crisis/contingency operation. USAFRICOM was required to plan kinetic operations, form a multinational coalition, stand up a multinational joint task force (JTF), conduct offensive and defensive maritime and air operations, and transition leadership of the operation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The best practices and lessons learned from all phases of USAFRICOM's execution of the operation will be valuable in determining the viability of its unique structure and organization and its applicability to other commands. Additionally, the lessons learned will provide input to changes that may be required to ensure future success.

Background

In December 2010, unrest in North Africa began with protests against the Tunisian government and spread like wildfire across Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, and Libya. In January 2011,

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Admiral Samuel Locklear III, USN, recognizes Sailors
aboard USS *Barry* for their efforts in support of Joint
Task Force Odyssey Dawn





peaceful protests and demonstrations against the Libyan government began. In February, the arrest of a human rights activist triggered a riot in Benghazi, Libya, setting off protests that turned violent when confronted by Libyan security forces. Due to increased violence and inflammatory statements by Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi, the U.S. Government directed USAFRICOM to begin preparations for a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) of U.S. citizens from Libya.

the United States, with ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, was reluctant to go it alone to protect Allied interests in Libya

As the responsible command, USAFRICOM established Joint Task Force Odyssey Dawn (JTF-OD) to facilitate civilian evacuation, provide humanitarian assistance (HA), and transport Egyptian civilians from Tunisia to Egypt in support of the U.S. Department of State. JTF-OD was commanded by Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III of U.S. Naval Forces Africa, with naval assets assigned from 6th Fleet and air assets from 3^d and 17th Air Force.

On February 26, the United Nations (UN) authorized sanctions against Libya under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1970 to include an arms embargo and demand for an immediate ceasefire. The situation in Libya deteriorated, and the threat of violence against the civilian population increased. The United States, with ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, was reluctant to go it alone to protect Allied interests in Libya—and from a political standpoint, U.S. solo intervention in Libya could be perceived by some in the Muslim world

community as *another* U.S. attack on Islam. Additionally, there were concerns expressed by several African nations that a unilateral move by the United States could be viewed as veiled imperialism. To address these and other concerns, the U.S. Government attempted to form a coalition that included both Arab Muslim and African nations to provide legitimacy for any military action against the Libyan government.

Unfortunately, although most of the African nations agreed that Libya had gone too far in its attempts to suppress the popular demonstrations, these nations were neither militarily equipped nor politically motivated to join a coalition to enforce UNSCR 1970 sanctions against the Libyan government.

France and England were already involved in evacuation operations in Libya and indicated that they would be willing to join with the United States to protect the civilian population. Italy and Germany agreed to provide logistic support for a NEO or HA operation, but would not support kinetic operations unless endorsed by the UN. USAFRICOM, as lead, had no previous experience with forming a coalition, and since none of the African nations within USAFRICOM's area of responsibility (AOR) was willing to participate, potential coalition partners had to come from U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) AORs. In addition, agreements for basing rights and third-party access to host-nation bases and facilities had to be negotiated with nations residing in the USEUCOM AOR. As one USAFRICOM general officer noted, "Building a coalition: We didn't know who to call and contact to make this happen. We sent LNOs [liaison officers] to the [United Kingdom] and France to facilitate, and later sent an LNO to SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe]. . . . 'Who

do you talk to in order to find out who's going to play and how much they are going to bring to the fight?"¹

USEUCOM began contacting potential coalition partner nations through its local military channels, while State worked through its Embassies and other political connections. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J5) took the lead for coordinating the coalition-building effort, daily contacting potential coalition partners to determine who would participate, what they could contribute, and what support (basing rights, facilities, overflight rights, and logistics, among others) they would need. J5 kept State informed of its activities on an almost hourly basis. As the partners and their level of support were identified, J5 established and facilitated a coalition coordination center (CCC) at the Pentagon to resolve issues such as force sustainment, host-nation support, and movement control. Eventually, USEUCOM, USAFRICOM, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and State also set up CCCs to coordinate coalition activities within their own areas and with J5.

In all, 15 nations, including nations from NATO and the Arab League, agreed to join the coalition, with other nations agreeing to provide support if sanctioned by the UN. The combined efforts of J5, State, USEUCOM, Defense Logistics Agency, U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), and the experience of the USAFRICOM and JTF staffs were crucial in overcoming the challenges faced by USAFRICOM as it strove to form the multinational coalition and JTF.

By early March, as the situation in Libya continued to deteriorate, the United States and its NATO and non-NATO allies began to discuss the possibility of military action to enforce the arms embargo and establish a no-fly zone.

On March 12, the Arab League called on the UN to establish a maritime arms embargo and a no-fly zone over Libya to protect civilians. On March 17, Qadhafi threatened to burn the city of Benghazi (the rebel stronghold) to the ground. In response, the UN issued UNSCR 1973, authorizing the use of "all necessary means" to protect civilians and their property: "UNSCR 1973 demanded an immediate cease-fire and authorized the establishment of a no-fly zone, enforcement of the arms embargo delineated in UNSCR 1970, and all necessary measures, short of foreign occupation, to protect civilians and civilian populated areas threatened by attack."²

On March 18, President Barack Obama declared that the United States and its Allies would implement the provisions of

U.S. solo intervention in Libya could be perceived by some in the Muslim world community as *another* U.S. attack on Islam

UNSCR 1973; on March 19, the multinational JTF-OD launched operations. The U.S. Government immediately began working to transition leadership of the campaign to NATO, the European Union, Arab League, or another country or countries, in order to remove the U.S. footprint from the operation. On March 31, NATO assumed full control of operations under Operation *Unified Protector*. Operation *Odyssey Dawn* concluded and JTF-OD was disestablished.

Introduction to Command and Control Issues

This article focuses on the command and control (C²) challenges that USAFRICOM

overcame in order to execute *Odyssey Dawn*. Those challenges included establishing the joint operations area (JOA), defining command relationships among combatant commands, leveraging subordinate commands, interpreting strategic guidance, adapting staff processes, and communicating with coalition partners. The following discusses each of these challenges in detail.

Establishing the Joint Operations Area.

Because a NEO was considered the most likely contingency operation that USAFRICOM would be called upon to execute, the command devoted its initial planning efforts to the conduct of a NEO in support of the State Department, normally the leader in this type of operation. USAFRICOM planned to provide air and sea assets for the evacuation of designated civilian and military personnel, HA as required, and air cover to prevent Libyan forces from impeding or harassing NEO/HA operations. The initial JOA requested by USAFRICOM was therefore designed with a NEO in mind; however, this JOA proved insufficient to support maritime operations either for a NEO, HA, or Operation *Odyssey Dawn*. It did not include any Egyptian or Tunisian territory, and it contained limited air and water space.

in order to conduct Operation *Odyssey Dawn*, USAFRICOM relied heavily on USEUCOM and USCENTCOM for forces

USAFRICOM is located adjacent to USEUCOM and USCENTCOM areas of responsibility. Command and control of the operation stretched across the three combatant command geographic regions. As the operation began, the JOA was modified to extend into Egypt in the northeast (USCENTCOM

AOR) and along the Tunisian border. In addition, the water space was increased well into the Mediterranean Sea (USEUCOM AOR), encompassing most of the area between North Africa, Italy, and Greece.

Although the 2011 Unified Command Plan (UCP) provided overarching guidance to combatant commanders on how to conduct operations that cross combatant command seams, it lacked specifics, except to state that a joint task force should be formed. The formation of JTF-OD filled that requirement:

Geographic AORs provide a basis for coordination by Combatant Commanders. These geographic AORs do not restrict accomplishment of assigned missions. Combatant commanders may operate forces wherever required to accomplish their missions. When significant operations overlap boundaries, a task force will be formed unless otherwise directed.³

Establishing Command Relationships.

Because of the complexities of the cross-combatant command JOA and UCP boundaries, it was essential to define and establish supported and supporting command roles early in the operation. Initially, when tasking for a NEO seemed likely, USAFRICOM was designated the supported command (the command with the authority to coordinate and conduct operations);⁴ however, as combat operations loomed, there was discussion about making USEUCOM the supported command, with USAFRICOM the supporting command (command assigned to support the supported commander).⁵ The latter option was considered likely because the air and maritime assets needed to conduct the operation were predominately based in, and would need to transit through, the USEUCOM

AOR. In the end, the decision was made to retain USAFRICOM as the supported command, with USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, USTRANSCOM, and U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) in support.

As an engagement-focused combatant command, USAFRICOM had few assigned forces. In order to conduct *Operation Odyssey Dawn*, USAFRICOM relied heavily on USEUCOM and, to a lesser extent, USCENTCOM for forces. Command and control of forces also included assets owned by USSTRATCOM and USTRANSCOM, many of which were either based in the United States or deployed and operated from bases within Europe. Due to proximity and capability, USEUCOM became the primary supporting command and de facto force provider to USAFRICOM. A USEUCOM general officer stated, “Here is the complexity of this operation—you have kinetic effects in one GCC [geographic combatant command], generated out of another GCC, partnered with a coalition, with resources from a third GCC.”⁶

One of the cross-combatant command challenges in the operation lay in establishing command relationships that worked for all combatant commands involved. While initially challenging, a CJCS order authorized the USAFRICOM and USEUCOM commanders to hash out command relationships of transferred forces without first soliciting Secretary of Defense approval, as would normally have been required.⁷ The inherent flexibility and latitude delegated to both combatant commands in the CJCS order facilitated the establishment of functional and effective authorities. With the concurrence of the commanders, provisioning of forces occurred at the combatant command level. In theater, the relationships established remained consistent with the guidance provided—USAFRICOM

was to be supported by USEUCOM and the other combatant commands.

Planners and operators on all staffs lacked clear doctrinal understanding of the various command relationships—in particular operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), and direct support (DS).⁸ They did not fully understand the benefits and drawbacks of the different levels of command relationships. This added to confusion, taking valuable time away from planning and execution. One officer noted, “People don’t really understand OPCON/TACON/administrative control/DS and the constraints on operations each one entails.”⁹

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OPCON and TACON relationships each had advantages and disadvantages for the commander. For example, using an OPCON relationship allowed a joint force commander (JFC) to task-organize and establish support relationships; however, the commander would then also be responsible for training, administration, and logistics support, and he would “buy” attrition of forces. Alternatively, a TACON relationship would not provide the ability to task-organize and establish support relationships, but the JFC would receive the requested number of units/sorties without concern for maintenance, training, administration, or unit replacement issues.

Since a large number of air assets were operated from bases in the USEUCOM AOR, the command retained OPCON of these forces, allowing logistics/administrative support

through preexisting relationships and infrastructure. USAFRICOM assumed TACON of air assets during the actual sorties.¹⁰ With regard to air-to-air refueling support, USTRANSCOM retained OPCON of the tankers while giving USAFRICOM TACON for mission support. This allowed USTRANSCOM to manage maintenance and support yet still provide USAFRICOM the assets required.

multi-hatted commanders, collocated organizations, and shared forces were crucial to the success of Operation Odyssey Dawn; however, they also created risks

Maritime forces, which retained other maritime missions within the USEUCOM AOR, remained OPCON to USEUCOM while providing direct support to USAFRICOM. Direct support of these forces gave USAFRICOM and the JTF commander authority over the general direction of the supporting forces, providing for the necessary effects within the JOA while unburdening JTF-OD of determining the tactics, methods, and procedures used. Also, all sustainment responsibilities remained with the supporting command. However, if a ship or submarine did not have a USEUCOM mission, it was assigned OPCON to USAFRICOM from the outset.

Eventually, the JTF-OD C² structure contained a complex myriad of operational/tactical control and direct support command relationships. Yet from the JTF-OD commander's perspective, the heavy reliance on relationships other than OPCON posed potential risks and created confusion. There were concerns about TACON or DS forces getting pulled for other contingencies because it would be easy

to reassign forces away from a supported command (USAFRICOM) when OPCON was retained by supporting commands (for example, USEUCOM): "As the JTF commander, [you] need OPCON of forces otherwise someone can take them away when you need them. . . . We were responding to OPCON pleas of the provider to make his life easier rather than OPCON needs of the commander."¹¹

Leveraging Shared Command Roles.

Multi-hatted commanders, collocated organizations, and shared forces were crucial to the success of Operation *Odyssey Dawn*; however, they also created risks. The challenges posed by cross-combatant command operations and complex command relationships were in part overcome through the use of multi-hatted and/or collocated commanders and associated staffs.

Admiral Locklear and his staff were the Navy component command (U.S. Naval Forces Europe [USNAVEUR] and U.S. Naval Forces Africa [USNAFAF]) for both USEUCOM and USAFRICOM and were collocated with U.S. 6th Fleet at Naval Support Activity Naples. Vice Admiral Harry Harris (Joint Force Maritime Component Commander [JFMCC]), U.S. 6th Fleet, provided forces and orchestrated naval operations on a routine basis for USEUCOM and, when required, USAFRICOM. Both staffs, USNAVEUR-USNAFAF and 6th Fleet, worked closely on a daily basis and had recently completed an exercise with USEUCOM (Austere Challenge 2011). This exercise had a similar scenario to *Odyssey Dawn* and incorporated the use of a four-star-led JTF with a three-star JFMCC. Thus, the JTF-OD staff and JFMCC staff were well prepared to execute the operation for USAFRICOM because of training received via USEUCOM. VADM Harris noted, "Austere Challenge exercises were crucial in preparing for this operation. Because we have been

operating in this arrangement (and have been doing it for six years), the decision to make a 4-star JTF and [a] 3-star Joint Force Maritime Commander was really easy.”¹²

A 1954 bilateral agreement between the United States and Italy drove the initial decision to collocate the JTF and JFMCC onboard the command ship *USS Mount Whitney*. Collocating the JTF and JFMCC onboard facilitated command and control but presented its own set of challenges.

Some key leaders in the JTF were dual-hatted with equivalent roles in the JFMCC (J2, J5, J6, J7, judge advocate, and surgeon). Ultimately, much of the staff worked for both commands, which streamlined the staff but in some instances created confusion and increased staff work. One flag officer noted, “The dual-hatted nature of our components brought a level of readiness and experience that was instrumental to the command’s success during Operation *Odyssey Dawn*.”¹³

Although many senior commanders onboard praised the co-mingling of staffs, concerns were raised by JTF and JFMCC staff officers over sustainability. Many action officers continued to work for both commands, significantly increasing their workload. As one officer commented, “Co-location of JTF and JFMCC provided good coordination and having some billets dual-hatted made the info flow better . . . but burned the crew out.”¹⁴

Collocated commands also proved valuable for the Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC). The 3^d and 17th Air Forces, USEUCOM and USAFRICOM’s Air Force (AF) component commands, respectively, were both located at Ramstein Air Base, Germany. As Air Forces Africa Command, the 17th Air Force and its air operations center (AOC), 617th AOC, formed the JFACC;

however, the 17th Air Force was organized primarily for logistics and lift operations, not kinetic air operations. The JFACC received heavy augmentation from the more heavily staffed 3^d Air Force (Air Forces USEUCOM) and its AOC, the 603^d AOC.¹⁵ For *Odyssey Dawn*, these two staffs in effect merged under the leadership of the 17th AF commander operating out of the 603^d AOC, providing increased capacity for the JFACC.

had other contingencies arisen, forces taken from USEUCOM or USCENTCOM to support the operation would not have been readily available to respond

While multi-hatted commanders and staffs had advantages for the operation, there were also risks. Had other contingencies arisen, forces taken from USEUCOM or USCENTCOM to support the operation would not have been readily available to respond. In addition, with JTF–OD in place, forming another JTF for a new crisis would have been challenging.

Interpreting Strategic Guidance

As the crisis in Libya unfolded, USAFRICOM was initially directed by the Defense Secretary to prepare to conduct a NEO to evacuate American citizens from Libya. Planning for the NEO was still in progress when USAFRICOM was tasked to support the State Department in its HA operation to help move Egyptian citizens from Tunisia to Egypt. While USAFRICOM was planning for the NEO and HA operations, the Defense Secretary tasked USEUCOM to prepare plans to implement a no-fly zone and possible enforcement of sanctions on the Libyan regime. As one USAFRICOM general

officer noted, “Early on, in setting up potential NEO [operations], there was poor coordination between [State] and DOD. . . . During preparations for the NEO, there were almost daily changes to tasking by [State] and DOD, gradually morphing from a NEO to enforcing a [no-fly zone] and arms embargo.”¹⁶

without a defined endstate for operations in Libya, USAFRICOM was uncertain as to what resources it needed for operations

Guidance from the White House and DOD was confusing. Many people at USAFRICOM were unsure as to whether “regime change” was an intended option, as stated by the President, or whether operations were to be focused solely on protecting civilian life and providing humanitarian assistance to the refugees, as implied by the Defense Secretary’s warning orders. Without a defined endstate for operations in Libya, USAFRICOM was uncertain as to what resources it needed for operations:

[T]here was a lack of clear guidance from [Washington]. The lack of guidance was perceived by the POLAD [political advisor] to be due to a lack of coordination at the senior policy making level. DOD was different, once tasked the JTF went out and executed the mission. The POLAD never received any clear direction from [State].¹⁷

At the start of Operation Odyssey Dawn, the national strategic objectives were not fully developed. The operation was intended to be a short-term, U.S.-led multinational effort to protect civilians. President Obama made it clear that the United States wanted to transfer leadership

responsibilities to its Allies and coalition partners quickly.¹⁸ As General Carter Ham stated, “Our role currently . . . under my authority as the commander, is to make sure of two things—first, that we continue exercising our . . . mission that we have—protect civilians, and secondly, that we are prepared to transition responsibility for the mission to NATO quickly, effectively, and without disruption of the ongoing mission.”¹⁹

However, translating given political objectives into viable and coherent military objectives without a clearly defined endstate proved difficult. With no specific guidance on desired outcomes after the intervention, termination criteria were determined by transfer of ongoing operations vice completion of operations or end of hostilities. USAFRICOM’s course of action was to remain narrowly focused on the limited military objectives given:

[T]he biggest problem and concern was difficulty in getting a definite/consistent message from the White House and [State]. From discussions, it was clear that we would work some type of intervention in Libya; the UNSCR would allow civilian protection, but regime change? This discussion fed ambiguity all around . . . we had to look at policy statements from [principals] to use as policy direction.²⁰

Establishing, Improving, and Adapting Staff Processes

Although tasked with the same authorities and responsibilities as other combatant commands, the USAFRICOM mission was more aligned toward engagement, focusing on stability and security operations. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted at USAFRICOM’s inception: “AFRICOM represents yet another

important step in modernizing our defense arrangements in light of 21st century realities. It is, at its heart, a different kind of command with a different orientation. . . . AFRICOM's mission is not to wage war, but to prevent it; not to show United States military presence, but to enhance the security forces of our partners.”²¹

USAFRICOM's emphasis on security engagement, as described in its mission statement, had a major impact on how it was organized and resourced: “[USAFRICOM], in concert with other U.S. government agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activity, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy.”²²

Because of its mission to conduct security and stability operations in support of State and other non-DOD agencies, many key senior leadership positions within USAFRICOM were manned by State and non-DOD civilians. In addition, the staff was 50 percent civilian, as opposed to the usually heavy military staff of other combatant commands. As Admiral Locklear stated, “AFRICOM was built for security cooperation, not kinetic operations. It never dawned on anyone that they would have to be prepared to fight a war; they had the right elements, but the staff was not trained or manned to do targeting and embargo enforcement.”²³

At the onset of the Libyan crisis, USAFRICOM was not manned to plan and conduct large-scale contingency operations. There were not enough target analysts assigned to support USAFRICOM, the JTF, or the JFMCC, and until analysts could be moved from other commands to fill the void, planning to enforce the embargo and a no-fly zone was slow to develop. Because of the high number of civilians assigned

to the staff, standing up a 24/7 Joint Operations Center was difficult, and it could not have been sustained over a long campaign: “They never trained or practiced for a kinetic scenario, no one knew where to go for ‘General Quarters.’ Some directorates within AFRICOM were not prepared or manned for 24/7 operations.”²⁴

USAFRICOM strayed from the standard orders process and used an ad hoc method of orders production and dissemination

In addition, USAFRICOM was short on planners and analysts, which, under the circumstance of planning for multiple courses of action ranging from NEO to HA operations to regime change, further complicated the task.

Although USAFRICOM was established in 2008 and achieved full operational capability in 2009, it had not often practiced standing up a fully manned JTF at the headquarters nor had it practiced JTF operations with its component commands. In addition, staff personnel were neither familiar with nor had they practiced the processes and procedures for transitioning from security engagement operations to crisis/contingency operations.

USAFRICOM therefore had undeveloped staff processes for the scale of operations encountered in *Odyssey Dawn*. There were no established procedures for handling requests for information (RFIs), leading elements within USAFRICOM to respond to RFIs in parallel without cross-leveling their efforts throughout the rest of the command. Eventually, USAFRICOM developed an operational planning team as the primary action cell for all RFIs.

USAFRICOM strayed from the standard orders process and used an ad hoc method of

orders production and dissemination. It leaned heavily on the use of verbal orders of the commander (VOCO), PowerPoint, Tandberg video teleconferencing (VTC), telephone, and plain text email for two reasons: the speed of the operation required rapid production of orders, and USAFRICOM lacked experience in formal written orders production: “We were fighting this thing one PowerPoint slide at a time.”²⁵

USAFRICOM leaned heavily on the use of verbal orders of the commander, PowerPoint, Tandberg video teleconferencing, telephone, and email

Although VOCO/PowerPoint/email usage proved timely, these workarounds lacked the detail, discipline, and written records needed to prevent inconsistencies and confusion at subordinate staffs:

AFRICOM was not proficient at writing and publishing orders. They relied on e-mail and PowerPoint.²⁶

Lots of VOCO between all levels of command; speed of operations and information flow required it but you lose tracking of what is being told to whom. [Concept of operations] and orders were being implemented under PowerPoint.²⁷

Use of VTC allowed for rapid communication and dissemination of orders among the Flag and General Officers but at times left staff officers in the dark about leadership intentions. Staffs lost track of what was being told to whom: “These days everything is done by [VTC]; written products are kind of [overcome by events]; now you have a living [knowledge

management] system that needs to be robust and contain key documents.”²⁸

Gaps in the orders process, whether in communication or production, were compensated for at the JTF level. The JTF and its functional commands operated from Joint Chiefs of Staffs orders to stay ahead of the process.²⁹ The JFMCC issued Daily Intentions Messages across the net to provide a sort of “cleanup.” Formal orders that were missing from USAFRICOM were written at the JFMCC level to direct force movement and produce warning orders.³⁰

Communicating with the Coalition

Conducting operations with both NATO and non-NATO partners magnified difficulties in information-sharing. Many U.S. products did not meet “releasability” requirements for sharing with coalition partners. In addition, the ever-shifting makeup of the coalition challenged Foreign Disclosure Officers (FDOs) and exacerbated the problem. Releasability caveats shifted from U.S. Secret, to NATO releasable, to releasable to the coalition force. This placed a greater burden on the FDOs to clear information for release:

Many U.S. participants did not understand requirements to classify for releasability, and this became the primary roadblock to releasing information.³¹

Info coming in at all security levels created a challenge sorting out what info could be passed to coalition partners.³²

On average, it took FDOs 2 to 3 days to release requests. Despite challenges, FDOs did a heroic job considering the circumstances involved; however, there was a lack of capacity overall:

The White House (Pete Souza)



President Obama leads briefing on situation in Libya during secure conference call aboard Air Force One

The FDO did a great job; it was messy at first and not a perfect process; took a week to get to [the] point where [releasable] to [Combined Forces Odyssey Dawn] was established.³³

A tremendous effort was required to push information through the FDO. There were only two onboard the Mount Whitney to support both the JTF and JFMCC.³⁴

As events unfolded in Libya, it became apparent that USAFRICOM did not have adequate satellite bandwidth to conduct operations. USEUCOM transferred bandwidth to USAFRICOM; however, this put some of USEUCOM's potential operations at risk.³⁵ In addition, a network capability did not exist to pass classified information to both NATO and non-NATO partners. Considering the diversity of the coalition, it is understandable that no standard network was in existence. However, a lack of network capability at USAFRICOM between U.S. and NATO systems restricted information flow between the United States and its NATO partners.

At the outset of operations, USAFRICOM had only a limited Battlefield Information, Collection, and Exploitation System (BICES) capability—USEUCOM had to plus them up.³⁶

BICES didn't exist in AFRICOM; with political pressure to move away from U.S. lead, how do we communicate? EUCOM and [U.S. Army Europe] helped engineer a plan in three days to get BICES infrastructure; a training plan was developed and members from [Operation Enduring Freedom] were pulled to assist.³⁷

*BICES capability is needed at all [combatant commands], because in the current environment any [combatant command] could be called upon to work with NATO partners.*³⁸

as events unfolded in Libya, it became apparent that USAFRICOM did not have adequate satellite bandwidth to conduct operations

Lacking capability, liaison officers were used to manually “hand jam” data from one network to another to pass critical information. The network capability used was BICES “manually” enabled by LNOs: “BICES was used as the primary cross domain solution for information sharing, but much work remains to build systems capable of transferring real-time intelligence between U.S. and NATO [command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence] systems.”³⁹

An additional challenge when operating within a coalition lay in ensuring interoperability of command platforms’ enabling systems from different nationalities to allow communication with each other within the operational environment. While most of the NATO assets could communicate through various networks, not all coalition ships and aircraft could communicate with each other. Non-NATO partners required extra communications support in order to link them into the network. USAFRICOM, USEUCOM, and the JTF were able to work through this issue in order to conduct operations.

Conclusion

In spite of the Operation *Odyssey Dawn* C² challenges and adaptations discussed,

USAFRICOM was able to lead a coalition comprised of 15 nations, establish a JTF, plan and execute operations in support of UNSCR 1973, and transfer leadership of the operation to NATO. This was due in no small part to strong cross-component command support, which enabled an inexperienced command with a security engagement focus to achieve its military objectives. In addition, leaders and staffs used 10 years of recent warfighting experience in Iraq and Afghanistan to overcome the challenges of a headquarters that was under-resourced for the mission.

Manning shortfalls created by USAFRICOM’s engagement mission and the heavy use of civilians to fill traditionally military roles hindered planning and operations early on, but with support from USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, and an innovative core of experienced leaders, USAFRICOM quickly overcame this challenge. Due to the USAFRICOM mission, there was little emphasis placed on training to stand up a JTF or transition from engagement to combat operations. The extensive combat experience of senior leadership and staff helped to rapidly mold the headquarters team into a cohesive fighting unit.

In this scenario, the presence of a large number of State Department and other non-DOD civilian personnel on the USAFRICOM staff did little to improve or enhance coordination between myriad players. State personnel were familiar with and had good contacts within the USAFRICOM AOR, but once the scope of the operation morphed to combat operations with basing and resources coming from and being staged outside USAFRICOM’s sphere of influence, they were out of their element and had to rely on coordination between

State and USEUCOM to form the coalition and obtain the necessary staging areas for forces and logistics.

While the specific circumstances of Operation *Odyssey Dawn* generated numerous challenges, USAFRICOM successfully worked with the supporting combatant commands and JTF to manage these challenges and conduct operations. As the military will likely conduct future coalition operations that cross combatant command seams and require continued use of shared assets, the command and control lessons learned from the operation will remain germane. **PRISM**

The information provided in this article is derived from a larger, classified study on Operation *Odyssey Dawn* conducted by the Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis division of the Joint Staff J7 that examined the U.S. Africa Command response to the Libyan crisis and its execution of the operation.

Notes

¹ Brigadier General (BG) James W. Lukeman, USMC, Deputy Director for Plans and Programs, U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), Strategy, Plans, and Programs (SPP)/J5, interview by Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) Division, April 12, 2011.

² United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, March 17, 2011.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, May 14, 2007, updated March 20, 2009), states, “[T]he supported commander has the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort. General direction includes the designation and prioritization of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency.”

⁵ Ibid.: “The supporting commander will advise and coordinate with the supported commander on matters concerning the employment and limitations of such support, assist in planning for the integration of such support to the commander’s effort as a whole and ensure that support requirements are appropriately communicated throughout the supporting commander’s organization.”

⁶ U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), Chief of Staff, interview by JCOA, April 12, 2011.

⁷ JP 1: “When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining CDR will exercise (and the losing CDR will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the [Secretary of Defense],” (March 20, 2009), IV–7.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ USEUCOM, J5 Officer, interview by JCOA, April 12, 2011.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Admiral (ADM) Samuel J. Locklear III, USN, Commander, Joint Task Force Odyssey Dawn (JTF–OD), interview by JCOA, April 20, 2011.

¹² Vice Admiral (VADM) Harry Harris, USN, Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Odyssey Dawn (JFMCC–OD), interview by JCOA, April 18, 2011.

¹³ VADM Charles J. Leidig, USN, Deputy Commander, USAFRICOM, interview by JCOA, April 11, 2011.

- ¹⁴ JTF–OD, J5 Officer, interview by JCOA, April 18, 2011.
- ¹⁵ USEUCOM, Combined Joint Plans and Policy Division, interview by JCOA, April 12, 2011.
- ¹⁶ Major General (MG) Salvatore F. Cambria, USA, USAFRICOM, Operational Logistics (OPLOG)/J3, interview by JCOA, April 11, 2011.
- ¹⁷ U.S. Naval Forces Europe/U.S. Naval Forces Africa, Senior Foreign Service Officer, interview by JCOA, April 19, 2011.
- ¹⁸ President Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya,” National Defense University, Washington, DC, March 28, 2011.
- ¹⁹ General Carter F. Ham, Commander, USAFRICOM, interview, *NBC Nightly News*, March 25, 2011.
- ²⁰ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff J5, Senior Officer, interview by JCOA, May 18, 2011.
- ²¹ Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, USAFRICOM activation ceremony, October 1, 2008.
- ²² USAFRICOM, mission statement, available at <<https://portal.africom.smil.mil/Pages/Default.aspx>>.
- ²³ ADM Samuel F. Locklear III, April 20, 2011.
- ²⁴ USAFRICOM, SPP/J5 Officer, interview by JCOA, April 15, 2011.
- ²⁵ USAFRICOM, Strike OPS Planner, interview by JCOA, April 11, 2011.
- ²⁶ Rear Admiral (RADM) Gerard P. Hueber, USN, JFMCC–OD, Chief of Staff, interview by JCOA, April 16, 2011.
- ²⁷ BG Arnold Gordon-Bray, USA, USAFRICOM, Deputy OPLOG/J3, interview by JCOA, April 11, 2011.
- ²⁸ ADM Samuel F. Locklear III, April 20, 2011.
- ²⁹ RADM James G. Foggo, USN, JTF–OD/J3 (paraphrased), interview by JCOA, April 21, 2011.
- ³⁰ JFMCC, Chief of Staff (paraphrased), interview by JCOA, April 20, 2011.
- ³¹ JFMCC–OD, Command Operational Assessment (COA), April 19, 2011.
- ³² MG Salvatore F. Cambria, April 11, 2011.
- ³³ USAFRICOM, Deputy Strategy, Plans, and Programs Officer, interview by JCOA, April 12, 2011.
- ³⁴ JFMCC–OD, COA, April 19, 2011.
- ³⁵ USEUCOM, J63 Officer, interview by JCOA, April 13, 2011.
- ³⁶ Ibid.
- ³⁷ BG Robert Ferrell, USA, USAFRICOM, C⁴ Systems Director, interview by JCOA, April 12, 2011.
- ³⁸ MG Salvatore F. Cambria, April 11, 2011.
- ³⁹ JFMCC–OD, COA, April 19, 2011.

An Interview with Donald Steinberg



John Harrington

After a career at the Department of State, and now serving as Deputy Administrator at the U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID], how would you characterize the differences in organizational culture between State and USAID?

Ambassador Steinberg: I think the emphasis on cultural differences is overstated. There is a traditional assumption that State Department

officers are striped-pants diplomats who are most comfortable working with foreign ministries and other government officials in capital cities, and that USAID officers are in cargo pants, getting their hands dirty working with civil society and grassroots populations in the countryside. To the extent that this stereotype was true in the past, the lines are merging these days under Secretary [Hillary] Clinton's vision of an operational State Department and a fully empowered USAID. You will find many State Department officials in the field negotiating agreements at local levels, linking with lawyers' groups and women's organizations, and taking American diplomacy to the people. At the same time, you find USAID officials with Ph.D.s working with prime ministers, finance ministers, and foreign ministries in capitals.

The QDDR [Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review] and other documents define a multifaceted, team-based approach working under our Chiefs of Mission authority in which the State Department drives the diplomatic agenda and USAID drives the development agenda. We recognize that these roles may overlap, for example, insofar as diplomatic initiatives can promote development by engaging governments on issues such as creating the proper environment for trade and foreign investment, ensuring that all elements of society are engaged in establishing goals for

Ambassador Donald Steinberg is Deputy Administrator at the U.S. Agency for International Development.

equitable and inclusive development, and so on. It's all about maximizing the influence that we can have in a particular country or region, and using the proper tools for the challenge at hand.

The development space is a lot more crowded, though, with the State Department and Department of Defense [DOD] working in areas such as security sector reform and public safety. How has USAID adjusted to that greater density of personnel from other agencies in the same space?

Ambassador Steinberg: There are now more than two dozen separate U.S. Government agencies that have a role in the international development arena. While USAID accounts for just over half of the total development spending abroad, the Defense, State, Health and Human Services (including [the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention]), Justice Departments, and other agencies are significant actors as well. We welcome this engagement since it means greater resources, greater expertise, and greater capacity to contribute. The QDDR states clearly that the default position is that the USAID mission director serves as the Chief of Mission's principal assistance advisor, and this means that USAID needs to coordinate the various types of development assistance flowing into a country. This involves USAID serving in an inclusive leadership role, where it drives mutually agreed upon development goals and empowers the priorities, talents, skills, and resources of other U.S. Government agencies. We've said for a long time that no agency has a monopoly on resources, on ground truth, on good ideas, or on moral authority.

There will also be times when USAID has to be an inclusive follower, where we use our skills and resources to support broader

administration goals. This is especially true in conflict situations around the world where USAID's role in supporting stabilization operations will be affected by the security situation. In these environments, we will continue to work with our colleagues from Defense and State in order to determine the best approach.

How do you envision the relationship evolving between USAID and the State Department's new Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations [CSO]?

Ambassador Steinberg: The proliferation of conflict situations abroad makes it clear that there's room enough for many actors in this space. Ambassador Rick Barton is uniquely positioned to lead the CSO bureau given his long history of engagement with U.S. Government agencies and international organizations. For example, in his role as Deputy [United Nations] High Commissioner for Refugees and his founding role in creating the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives [OTI], Ambassador Barton pushed processes that ensured collaborative approaches among civil society, donor and host governments, and international organizations. He understands that in pursuing the Secretary's vision of a more operational State Department response to conflict situations, we need to avoid redundancies and work respectfully toward common goals. At USAID we have, for example, within our Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, core capabilities to address prevention, response, and recovery in areas suffering from shocks or conflict.

Equally important, CSO will help ensure consistency and common purpose among the many State actors in this arena, including the Bureaus of International Narcotics and

Law Enforcement; Population, Refugees, and Migration, and others.

Has USAID given thought to the problem of rapid turnover in the kinds of conflict-ridden environments that you are talking about? In other words, how do we get people to commit to more than 1 year?

Ambassador Steinberg: Absolutely. As a good example, in July 2011, Administrator Rajiv Shah launched a new 2-year pilot program, the AfPak [Afghanistan-Pakistan] Hands program. The basic principle of the program is to use our Foreign Service Limited Officers, who serve for up to 5 years, to develop specializations in the AfPak region. An officer will serve for a year in Afghanistan or Pakistan; return to Washington to work in a related area such as food security, health, or gender issues for that region; and then return into the field. In addition, we've already noted that about 25 percent of our officials in these countries are now requesting extensions. But I don't want to underestimate the difficult challenge of dealing with these environments from a human perspective. I've served in a number of hardship posts, including the Central African Republic in my first tour and, more recently, as Ambassador in Angola from 1995 to 1998. I understand the physical and emotional effects of living constantly in insecure situations, hearing gunfire everywhere, watching aircraft go down, and witnessing colleagues being killed or injured. The last thing we want to do is subject our officials to psychological challenges like post-traumatic stress disorder or create family problems from overly lengthy assignments.

You mentioned the Foreign Service Officer and OTI as a well-known brand.

OTI is populated mostly by contract employees. Has USAID thought of creating a career path for the kinds of officers who work in OTI and are frequently deployed to these kinds of areas?

Ambassador Steinberg: We have a de facto system in effect in the form of a broad pool of personal services contractors who work for us time and again in these situations. We call quickly on these individuals, who have proven their capabilities in the field, when we need people for Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, or elsewhere. They have the skills we need, whether it's in transitional justice, domestic governance, local government, or employment generation. This gives us the flexibility we need to get the right kind of expertise for stabilization and complex development environments when we need it. The system works well and we have quickly ramped up in a number of situations that required immediate attention. So if you go back to proven performers time and again, it's very similar to having a dedicated corps.

Where is the Civilian Response Corps idea going? Is USAID actually developing a viable expeditionary capability? How are these people being deployed?

Ambassador Steinberg: Last year, the Office of Civilian Response at USAID deployed some 38 staff members to 27 countries around the world. They provided about 6,200 days of support in the field for efforts related to civil engineering, conflict mitigation, rule of law, logistics, administration, and other technical areas of expertise. It's also important to have experts on gender given that women are both the primary victims of conflict and are key to

the successful conclusion of peace processes and postconflict reconstruction and reconciliation. The program has been very successful so far. In particular, our Civilian Response Corps demonstrated an immediate capacity to respond in South Sudan as the country was moving from an uncertain past to its referendum in January 2011 and its independence the following July.

Right now we have Civilian Response Corps supporting many crisis hot spots including Libya, Tunisia, Senegal, and Burma.

The Civilian Response Corps originated in the lack of capacity to respond to the huge personnel needs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Do we now have a stepping stone toward that ultimate larger capacity, or do you think the corps has reached its maximum size?

Ambassador Steinberg: We're going to be expanding our operations in complex emergencies and transitional periods, but USAID is also taking our existing capabilities and linking them to ensure we are addressing the so-called relief-recovery-development continuum. The Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, where the Office of Civilian Response lives, is a good example. The bureau has nine offices that have technical expertise, teams, and funding essential to addressing response, recovery, and transition efforts, while keeping inclusive democracy and governance at its core. The Civilian Response Corps feeds into this model by providing surge personnel with the critical expertise needed to address crisis and transition needs.

In addition, we have to ensure a seamless transition where, from the moment you enter a humanitarian relief situation, you are already planning for postconflict, post-emergency situations and enabling sustainable

development. To this end, we have organized a new initiative to focus on smart planning for areas of chronic crisis.

DOD now has tens of thousands of personnel with extensive experience in areas traditionally thought of as within the development domain—such as infrastructure development, governance, public security, security sector reform, and even economic growth. How would you assess that asset and how does USAID work with that asset?

Ambassador Steinberg: It's important to remember the shared goals that we all have in supporting economic and political stability around the world. As Administrator Shah frequently points out, countries that are prosperous, well governed, and respectful of human rights tend to not traffic in drugs, weapons, or people. They don't transmit pandemic disease or spew out large numbers of refugees across borders and oceans. They don't harbor terrorists or pirates. And they don't require American ground forces. Admiral James Stavridis [Commander of U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe] spoke to the USAID global mission directors' conference last November, and he noted that the international community is not going to *fight* its way out of Afghanistan—we're going to *develop* our way out of Afghanistan. So we all have a stake in international development.

That said, development is a discipline. Working under Chief of Mission authority, trained and experienced USAID officials are best suited to bring together the different elements of development in terms of a comprehensive approach toward good governance, human security, economic growth, development of civil society, and promotion of trade and investment.

These are complex paradigms that we need to pursue in a holistic manner. There is a key role for Defense in this effort, both in countries facing kinetic environments and in areas like security sector reform and demobilization of ex-combatants, but it is part of a larger environment where USAID helps drive the process.

When we talk about the 3D approach, are we talking about three departments, three disciplines, or three principles?

Ambassador Steinberg: We are indeed talking about roles and responsibilities when we discuss diplomacy, development, and defense, rather than strict tasks that conform easily to the State Department, USAID, and Defense Department, respectively. There will be times when Defense and USAID officials serve in essentially diplomatic roles, and the same can be said of development. During my career as a Foreign Service Officer in the economics cone of the State Department, I served as the development officer in several posts where USAID did not have a presence, such as the Central African Republic and Malaysia, and collaborated closely with USAID in places where they did, such as Angola and South Africa. I described before the security motivation for development, but there is also a key economic motivation as well. We are pursuing overseas development because it's in our economic interest. Our fastest growing export markets today are former large recipients of development assistance, whether that's South Korea, South Africa, Brazil, Taiwan, or India. This means U.S. exports, U.S. jobs, and opportunities for U.S. foreign investment. We have a real interest in these emerging countries, especially as we see declining growth rates in our traditional markets. One estimate states that 85 percent of the

growth in U.S. exports in the next two decades will go to developing countries.

Over the last 10 years, we've learned a lot. What is USAID doing to make sure that we can capture the lessons of the last decade?

Ambassador Steinberg: The last 5 years in particular have been a period of real change for USAID. From 1990 to 2005, the agency lost some 40 percent of its staff, even as budgets were rising. USAID lost a lot of its capacity to serve as a development agency; in some ways, we became an assistance agency. In many cases, we sought contracts with large contractors or similar activities with nongovernmental organizations where they would not only do the projects but would also design and evaluate them. These groups are filled with talented, dedicated professionals who can serve as partners, but it must be USAID who drives the process. Furthermore, USAID ceased to have a planning division or a budget office. In addition, many of the larger initiatives in the development space were housed elsewhere. Whether that was the Millennium Challenge Corporation (set up as a separate entity), the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief set up at the State Department, the Global Climate Initiative, or the Global Health Initiative, USAID ceased to provide leadership for these Presidential initiatives.

In the last 5 to 7 years, this trend has reversed. We have now brought on about 850 new officers who are filling important gaps, and we've essentially returned to previous staffing levels. We have been asked by the President to lead the Feed the Future Food Security Initiative. We have established an Office of Budget and Resource Management that prepared USAID's fiscal year 2013 budget to be

incorporated into the Secretary's broader development budget, and we have created a Bureau for Policy, Planning, and Learning. The latter bureau is responsible for incorporating the lessons learned and best practices from USAID's proud history into our development strategies as we move ahead. Already we have prepared a policy framework for 2011–2015 that spells out a new, better focused and concentrated set of priorities. We have developed strategies for dealing with climate change and education, and plan to release soon policies or strategies for countering trafficking in persons, gender issues, and water in the 21st century. In late 2011, we released a policy that addresses how we can use development to combat violent extremism and insurgencies around the world. We are once again a learning organization. We have reasserted our role as a thought leader in this space.

Equally important, we are working to empower our local partners—both governments and civil society—by channeling additional resources through those institutions in cases where we are certain they can transparently and effectively conduct effective programs. We are also reincorporating science, technology, and innovation into our development activities. This is all a part of the agency's ambitious USAID Forward agenda.

Is Congress giving greater strategic latitude to USAID than it has in the past?

Ambassador Steinberg: It goes back and forth. Last year, fiscal year 2011, our budget contained directive language but fewer earmarks. For fiscal year 2012, we saw some backtracking: much of the “USAID should” language reverted to “USAID shall.” This affected primarily basic education and water and the Development Grants Program. Still, I think our relationship

with Congress now is quite good. We've just completed a budget process for 2012 that essentially maintains our commitment to international development, which is quite impressive in the tough budget environment we face.

I might add as an aside that this total still represents less than 1 percent of the total Federal budget. Members and staffers on our authorizing and appropriations committees are extremely knowledgeable about development, committed to development priorities around the world, and have a sophisticated understanding of where our priorities should lie. As in all of Washington, the key is open and transparent communications, and making certain that we keep the number of surprises to a minimum. In the last year, Administrator Shah and I have had approximately 200 meetings with Members of Congress in both the House and Senate. We have a good understanding of their priorities, and, I like to believe, they have a growing confidence in our capacity to promote development while being responsible stewards of the taxpayers' dollars.

In this regard, we all have to recognize that this is a new world in the development space. Official development assistance today makes up a small percentage of the total requirements for investment capital in developing countries. It's instructive to remember that total U.S. official development assistance last year was about \$30 billion. That is less than the \$36 billion in funds that private American citizens gave abroad to support development and humanitarian relief. It is far less than the \$100 billion that American residents sent to people in remittances and a fraction of the \$1 trillion in private investments flowing to these countries. In this environment, development assistance is no longer intended primarily to fill fiscal and savings gaps, but it must instead have a catalytic role. And so, we're trying to encourage

partnerships and innovative approaches and use our dollars to leverage assistance from foundations and private companies. We can also help reduce the risk associated with long-term development investments, use our convening authorities to coordinate with host governments, introduce new technological and innovative solutions, share experiences from other countries, and so on. Congress recognizes that the whole development space has changed. The fiscal year 2012 budget bill authorized enterprise development operations, loan guarantees programs, and debt relief initiatives—all of which are designed to take advantage of the vast resources out there.

Has USAID had a chance yet to reflect on the President's new national security guidance that indicated that the United States would be pivoting toward Asia? What does this mean for USAID?

Ambassador Steinberg: Asia has always been a significant area of emphasis for USAID and will be even more so under the President's guidance. We have active development, reconstruction, and humanitarian relief programs throughout the region, whether it's Pakistan, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Vietnam, the Philippines, or many other nations. The opening of Burma is particularly encouraging. We are also seeking to partner with the emerging powers of Asia on triangular development efforts, such as working with India to promote agricultural development in Africa. But the President has also made clear that USAID doesn't have the luxury of focusing exclusively or even primarily on one region. We need to continue to alleviate disease and poverty, address illiteracy and weak governance, and promote sustainable growth in Africa; to consolidate political and economic transformation in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia; and to support the awakening in the Middle East by promoting socioeconomic systems that can deliver a transition dividend through jobs and economic growth. These are the challenges of a modern development enterprise. **PRISM**

Book Reviews

The Afghan Way of War: How and Why They Fight

By Robert Johnson
Oxford University Press, 2011
400 pp., \$29.95
ISBN: 978-0-19979-856-8

**REVIEWED BY DONALD
LARRY SAMPLER**

I began the task of reviewing Robert Johnson's *The Afghan Way of War: How and Why They Fight* not expecting to enjoy the book at all. I have deep interests in Afghanistan, but am the type of reader who prefers my military history as told by Bernard Cornwell through the eyes of Richard Sharpe in his successful string of historical novels. But to my surprise, I found the book quite compelling. Johnson has produced a readable account of Afghan conflict over the past couple of centuries that, while not profoundly challenging any of my perceptions or expectations, has certainly enriched them and reinforced them by grounding them in history.

The Afghan Way of War fills a significant gap in our understanding of the context surrounding our current imbroglio in the region, though the author cautions against trying to draw direct policy guidance from his observations. Johnson notes that most of the historical sources on the various Afghan conflicts reflect

a Western perspective. He makes it clear that the lack of thoughtful analyses of how and why Afghans fight *from an Afghan perspective* is a serious impediment to accurate understanding of how and why both our friends and enemies in the region behave as they do. He also notes that even our concept of “friends and enemies” is not necessarily part of the Afghan way of war. The consequences of this gap in knowledge are made clear, as Johnson cites Patrick Porter, who “pointed to a predilection to stereotyping in the Western episteme which is so pervasive as to threaten to prevent accurate judgments being made in the policy sphere” (p. 3). Johnson assesses the Afghan way of war and attempts to use Afghan materials—to the degree possible, given limited non-Western source material—to understand why and how the Afghans fight the way they have. He then challenges some of the assumptions commonly made about how Afghans fight that have emerged from an ethnocentric Western historical perspective.

As an example of how Afghan behaviors, viewed through Western lenses, tend to be misunderstood in ways both profound and significant, he cites various (Western) historians and authors describing the proclivity of Afghans to switch sides and realign their loyalties when necessary as being without honor or loyalty. An Afghan perspective of that same behavior would be based on a more pragmatic understanding of a fully acceptable behavior that has evolved over centuries as a mechanism for survival. Likewise, the brutality of Afghan combat has been described as the “ruthless mass murder and mutilation of their enemies” and “an expression of Afghan backwardness and lack of restraint” (p. 7). Johnson notes that “There

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was no acknowledgment of the need to annihilate those who would otherwise return to seek revenge” (p. 7)—a need that would have been clear to an observer who was informed by an Afghan perspective.

In reviewing the marginalia that I scribbled throughout the book, I found a surprising number of exclamation points that I use to draw attention to particularly good points or well-phrased and clear statements worth remembering. For example:

Afghan Pashtuns were not entirely anarchic, forming alliances through marriage and relations to increase military power and deter rivals. However, once qawm, or descent-locality group, reached a size likely to threaten the available resources, then suspicion and anxiety increased and served to undermine the alliance to which a family or an individual might belong. Pashtuns valued the idealism of gheryatmun (courageous independence), rendering qawm alliances inherently temporary, unstable, and liable to disintegration. . . . [T]he Pashtun needed to engage in alliances that were convenient but avoid military obligations that might incur his or his family's destruction. This helps to explain the fluidity of Afghans on the battle field, rushing to assist another clan in the hope of spoils or an alliance, but equally quick to retreat and disperse if the engagement turned unfavorably against them (p. 17).

This passage describes behavior that anyone spending any amount of time in the region would have experienced first-hand. But Johnson's clear explanation of the how and why of such behavior brings new rigor and resilience to our understanding. Rather than dishonorable

or illogical behavior that we might hope to modify, such fluidity on the part of Pashtuns is a sensible part of their coping mechanisms for the environment in which they live. Later, Johnson describes various attributes of how and why Afghans negotiate in war, citing five stages of their negotiations, four main themes common to Afghan negotiations, and so forth. These insights, while not always new, are useful for practitioners in helping to clarify our expectations of the Afghans in various situations. Viewed through a Western lens, a particular trait might be seen as aberrant. But through Johnson's Afghan-centric historical lens, that same trait can now be understood and, if not predicted, at least anticipated.

In contrast to his clarity, there are also examples of academic rhetoric that I presume are of value to the military historians among his audience, but which made my eyes bleed as I read them: “Ethno-nationalist mobilization and contestation are macrohistorical processes that operate over both short and long timespans. It may take decades until perceived humiliation and unfair ethnic status hierarchies give rise to political mobilization and conflict. . . . [I]n extreme cases of path dependency, actors may find themselves trapped in self-sustaining cycles of violence” (p. 17). Fortunately, such academic prose is used sparingly.

In many ways, the intellectual “heavy lifting” of the book is accomplished in the introduction and early historical anecdotes at the beginning of the second section of the book, where Johnson establishes the Afghan-centric perspectives of behavior. The latter sections then examine those behaviors in various temporal settings. The examination of the Afghan way of war during “Dynastic struggles and Popular Resistance in Afghanistan” was astonishing for its relevance. Consider, for

example, his descriptions of the problems affecting the Afghan military forces of Ahmad Shah Duranni and his son in the late 1700s: First they lacked any secure financial-logistical system. Second, the resistance against their central army learned and stiffened. Third, the loyalty of the army was often in doubt (p. 42). He goes on to suggest that “Duranni Shahs faced the dilemma of staffing governorships with weak men who might be unable to rule effectively, or stronger men who might be tempted to rebel,” and cites a traditional proverb that “An Afghan Amir sleeps upon an ant heap” (p. 42). Hamid Karzai faces many of the same dilemmas as his Duranni ancestors.

And it is not only President Karzai: International Security Assistance Force leaders might appreciate Johnson’s description of the British situation in 1841, noting that “The biggest oversight has been the failure to acknowledge that it was the under-resourced nature of the occupation, with small and isolated garrisons, both those of the Shah, and the British, and the consequent under-financing of the project, that led to the crisis of 1841” (p. 62).

The number of times a passage or particular insight generates immediate and blindingly obvious parallels to contemporary issues of today might be one of the most surprising constants of the book. In describing the Pashtun uprising at the end of the 19th century, for example, Johnson notes that “Various explanations [for the uprising] were offered, but it was generally accepted that recent encroachments into tribal territory, with fears that the British meant to occupy the region permanently as a prelude to the destruction of Afghan independence and their way of life, led to the initial fighting” (p. 149). Pages later he quotes Winston Churchill, who served as a lieutenant during the “Pathan revolt,” as stating, “Great

and expensive forces, equipped with all the developments of scientific war, are harried and worried without rest or mercy by an impalpable cloud of active and well-armed skirmishers. To enter the mountains and attack an Afridi is to jump into the water to catch a fish” (p. 154).

In a telling precursor to today’s debates among Western military strategists with respect to counterinsurgency and/or “population-centric engagements,” Johnson cites Secret Dispatches from the India Office in 1898: “The India Office concurred with Lord Curzon’s thoughts on the need for a change of policy in tribal territories: ‘it has always been an axiom that the good will of the tribesmen affords the best guarantee for the success of a frontier policy—the friendly attitude of the frontier tribes would be of much greater moment than the absolute safety of any single pass, however important’” (p. 171).

And, as a last example of relevant precursors, Johnson cites Captain H.L. Nevill, writing in 1912, “To compel the surrender of guerrillas, such as the frontier tribes of India, by the usual process of breaking down the means of defence would entail operations so prolonged and costly as to be out of all proportion to the interest at stake” (p. 172). The book is rife with such parallels, and they are uniquely instructive to those operating in and on Afghanistan policies.

Johnson’s discussion of the Soviet period, ending (more or less) with the Geneva Accords of 1988, clearly and strongly supports his thesis that there is no immutable “Afghan way of war.” When faced with the dramatically different technologies brought to bear by the Soviets, the Afghans again adapted their own tactics, making effective use of the terrain and resources available to them. His subsequent coverage of the civil war, the Taliban, and the present insurgency is comparatively less

detailed, yet still there are revelations: the 1989 battle for Jalalabad, between the Mujahideen and government forces, is compared with respect to brutality to the Battle for Stalingrad. It was a critical moment for the Mujahideen, and yet I had known virtually nothing about its scale or significance before his exposition.

His coverage of the contemporary insurgency, in contrast to the depth and constant delightful discoveries of the earlier sections of the book, is not particularly revealing. He quotes a Special Air Service officer as stating that “Killing was a way of life for [Afghans] and they would pick up a weapon for the slightest of reasons and fight under the flimsiest of flags” (p. 269). But the reader, having the benefit of Johnson’s previous chapters, would have expected no less and could, in fact, provide an Afghan-centric perspective on why such behavior is understandable and culturally acceptable. The Afghan behaviors described in this last section of the book come not as revelations, but as the expected—which is perhaps evidence of the efficacy of Johnson’s thesis.

The final section, entitled “Lessons Learned,” is not particularly insightful or helpful. And in direct contrast to the rest of the book (and particularly the earliest sections), the analyses are somewhat shallow and general in nature. One observation in this section is that “Afghans are not culturally determined in their actions, but are reactive and adaptive. Their operations are shaped and influenced by a cultural ‘lens,’ but they are also pragmatic” (p. 305). While both may be true, the sentences seem almost to contradict each other and, regardless, are not particularly new or useful insights. If there is a particular thesis for the book, it might be that “there is no fixed and unchanging way of war for Afghanistan” (p. 8), but that Afghans have long been a learning, adaptive society that made war (and accommodations related to war) based upon contemporary constraints and relationships.

The true lessons learned in Johnson’s excellent book are buried among the historical recitation of battles fought in centuries past where a particular attribute of Afghans of the past or particular idiosyncrasy of their cultural dynamic is highlighted and resonates clearly with a modern, contemporary attribute or action. Harking Johnson’s admonition not to make too direct a connection between historical antecedents and current policy, it is still possible to mine from this book much in the way of context and depth of understanding and knowledge for those whose job it is today to fight with or—and perhaps even more usefully—negotiate with Afghans.

Now if only he could retell these stories through the eyes of Richard Sharpe and his Irish Sergeant Harper. **PRISM**

Book Reviews

Two Recent Takes on Where We Are in Afghanistan, and How We Got There

*A Vulcan's Tale: How the Bush
Administration Mismanaged
the Reconstruction
of Afghanistan*

By Dov S. Zakheim
Brookings Institution Press, 2011
320 pp., \$32.95
ISBN: 978-0-8157-2122-2

*Understanding War
in Afghanistan*

By Joseph J. Collins
NDU Press, 2011
158 pp.
ISBN: 978-1-78039-924-9

**A REVIEW ESSAY
BY JAMES KUNDER**

For serious students of Afghanistan specifically, and stabilization operations more generally, two recent books are worth a look. Both Joseph J. Collins's *Understanding War in Afghanistan* and Dov S. Zakheim's *A Vulcan's Tale: How the Bush Administration Mismanaged the Reconstruction of Afghanistan* focus on U.S. policy toward that tortured South Asian country.

Dr. Collins's book, which draws on his broader writing on the topic, is, in his own words, "an intellectual primer on war in Afghanistan." And it strikes its target admirably. As the word *primer* suggests, the work is spare, focusing on the essential facts about Afghanistan and the nature and history of warfare there. Simply put, the book is a gem, summarizing in its short 158 pages an enormous treasure trove of information on everything from the topography of the land to the tribal code of the Pashtun ethnic group to Western policy options to conclude the Afghan war.

Here the reader finds important data on the ethnic makeup of Afghanistan, historical roots of many current rivalries, and insights into topics that otherwise might be invisible to the soldier or reconstruction worker encountering Afghanistan for the first time. An example of the latter is Dr. Collins's short but useful foray into the trilateral dynamics among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, an invisible but potent interplay that affects the actions of all three important nations.

Scattered throughout *Understanding War in Afghanistan* are "mini" analytical syntheses that, without this book, would be distilled only after extensive research by readers. In the chapter on "Land, People, and Culture," for example,

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Dr. Collins notes that Afghanistan history and current politics result from a complex interplay of four factors: the rugged, landlocked topography; the low level of factor endowments that “makes poverty a natural condition”; local and tribal power structures; and the nation’s location among more powerful neighbors contending over its fate. My personal favorite, since I grappled with this set of issues while working at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), is the book’s treatment of the counterpoint between “a drastic need for modernization,” on the one hand, and the “entrenched interests” and “very conservative populace in the countryside that jealously guards its autonomy,” on the other. Without an understanding of this dynamic, and the related “center versus periphery” issues that Dr. Collins also covers, it can be extraordinarily difficult to reconcile the seemingly conflicted attitudes of many Afghans toward programs to improve their lives.

Even when Dr. Collins moves beyond the facts of geography and culture, he retains an admirable economy of words and objectivity. His summation of four broad policy options (essentially large-scale counterinsurgency [COIN], counterterrorism, capacity-building, or “reconciliation”) makes the complex political/security situation digestible for newcomers, without insulting more sophisticated readers.

This is the book I wish I had when USAID deployed me to Kabul to reopen its office in January 2002. It is the book that military personnel and civilians deploying to Afghanistan now, even if for the second or third time, should take the time to read. I do not know if anyone at the Pentagon, State Department, or USAID is contemplating buying this important book in quantity for those deploying to Afghanistan, but—while I am not Dr. Collins’s agent—all of those institutions should be doing just that.

The work by Dr. Zakheim, former Department of Defense Comptroller and Chief Financial Officer during the early days of the Bush administration, goes in a different direction. It, too, concludes with a number of policy recommendations related to COIN and effective U.S. Government policy more generally, and it too covers a brief history of Afghanistan policy during the Bush years. But as the word *tale* in the title suggests, this work is a more sequential, personal recounting of the events surrounding the formulation of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and, especially, how the decision to go to war in Iraq affected that policy.

The author’s self-identification as a “Vulcan” (from the Roman god of fire and war, and implying one who forges products from hot metal) refers to former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s characterization of eight foreign policy experts, including Dr. Zakheim, who were early and influential advisors to then-candidate George W. Bush in 1999–2000 in a manner chronicled in James Mann’s 2004 book, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet*. As befits someone who was “present at the creation,” Dr. Zakheim’s recollections are full of first-person experiences with the primary architects of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. So for those ready and eager for another insider account of politics, bureaucratic and personal, during this intense period of our nation’s history, then the former Under Secretary of Defense’s work is a must-read.

The straightforward premise of the book—which, while it would have been stunning if Dr. Zakheim had articulated it during early Iraq policy deliberations, now seems a bit pedestrian—is that the decision to invade Iraq, and the subsequent unanticipated insurgency there, distracted senior Bush administration policy-makers from Afghanistan. This distractedness

contributed, the author convincingly argues, to an underresourcing of the Afghan conflict at a time when modest additional assets might have been decisive. As a USAID participant in many of the National Security Council (NSC) and other interagency deliberations at the time, I find myself concurring wholeheartedly with Dr. Zakheim's hypothesis and conclusion. The policy and operational burdens of managing the Iraq conflict, especially as the insurgency heated up, nudged the Afghanistan conflict into the background, not as a matter of policy but as a matter of practicality. This downgrading of the Afghan effort was magnified by the reality that virtually the same cast of senior U.S. Government officials from Defense, State, Treasury, and other key departments were attending recurring, high intensity NSC sessions on both conflicts.

Structurally, *A Vulcan's Tale* is a bit of a ramble, equal parts personal reflection, a primer of its own on Federal budget procedures, a travelogue on Dr. Zakheim's globe-trotting efforts to dun donors from the Gulf to East Asia, and collection of policy recommendations on improving U.S. Government decisionmaking. The ramble can sometimes be distracting. In the middle of the book, a chapter titled "Engaging Syria" pops up, recounting the author's diligent efforts to ensure Damascus would repatriate frozen Iraqi financial assets. Although interesting enough in its own right as an example of how diplomacy is conducted between contending countries, five pages into the chapter, I found myself asking what this Syrian foray had to do with the book's central premise about a distracted U.S. Government ignoring Afghanistan.

Beyond the interplay between Iraq and Afghanistan, Dr. Zakheim's work has a second unifying theme: senior policymakers within the U.S. Government often undervalue operational

and institutional concerns when deciding among courses of action. Stating his diagnosis in his own words, while recalling the obstacles to progress in Afghanistan, he writes, "No one in a position high enough to matter appreciated the institutional design function of leadership. So absorbed were policymakers with the 'why' and 'what' questions of policy direction, no one bothered with the 'how' questions of policy implementation." The author also summarizes this argument more pungently by reporting that "details are not for heroes and visionaries." This is an important and complex hypothesis about how the U.S. Government works. Since the author served as the Chief Financial Officer at the Defense Department (as well as the department's coordinator for Afghan reconstruction), he was well placed to support his thesis with personal experience. He had, during his tenure, direct access to the most senior policymakers in Defense, the White House, and elsewhere, while his day-to-day responsibilities were squarely in the realm of the arguably undervalued "details" of implementation.

As he argues his thesis, the battles to mobilize sufficient financial resources for both Afghanistan and Iraq figure prominently in Dr. Zakheim's recounting of events. This is the book for those who will relish the details of congressional appropriations confrontations, struggle to induce allies to make good on their financial pledges, and iniquities of senior Office of Management and Budget (OMB) officials (named by name).

Dr. Zakheim wraps up his final chapter with a series of recommendations on how the U.S. Government can better structure itself both "to make policy and to implement it." Several of these observations are well worn, as when he calls for "reining in" a "micromanaging" OMB. Others, including proposals for an enhanced

role for the Treasury Department, a reconfiguration of the deputy secretary slot at Defense, and a bit of restructuring at the NSC, merit consideration. I must admit, however, to being a bit disconcerted when the author's list of recommendations, despite ample critiques throughout the book of State Department and USAID inadequacies, failed to address two of the major institutional innovations now under way: the rebuilding of technical staff capability at USAID and the creation of a State Department Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations.

These quibbles aside, for all those who cannot put down the latest insider revelation on the inner workings of the Bush administration, and all those who relish a personal recounting from an author who was in a position to know, I highly recommend *A Vulcan's Tale*. Also, for those concerned about how U.S. Government policy formulation, institutional capacity, and operational details interact, especially as to the linkage between resource mobilization and effects on the ground, this book is a useful addition to the reading list. **PRISM**

